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Thesis Summary 
 
A “maverick firm” is one that behaves in a manner that differs from the industry norm. As 
a result they are perceived to present a barrier to tacit collusion and for that reason 
competition authorities can seek to prevent mergers that might result in their removal 
from a market. However, the existing literature on mavericks is limited. No formal theory 
exists and there is no established empirical method for identifying such firms.  
This thesis seeks to address these gaps. First, we begin to formulate a formal theory of 
mavericks via a repeated games model in which firms have contrasting preferences and 
asymmetric capacities. Then we analyse the use of the concept in European 
Commission merger cases during 2000-2013. Finally, we explore three strategies for 
empirical maverick identification. The first consists of a replication of the only previous 
attempt, which used simple regressions and a ranking system. The second utilises 
cointegration and error correction techniques. The third explores asymmetric error 
correction, applying the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) approach. 
These methods are used to identify the maverick in the market for bank and building 
society deposit accounts in the United Kingdom during 2000-2009. 
The theoretical model formally illustrates how a maverick can adversely impact non-
mavericks’ payoffs. However, we also highlight scenarios where collusion could occur 
despite the presence of a maverick. The analysis of EC merger cases highlights the fact 
that application of the concept has been inconsistent with merger guidelines. In 
particular, the term was regularly used in conjunction with unilateral effects whereas 
guidelines only relate the concept to tacit coordination. Finally, each of the identification 
strategies produces contrasting results. Ultimately, the NARDL approach allows the 
identification of favourable behaviours (from a consumer perspective). As a result we 
are able to identify the most likely candidate mavericks in our market. 
 
 
Key words: maverick firms, merger policy, tacit collusion, asymmetric error correction, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Competition policy1 can broadly be described as the set of laws and policies that are 
designed to ensure that firms do not act in ways that are detrimental to economic welfare. 
European competition policy can be more specifically subdivided into the regulation of 
horizontal and vertical agreements between firms (“Article 101” under European 
competition law), abuse of dominance (“Article 102”), and merger regulation. 
Competition authorities, such as the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in the UK 
and the European Commission (EC) in wider Europe, are there to enforce competition 
policy2. Their fundamental goal is to uphold economic efficiency. They wish to ensure 
that competition is effective and to deter and punish actions that have a detrimental effect 
on welfare (Motta, 2004). It is within this sphere that the work presented in this thesis 
resides. 
The focus of the thesis is merger policy. Competition authorities have the power to 
intervene in proposed mergers that are perceived to harm economic efficiency. To 
assess this they consider a wide array of factors. These include structural characteristics 
such as industry concentration, barriers to entry, symmetry and transparency, as well as 
factors such as market growth, the stage of the business cycle, and industry life cycles 
(Pepall, Richards and Norman, 2008). The sum of these factors captures the state of the 
market, or markets, that a given merger will impact. By considering how each of these 
factors would change following a given transaction, a competition authority is able to 
assess whether the merger is detrimental, acceptable, or requires some concessions 
(“remedies” or “commitments”) in order to be permissible. 
One factor that authorities consider is the possible impact of a “maverick firm”. A 
maverick is a firm that, for one reason or another, behaves in a manner that is different 
from the industry norm. A maverick may be particularly price aggressive, highly 
innovative, or produce a product of favourable quality. In terms of the former, they may 
offer consistently lower prices than their rivals, engage in favourable price-cutting, or 
show a reluctance to raise prices in line with their competitors (Baker, 2002). Irrespective 
of how their behaviour manifests itself, the crucial point is that some aspect of their 
behaviour differs from other firms in the market. Broadly, in terms of why mavericks 
behave differently, this could be due to differences in costs, for example, or simply 
                                                          
1 Otherwise known as “antitrust” in the United States. 
2 The Competition and Markets Authority was formerly known as the Competition Commission (CC). 
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managerial preference (Langenfeld, 1996)3. Proctor (2014) offers further specific 
explanations, including the desire to expand, the desire to improve the competitiveness 
of downstream operations, or to facilitate the growth of some new innovative product. 
Whatever the cause, mavericks are regarded as pro-competitive and are seen to impose 
a constraint on the actions of their rivals. Moreover, they are typically viewed as smaller 
players whose influence over rivals far exceeds their market share (Scheffman and 
Coleman, 2003; Breunig and Menezes, 2008). 
How, exactly, do mavericks constrain their rivals? In the literature the maverick concept 
is commonly related to coordination, otherwise known as tacit collusion. Collusion is 
where firms set prices cooperatively. Under collusion, rather than engaging in individual 
profit-maximisation, firms effectively joint profit-maximise and set a price that is higher 
than the competitive level (Tirole, 1988). Collusion can be overt (explicit) or tacit. Overt 
collusion is where firms communicate with one another in order to cooperatively set 
prices and divide a market. Tacit collusion is where firms achieve this without directly 
communicating. Instead, market signals lead firms to the simultaneous realisation that a 
particular outcome is beneficial to them (De La Mano, 2008). Whilst overt collusion is 
illegal, tacit is not; however, merger policy can be used to prevent the emergence of 
conditions that are conducive with coordination. Tacit collusion requires two conditions 
in order to be sustained. First, firms must be able to detect when a rival has deviated 
from a collusive arrangement – hence, greater transparency is advantageous. Second, 
they must be able to credibly retaliate or “punish” any deviation in order to encourage 
ongoing cooperation on the part of their rivals (Slade, 1987; Vasconcelos, 2005). Where 
these conditions are met it is possible for tacit collusion to arise.  
Tacit collusion is more likely to be achieved where a market is more symmetrical. Such 
markets have firms of similar sizes, with similar cost structures, and so on. As a result, 
firms’ incentives are better aligned and they are more likely to be able to reach a 
mutually-beneficial collusive arrangement (Ivaldi et al, 2003). Maverick firms act as a 
barrier to successful collusion because they represent a source of asymmetry. We have 
stated that a maverick is a (typically smaller) firm that behaves in a way that is different 
from its rivals. Such a firm might be disinclined to go along with tacit collusion because 
the conditions under which collusion would appeal to its rivals would not necessarily 
appeal to the maverick. Consequently, having such a firm in a market reduces the 
likelihood of tacit collusion (Kovacic et al, 2007; Sabbatini, 2014). 
                                                          
3 Carlton (2010) argued that authorities should distinguish between those firms that are maverick because of differences 
in economic conditions (costs, etc.) and those that are maverick due to managerial preference – and that only the former 
should be given special treatment under merger policy. 
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It follows that the loss of a maverick from a market is seen to increase the likelihood of 
collusion. Consequently, merger guidelines allow authorities to intervene in transactions 
that might result in their removal from a market or impinge upon their ability to fulfil the 
role of constraint. “The Agencies consider whether a merger may lessen competition by 
eliminating a ‘maverick’ firm, i.e., a firm that plays a disruptive role in the market to the 
benefit of customers” (DoJ and FTC, 2010, p.3)4. In merger guidelines, the removal of a 
maverick has long been perceived to increase the likelihood of “coordinated effects” 
arising from a merger5. Indeed, the maverick concept is present in most regions’ merger 
regulations, having first appeared in the United States merger guidelines in 19926. 
However, despite this, existing literature on the subject is relatively scant and only a 
handful of academic papers have been devoted to the topic. Moreover, it should be noted 
that despite its presence “…there is no direct and unambiguous definition, empirical or 
otherwise, for a ‘maverick’ firm in the Merger Guidelines” (Kovacic et al, 2009, p.401). 
Most existing maverick papers discuss the concept from a legal perspective (e.g. Baker, 
2002; Kolasky, 2002; Owings, 2013). Of these, Baker (2002) is by far the most detailed 
and widely-referenced paper to date, discussing the concept in terms of US antitrust. 
Baker outlined a number of avenues through which the maverick concept should be 
relevant in merger analysis, and discussed possible approaches to maverick 
identification, amongst other contributions7. There have been some attempts to relate 
the concept to economic theory (e.g. Kwoka, 1989; Ivaldi et al, 2003), though these 
studies have stopped short of producing a formal theory of mavericks. The issue of how 
to identify mavericks is particularly important to policymakers, and there have been a 
few attempts at empirical identification (Kovacic et al, 2007; Breunig and Menezes, 2008; 
Ivaldi, Mitraille and Muller, 2012). Finally, the maverick concept has arisen in some 
discussions of wider issues, for example Carlton (2010) considered the concept as part 
of a wider discussion of horizontal merger guidelines. We will elaborate on this literature 
throughout the thesis, as and when it becomes appropriate to do so. For now we simply 
emphasise that the literature on maverick firms is far from extensive. 
The lack of a formal theory of mavericks is a key gap in the literature. This gap is 
surprising given that the concept has been applied to merger cases of multi-million 
                                                          
4 Authorities assume that if a maverick merges with another firm, its behaviour will change post-merger since it “must 
take into consideration the interests of the group which it [then] belongs to.” (Sabbatini, 2014, p.3). Thus, authorities seek 
to prevent mergers where one of the notifying parties is believed to be a maverick. We will elaborate on this in due course. 
5 “Coordinated effects” is synonymous with tacit collusion. 
6 We will further discuss the wording of the term in merger guidelines in Chapter 3. 
7 We will discuss Baker (2002) in detail at various points throughout this thesis. 
4 
 
pound value8. One would like to believe that where a concept is used by authorities as 
part of their argument for preventing a significant transaction that the concept would be 
comprehensively researched and fully understood. However, the dearth of studies on 
the topic would seem to suggest otherwise. Thus, the absence of a formal theory is the 
first gap that this thesis hopes to address. Almost all papers agree that the presence of 
a maverick affects the likelihood of collusion, yet no studies have formally outlined how 
and why this is the case. The closest thing to a formal theory can be found in Ivaldi et al 
(2003), who provided an illustrative example of a maverick as part of a wider discussion 
of tacit collusion9. However, Ivaldi et al do not generalise or expand upon their model 
beyond their illustrative example. Thus, the first objective of this thesis is to contribute 
toward the development of a formal theory of maverick firms by expanding upon their 
work. 
A second gap in the literature is that whilst the maverick concept has been considered 
with respect to individual cases (such as Heineken/Scottish & Newcastle and 
Statoil/Topaz in Massey, 2010) no published academic work has analysed the practical 
use of the concept at an aggregate level. Lyons (2008) provides some analysis of the 
use of the term in cases, but this is far from comprehensive. The second objective of this 
thesis is therefore to analyse past use of the concept by the EC competition authority. 
We hope to establish the frequency with which the term is applied and whether its 
application is consistent with both theory and the wording of guidelines. We have reason 
to believe that authorities may apply the concept in ways that are inconsistent with 
guidelines. For example, Owings (2013) criticised US policymakers’ understanding of 
the concept, with reference to the cases of AT&T/T-Mobile and H&R Block/TaxACT. We 
are therefore interested in exploring the way the concept has been applied, so that we 
might better understand how it is perceived and whether its use in theory and practice 
can be reconciled.  
Finally, an issue which has been underexplored in the literature is the identification of 
maverick firms. Presently, their identification is usually achieved through qualitative 
reasoning10. Authorities apply their understanding of markets, combined with the views 
of market participants, in order to reason why a particular firm might be maverick. 
Following this, authorities sometimes apply econometric techniques to prove the 
“maverickness” of particular firms - though this is rarely done. Similarly, a couple of 
                                                          
8 Such as StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips (2008), T-Mobile/Orange (2010) and a host of other cases we will discuss 
throughout the thesis. 
9 This example is outlined in Chapter 2. 
10 This is something we confirm in Chapter 3. 
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academic papers have qualitatively identified potential mavericks and then tested their 
“maverickness” empirically (Kovacic et al, 2007; Ivaldi, Mitraille and Muller, 2012). 
However, to date only one paper has attempted to empirically identify a maverick without 
existing preconceptions regarding the likely identity of the party (Breunig and Menezes, 
2008). It would be desirable to develop such a method since this would remove 
subjectivity from maverick identification11. This is the third objective of this thesis. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 chronicles an attempt to develop a formal 
theory of maverick firms. We build upon Ivaldi et al (2003) via a repeated games model 
with asymmetric capacities. Chapter 3 analyses the use of the concept in European 
merger cases during the period 2000-2013. We produce some overall statistics on the 
population of cases and discuss three particularly interesting cases in more detail. 
Chapters 4-7 are then devoted to maverick identification. Chapter 4 outlines the dataset 
used; the market we consider is UK instant access deposit accounts, and the dataset is 
composed of individual banks’ interest rates. Chapter 5 consists of a replication of the 
methods used in the only objective empirical identification paper to date, that of Breunig 
and Menezes (2008). We begin with a replication in order to appreciate the sentiments 
behind the only previous attempt, and to observe precisely the reasons why that attempt 
was unsuccessful. In Chapter 6 we develop our first original attempt, using error 
correction models and cointegration analysis. This is inspired by the methods commonly 
used to analyse markets such as ours. Chapter 7 then improves upon this by considering 
asymmetric cointegration; we propose and test an approach to maverick identification 
using the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) approach. This is inspired 
by the apparent significance of asymmetry in the maverick literature. Finally, Chapter 8 
concludes by discussing the implications of findings and outlines areas for further work. 
  
                                                          
11 The present mode of identification is open to abuse. For instance, a merging party may wish to portray itself as non-
maverick to ensure a merger would be allowed, or an outside third party may wish to portray a merging party as maverick 
so it would not. 
6 
 
Chapter 2: A Repeated Games Model of Maverick Firms 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As we outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the existing literature on mavericks is 
limited. Papers tend to be discursive in nature and focus on the legal position of 
competition authorities (e.g. Kolasky, 2002; Owings, 2013) or refer to the concept in 
conjunction with particular merger cases (e.g. Kovacic et al, 2007; Massey, 2010). 
However, crucially, the literature has not yet produced a formal theory depicting maverick 
behaviour. This chapter seeks to at least begin to address this gap through the 
development of a repeated games model of maverick firms. Our objectives are to show 
formally how the presence of a maverick impacts the chances of tacit collusion arising 
in a market, to highlight scenarios where mavericks genuinely constrain their rivals, and 
to consider the impact to non-mavericks’ profits in such scenarios. Overall, we aim to 
consider the appropriateness of preventing mergers that might remove a maverick from 
a market. Can we show, clearly, how and under what circumstances the removal of a 
maverick would have a significant impact on competition and when it would not? 
In order to produce a formal theory it is first appropriate to consider what makes a firm 
behave in a maverick way. We have stated that maverick firms behave in a manner that 
is contrary to the industry norm by either charging a lower price, innovating to a greater 
extent, or producing a product of higher quality than their rivals (Baker, 2002). In terms 
of what causes this behaviour, we take the view that maverick behaviour is a rational 
response to some difference in the underlying conditions faced by a firm12. To this end, 
the literature suggests a few different explanations. Firstly, it could be due to the firm 
having a drastically different production capacity or cost structure to its rivals (Scheffman 
and Coleman, 2003; Proctor, 2014)13. Alternatively a firm may use (and be influenced by 
the price of) some input that its rivals do not, or may utilise common inputs to different 
extents, resulting in changes in input prices having a different effect on the maverick 
firm. Finally, it may be that a firm simply has a stronger preference for short-term payoffs 
than its rivals, due to its stage of development or individual circumstances (Ivaldi et al, 
2003). Each of these represents a possible explanation for why a maverick firm might 
                                                          
12 We conform to the view that “A maverick is not a wild firm that is out of control but one whose economic incentives 
make it an aggressive competitor” (Carlton, 2010, p.622). This is as opposed to Langenfeld (1996), for example, who 
discussed maverick behaviour possibly being attributable to managerial preference or whim. 
13 Proctor (2014) stresses that mavericks usually have low variable or (occasionally) fixed costs. 
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adopt a different strategy to its competitors. Therefore, each and any of these could 
potentially provide the basis for our model.  
In the literature the closest thing to a formal theory of mavericks comes from Ivaldi et al 
(2003), who provided a simple mathematical example of a maverick firm. Ivaldi et al 
distinguished between mavericks and non-mavericks on the basis of their preferences 
over current and future payoffs. This was achieved using discount factors. Discount 
factors are effectively a measure of firm patience; they capture firms’ preferences over 
current and future income streams, and range from zero to one. A discount factor of one 
represents the case where a firm values current and future income equally. For instance, 
a firm with a discount of one would be indifferent between receiving £1000 today or 
£1000 tomorrow. As a firm’s discount factor tends to zero they become less and less 
patient. The closer it is to zero, the more they prefer receiving income in the present. 
Ivaldi et al (2003) portrayed the maverick as having a lower discount factor than its 
rivals14. The result of this is that the maverick is less inclined to collude. Collusion 
involves cooperating to charge higher-than-competitive prices and sustain higher 
payoffs over time. The alternative (deviation from a collusive arrangement by charging 
a lower price) is typically modelled as one large payoff in the present followed by lower 
payoffs over time. This is because by “cheating” and deviating from a collusive 
arrangement the deviator is able to enjoy one period in which they “steal the market” and 
receive a boost in custom, after which rival firms respond and lower their own prices 
(“retaliation” or “punishment”). Hence, in subsequent periods the deviator loses custom 
and payoffs decrease (De La Mano, 2008a; Harrington, 2015). The more patient a firm 
is, the more likely it will favour collusion. The less patient a firm is, the more likely the 
one-off payoff from deviation would be appealing. Thus, by assigning a lower discount 
factor to the maverick, Ivaldi et al model that party as being less inclined to collude than 
its rivals. 
Ivaldi et al (2003) give a simple example of a triopoly. Suppose that two firms have the 
same discount factor, whilst the third (the maverick) has a lower discount. Ivaldi et al 
denote non-maverick firms’ discount factors as δ and that of the maverick as δ’, such 
that δ > 2/3 and δ’ < 2/3. It is assumed that if they were to collude then the three firms 
would share collusive market profits equally in each period. If any one firm decided to 
deviate away from the collusive arrangement then that firm would capture the entire 
                                                          
14 This portrayal is both intuitive and consistent with merger guidelines. For example, take new entrants. New entrants to 
a market are often perceived as likely mavericks (Tucker and Sayyed, 2006; Proctor, 2014). Such firms might favour 
short-term profits since their long-term survival may be uncertain. As a result, they would naturally be less patient. 
8 
 
market profit for one period, after which a lower payoff would be received by all15. Firms 
cannot trust one another following deviation and the breakdown of collusion. Ivaldi et al 
assume that following deviation payoffs would equal zero forever16. They assume a “grim 
strategy” (Harrington, 2015). 
In order for collusion to occur, the payoff to cooperation must exceed the payoff to 
deviation for all firms. Let πc denote collusive market profit and α denote market share, 
such that ∑αi = 1, where i=1,2,3. If a firm deviates they receive πc in the first instance 
followed by zero forever, whereas if collusion is achieved πc is shared according to α. 
Thus, for an individual firm to wish to collude then the following condition must be 
satisfied: α(πc/1-δ) ≥ πc+δ(0), or α(πc/1-δ) ≥ πc. This term includes the discounting of 
future payoffs through the discount factor.  
If the three firms were symmetrical then a collusive outcome with equal market shares 
(α = 1/3) would arise. However, because of the maverick’s lower discount factor this 
outcome is unsustainable. Specifically, Ivaldi et al (2003) demonstrate that in order for 
the non-mavericks to be willing to collude given their imposed discount factor (δ > 2/3) 
they must be allocated a collusive market share of at least 1- δ17. Then, supposing that 
non-mavericks received this market share, Ivaldi et al calculated the share left over for 
the maverick and showed that the firm would not be willing to collude at that level. If non-
mavericks had market shares equal to 1- δ, the maverick would be left with α’ = 1-2α = 
1-[2(1- δ)]. For the maverick to favour collusion with this market share, its discount factor 
would have to be at least 2/3. Yet by construction its discount is below this level (δ’ < 
2/3). Thus, Ivaldi et al show that collusion is unsustainable where there is a firm with a 
significantly lower discount rate than its rivals18. Effectively, the presence of a maverick 
constrains the ability of firms to achieve coordination. 
Ivaldi et al’s (2003) model is consistent with Baker (2002). Baker outlined four conditions 
under which a maverick would be able to constrain coordination. These are (i) where 
there is a diminished capacity for rivals to punish deviation by any one firm, (ii) where 
rents cannot be allocated satisfactorily amongst firms, (iii) where uncertainty over rivals’ 
strategies makes deviation hard to detect, and (iv) where the joint profit-maximising 
                                                          
15 This lower payoff could be a result of reverting to competition or due to punishment levied on the deviating firm. 
16 This is in line with, for example, the competitive equilibrium where firms compete according to Bertrand competition. 
In a Bertrand setting, if a firm were to deviate from a collusive arrangement then they would revert to competition, which 
is where price equals cost and profit is zero, i.e. the Bertrand paradox (Tirole, 1988).  
17 Note that this is derived from solving the inequality α(πc/1- δ) ≥ πc for α. 
18 Their illustrative example is grounded in reality. For instance, Fershtman and Pakes (2000) give real-world examples 
of situations where one firm in a market would prefer to deviate whilst their rivals would prefer to collude.   
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outcome is hard to identify19. Whilst the four conditions are not insurmountable they 
“make it likely that incomplete coordination will be constrained by a maverick firm” 
(Baker, 2002, p.166). Collusion can only be sustained where the long-term gain from 
cooperating exceeds any short-term gain from deviating combined with whatever 
punishment rivals may levy. If we accept Ivaldi et al’s idea of assigning a lower discount 
to the maverick, this would mean that they value the long-term gains from cooperation 
lower, and short-term gains from deviation higher, than their rivals. Therefore in order 
for them to collude they must be allocated a larger portion of the market than their rivals, 
making condition (ii) an issue. Moreover, they would be less concerned with the prospect 
of punishment than would a regular firm, making it harder for rivals to retaliate (i). Finally, 
their unusual strategy makes rivals uncertain over both what the joint-profit-maximising 
outcome might be (iv) and, should it be established and implemented, whether the 
maverick has deviated from it (iii). Thus, Ivaldi et al’s simple model is consistent with the 
conditions Baker (2002) outlines in his key maverick paper. 
As the closest thing to a formal theory and a seemingly accurate example of a maverick 
firm from a theoretical point of view, it makes sense for us to develop our model using 
Ivaldi et al (2003) as a basis. Hence, this chapter builds upon the idea that discount 
factors can be used to distinguish between mavericks and non-mavericks. One 
adaptation we make is to incorporate size into our model. Mavericks are typically viewed 
as smaller firms whose influence is greater than their market share would suggest 
(Scheffman and Coleman, 2003). In order to allow for this we allow capacities to differ 
across firms. We are then able to model the maverick as a firm with a smaller capacity 
than its rivals. Specifically, we build a repeated games model in which firms differ in the 
extent to which they are capacity constrained. This is in the spirit of Compte, Jenny and 
Rey (2002). 
Compte et al (2002) presented a repeated games model in which firms each had different 
production capacities but common discount factors (δ). They sought to explore for which 
values of the common discount factor tacit collusion could be achieved. In general, as 
we have stated, collusion is sustainable where the value of coordination exceeds the 
value of deviation for all firms20. Thus Compte et al sought to establish how high this 
common discount needed to be in order for collusion to be sustainable. What they found 
was that larger firms required higher discount factors. Therefore, given that they 
stipulated the discount be common across firms, this meant that the level required for 
                                                          
19 Broadly, (ii) and (iv) correspond to difficulties in reaching consensus over a collusive arrangement whilst (i) and (iii) 
relate to the deterrence of cheating. 
20 We assume at all times that firms are rational and that they would only choose Action A over Action B if the payoff to 
Action A were greater. 
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collusion depended on the capacity of the largest firm (kL). Specifically, they found that 
this critical discount factor (δ*) was equal to the ratio of the largest firm’s capacity to the 
overall capacity in the market (kL/K). For actual discount factors above this level all firms 
favour the discounted stream of profits from colluding to the one-off gain from deviating 
(followed by punishment). 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents our basic model. Section 2.3 
outlines a specific example, and identifies cases in which collusion could be sustained 
despite the presence of a maverick. Section 2.4 then considers partial collusion – the 
case where non-mavericks omit the maverick from their collusive activities. We consider 
whether it is ever optimal for firms to do so. Moreover, if full collusion with the maverick 
is impossible we consider the impact this has on firm profits. Finally, Section 2.5 
summarises the findings of the chapter, outlines areas for further extension, and 
motivates the subsequent chapters. 
 
2.2 Model 
In order to explore the implications of the presence of a maverick, here we use a Compte 
et al (2002) style framework to extend the ideas of Ivaldi et al (2003). As in Compte et al 
we assume that firms have asymmetric capacities. By doing so, we are able to model 
the maverick as a smaller firm, just as the party is depicted in the literature. As in Compte 
et al we also assume for simplicity that costs are zero and the product is homogenous. 
However, unlike that paper, we allow discount factors to vary across firms in the spirit of 
Harrington (1989). By doing so, we are able to incorporate the maverick concept into the 
model. Ivaldi et al (2003) portrayed the maverick as a firm with a much lower discount 
rate than its rivals. Along similar lines, we model the party as a firm that has a lower 
discount rate than the critical level necessary for collusion. We will explain this subtle 
difference in due course. 
We derive our model as follows. Let ki denote the capacity of firm i, K denote the capacity 
of all firms (∑ki) and K − i denote the capacity of all firms ∑kj where j ≠ i. Firms produce a 
homogenous product. With regard to demand, for simplicity we assume that there is a 
population of M buyers and that each buyer will purchase one unit of the good from the 
cheapest seller so long as the price is below their reservation value, which we denote 
by r. We assume that demand is perfectly inelastic; the amount that will be bought does 
not vary with price. Further assume that K > M > K − i for all i. The first part of this, K > M, 
ensures that competition is effective and firms do not just charge the monopoly price (r). 
The fact that M > K − i meanwhile ensures that no subset of firms can serve the whole 
11 
 
market; all firms must be involved in order to fully satisfy market demand. Finally, with 
regard to discount factors, let δ̂i denote the actual discount factor of firm i. 
If firms collude they charge a price equal to the reservation price, r, and sell a portion of 
demand M. We assume that at equal prices demand is divided according to a 
proportional rule; that is, proportionate to capacity21. If a firm deviates from the collusive 
agreement, it is optimal for the deviator to undercut its rivals and charge a price equal to 
(r - ϵ), where ϵ is some infinitesimally small value. By charging just under the collusive 
price, firms maximise their gains in the case of deviation. When a firm undercuts they 
are able to sell their full capacity ki for one period, after which their rivals will retaliate. 
We assume that retaliation takes the form of a grim punishment strategy in which firms 
revert to the static Bertrand-Nash equilibrium forever (“Bertrand-Nash Punishments”)22. 
Bertrand-Nash punishments in this context are derived as follows. The largest firm, firm 
l, can guarantee itself a profit of r(M − K − l) by charging the reservation price, since the 
maximum its rivals can produce is K − l, their combined capacity. Therefore firm l would 
not charge a price that yields a payoff lower than this amount; the minimum price firm l 
would ever charge is pmin = r(M − K − l) / kl. Since M > K − l, smaller firms (i < l) can then 
sell to full capacity by slightly undercutting pmin. It follows that the Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium will be in mixed strategies23, with each firm making a profit of pminki = [r(M − 
K − l) / kl]ki. 
Based on the above, we can derive expressions for the payoffs to collusion, deviation 
and during punishment. Let Πc denote the collusive profit, Πd the one-period profit from 
deviating, and Πp the profit during the punishment phase: 
  (2.1) 
  (2.2) 
 (2.3) 
                                                          
21 This is as in Compte et al (2002). 
22 This also constitutes the optimal punishment under the proportional rule for allocating demand amongst equal price 
firms (Compte et al, 2002). 
23 See Fonseca and Normann (2008) for further detail. 
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Firms will choose to collude if the discounted value of collusion (2.1) exceeds the payoff 
to deviation (2.2) plus the payoff during the subsequent retaliation (2.3). Firms will 
therefore be willing to collude if Πc ≥ Πd + Πp, i.e. where: 
  (2.4) 
Normalising r = 1 and exploiting the fact that (r − ϵ) ≃ r, we see that collusion is 
sustainable if: 
  (2.5) 
In order for collusion to be sustainable this inequality (2.5) must be satisfied for all i. Note 
that for the largest firm this simplifies to: 
  (2.6) 
Let δ*i denote the “critical discount factor” required for firm i to favour collusion over 
deviation. Given this setup, it can be shown that each firm’s critical discount factor 
depends on the capacity of the largest firm. Specifically, we find that δ* = kl/K24. In other 
words, we find that, as in Compte et al (2002), collusion may be sustained provided that 
each firm’s discount factor is greater than or equal to the proportion of the largest firm’s 
capacity relative to total capacity. 
 
2.3 A Specific Example 
We have outlined the parameters of our model. We will now employ a specific example 
in order to demonstrate the impact of the presence of a maverick firm. Consider a triopoly 
with firms whose capacities are k1 = 5, k2 = 4, and k3 = 3 such that industry capacity, K, 
equals 12. Suppose there is a population of M consumers and that M = 1025. Each of 
these consumers buys one unit of the good, which they will buy from the lowest price 
firm given the assumption of product homogeneity. Note that the critical discount factor 
in this case is δ* = kl/K = 5/12 (0.417) for all three firms. Collusion would be sustainable 
if all firms had an actual discount factor that exceeded this critical discount factor (δ̂i ≥ 
δ*). In other words, collusion is possible where δ̂i ≥ 0.417 for i = 1,2,3. 
                                                          
24 This is derived in Appendix A. 
25 Importantly, by construction the numbers satisfy the condition K > M > K − i for all i. 
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However, suppose that Firm 3 is the maverick, having an actual discount factor that is 
below the critical level needed for collusion, δ̂3 < δ*. In other words, suppose Firm 3 
prefers current profits over future profits (for whatever reason) and consequently this 
gives them an aversion to collusion. In such a case, by construction the value of deviation 
would exceed the value of collusion for Firm 3. Given the assumption that each firm 
satisfies an amount of total industry demand that is proportionate to their capacity, the 
firm would not be willing to collude and would instead choose to deviate. Based on this, 
we can immediately see how the presence of an impatient maverick would act as a 
barrier to successful collusion. So far, this is consistent with Ivaldi et al (2003). 
Next, let us consider whether there are circumstances in which the maverick could be 
encouraged to collude. In order to incentivise cooperation from Firm 3, the firm would 
have to be assigned a greater portion of the collusive market. In other words, they would 
have to receive a more-than-proportionate share of the demand at the collusive price. 
Recall the condition for collusion (2.5):  
  (2.5) 
The term ki/K on the left hand side captures collusive market share; it is the portion of 
demand that firm i receives when it is divided according to the proportional rule. Let us 
redefine this as αi. To incentivise Firm 3 to collude given their low discount factor, α3 
must increase to a level where the inequality tilts in favour of collusion. In other words, 
market share α3 must no longer equal k3/K; it must exceed this level in order for the 
maverick firm to favour collusion. 
To see this more clearly, let us assign a value to Firm 3’s discount factor. Initially, 
suppose the firm has an actual discount equal to δ̂3 = 1/12, or 0.083. This represents a 
case where the maverick is extremely averse to collusion since this value is considerably 
lower than the critical level26. With this level of impatience we can compute the market 
share the firm would have to receive in order for it to be willing to collude. By inputting 
the values of the specific example we find that for a discount factor of 0.083 Firm 3 must 
receive a collusive market share of 0.290. By contrast, under the proportional rule, Firm 
3’s market share would be 3/12, or 0.250. Let us term the proportionate example the 
“base case”. From this we can see that in order to be incentivised to collude a maverick 
with a discount factor of 0.083 would require 0.04 of market share above what was 
required in the base case. Choosing to collude rather than deviate is analogous with 
                                                          
26 Later, we consider lesser degrees of maverickness by imposing values of δ̂3 that are higher than 1/12 but which are 
still below the critical level. 
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choosing long-run payoffs over short-term ones and so the additional market share is 
needed in order to overcome the firm’s preference for short-term payoffs. 
Clearly, if collusion is to occur this additional amount of market share (0.04) must be 
taken away from other firms in the market. Under what circumstances is this possible? 
For this to be possible, the other firms must be willing to collude with a market share 
lower than their proportional amount. Theoretically, this would then allow them to give 
additional market share to the maverick and still prefer to collude themselves. 
Another way to look at it is that there needs to be “slack” in the incentive conditions of 
one or both of the non-mavericks; one or both of the non-mavericks needs to have an 
actual discount factor that is strictly greater than their critical value. If δ̂1 = δ* and δ̂2 = δ* 
while δ̂3 < δ* then collusion would not be sustainable. In such a case, Firm 1 and 2’s 
respective discounts would be just high enough for them to be willing to collude with a 
proportional market share but they would not be willing to give up some of their custom 
and still favour collusion. In such a scenario there would therefore be no scope for 
mutually beneficial coordination and the maverick would indeed present an effective 
barrier to collusion, as is suggested in the literature. 
However, within our triopolistic setup we can demonstrate three broad hypothetical 
scenarios in which collusion could occur. These are: (i) where Firm 1 has sufficient slack 
in its incentive condition to unilaterally provide the maverick the necessary additional 
market share, (ii) where Firm 2 has sufficient slack to do so, and (iii) where both have 
some slack and could jointly sacrifice the necessary market share in some configuration. 
In the next few subsections we consider each of these in turn, demonstrating each 
scenario in the context of our specific example. 
 
2.3.1 Scenario One: where δ̂1 > δ* but δ̂2 = δ* 
First, consider the case where δ̂1 > δ* but δ̂2 = δ*, i.e. where there is slack in Firm 1’s 
incentive condition but where Firm 2’s discount is only just high enough for them to be 
willing to collude with a proportionate market share. If collusion is to be achieved in this 
scenario, we can immediately state that any movement away from the proportionate 
arrangement will involve a transfer of market share from Firm 1 to Firm 3 with no change 
in Firm 2’s share of the collusive market. This is because if Firm 2 received a lower share 
then they would rationally choose to deviate and so collusion would break down. We 
therefore turn our attention to considering how high Firm 1’s discount rate needs to be 
in order for them to be able to give up the necessary 0.04 of market share to Firm 3. 
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Under the proportional rule Firm 1 would be assigned a collusive market share of 5/12, 
or 0.417. Therefore, in order for them to be willing to give up 0.04 of market share to the 
maverick they must be willing to collude with a lower market share (0.377). We are 
therefore interested in finding the minimum level of δ̂1 for which they would be willing to 
settle for a market share of 0.377. Specifically, Firm 1, the largest firm, is willing to collude 
if: 
  (2.7) 
By imposing the market share α1 = 0.377 and the values of our specific example, we can 
compute how high δ̂1 would need to be for successful collusion in this scenario. Doing 
so yields a value of 0.61527. Recall that the critical discount was 5/12, or 0.417. From 
this we can see that Firm 1 would have to be considerably more patient than this 
benchmark in order to accommodate Firm 3; their discount factor would have to be 0.198 
greater than it would need to be in order to achieve collusion in the absence of the 
maverick28.  
 
2.3.2 Scenario Two: where δ̂1 = δ* but δ̂2 > δ* 
A similar approach can be applied to the case where δ̂1 = δ* but δ̂2 > δ*, i.e. where Firm 
2 is the only non-maverick with slack in its incentive condition. In this case, the non-
maverick with slack is not the largest firm, and so the collusion-deviation inequality takes 
the form: 
  (2.8) 
We are nonetheless similarly able to identify how high Firm 2’s discount factor would 
need to be in order to unilaterally sacrifice the necessary market share required to 
encourage the maverick to collude. Under the proportional rule, Firm 2 would be 
assigned a collusive market share of 4/12 or 0.333. Therefore, in order to give up 0.04 
to the maverick and still be willing to collude, Firm 2 must possess a discount factor 
under which collusion is preferred with a collusive market share is just 0.293. 
                                                          
27 Note that for higher values of δ̂1 Firm 1 would be willing to collude with a lower share than 0.377. 
28 It is noteworthy that the degree to which the non-maverick’s discount factor needs to be above the critical level is less 
than the degree to which the maverick’s was below it. In this specific example we imposed a discount factor of 0.083 on 
Firm 3, a value which is 0.334 lower than the critical level of 0.417. Yet the non-maverick’s discount factor only needs to 
be 0.198 greater that this level. Hence the necessary “aggregate level of patience” in the market is actually lower than 
the case where each firm has δ̂i = δ
*.  
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As in Scenario One, we can calculate how high δ̂2 would need to be by imposing α2 = 
0.293. Doing so yields a value of 0.669. Again, if we compare this to the critical discount 
factor of 0.417 we see that in this scenario Firm 2’s discount would need to be 0.252 
greater than this level. This figure is higher than in Scenario One. From this we note that 
whilst collusion is possible if any non-maverick is sufficiently patient, it is easier to 
achieve where it is the largest firm that has more patience. 
 
2.3.3 Scenario Three: δ̂1 > δ* and δ̂2 > δ*  
So far we have considered cases where only one of the non-mavericks has slack in their 
incentive condition. Next we consider the case where both have slack, i.e. where both 
δ̂1 > δ* and δ̂2 > δ*. In such a scenario, both firms would be able to sacrifice some market 
share in order to achieve full collusion. As above, let the maverick third firm have an 
actual discount that is equal to δ̂3 = 0.083, requiring a market share transfer of 0.04 to 
encourage them to collude. In the base case, by the proportional rule, Firm 1 and 2’s 
combined market share would be 0.75. Thus, in order for the maverick to receive an 
additional 0.04, Firm 1 and 2’s respective discount factors must be such that they have 
a combined market share of 0.71 but still both favour collusion. Then, between them they 
can transfer the necessary market share required in order to encourage Firm 3 to 
collude. 
Clearly, there are different ways in which the transfer of market share to the maverick 
could be divided between the non-mavericks. The two extreme options are portrayed in 
Scenarios One and Two. Between these two extremes, in principle we have a continuum 
of possibilities whereby the non-mavericks supply different proportions of the required 
transfer. However, if we restrict market share to units of 0.01, we can conceive of three 
possibilities in addition to the two extremes. These are where Firms 1 and 2 each provide 
half of the required transfer, where Firm 1 provides three quarters whilst Firm 2 provides 
a quarter, and where Firm 2 provides three quarters whilst Firm 1 provides a quarter. 
The level of actual discount factor required for each of the two firms in each of the five 
eventualities is summarised in Table 2.1. Figure 2.1 shows the difference in required 
discount factor for Firm 1 and Firm 2, according to the transfer they are required to 
make29. Figure 2.1 clearly demonstrates that the larger firm does not require as high a 
discount factor as its rival. 
                                                          
29 Obviously, in any scenario the full transfer of 0.04 is being made, and so if Firm 1 is transferring 0 then Firm 2 must 
transfer 0.04 and so on. 
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Table 2.1: Required discount factors to facilitate collusion 
Transfer 
given by 
Firm 1 
Transfer 
given by 
Firm 2 
Firm 1’s 
required 
discount factor 
Firm 2’s 
required 
discount factor 
Notes 
0.04 0 0.615 0.417 “Scenario One” 
0.03 0.01 0.565 0.482  
0.02 0.02 0.515 0.544  
0.01 0.03 0.465 0.607  
0 0.04 0.417 0.669 “Scenario Two” 
 
 
It is clear that the presence of a maverick need not necessarily rule out collusion. Table 
2.1 depicted several scenarios in which the maverick firm could theoretically be 
accommodated, provided that other firms in the market were sufficiently patient. 
However, in the event of both non-mavericks having slack in their incentive condition it 
is not immediately obvious which of these intermediate outcomes would arise. More 
generally, it is not obvious how market share would be transferred to the maverick; recall 
that we are operating in the realm of tacit collusion with no communication between 
firms. Thus, the presence of the maverick at least makes collusion more difficult to 
achieve. The need for reorganisations of market share makes the success of collusion 
less likely. We will further discuss these points in Section 2.4. 
 
2.3.4 Degrees of Maverickness 
In the three scenarios we outlined above we imposed a discount factor of 1/12, or 0.083, 
upon the maverick. This was an arbitrary value. In fact, we could capture maverick 
behaviour with any discount rate that satisfied the inequality δ̂3 < δ*. As a result, Table 
0.417
0.465
0.515
0.565
0.615
0.482
0.544
0.607
0.669
0.400
0.450
0.500
0.550
0.600
0.650
0.700
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Figure 2.1: The required discount factors of the two 
non-mavericks, subject to their level of transfer
Firm 1’s required discount factor Firm 2’s required discount factor
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2.2 below presents alternative results for hypothetical mavericks with different degrees 
of impatience. The table shows the discount factor Firms 1 and 2 would have to possess 
in order to unilaterally transfer market share to a maverick Firm 3 that has a discount 
rate of 2/12, 3/12 and 4/12, as well as the 1/12 case. Note that all of these possibilities 
are all under the critical discount level, 5/12. 
Table 2.2: Required discount factors to facilitate collusion with mavericks of 
varying impatience 
Maverick’s 
discount factor 
(δ3̂) 
Required 
transfer 
Firm 1’s required 
discount factor 
(Scenario One) 
Firm 2’s required 
discount factor 
(Scenario Two) 
0.083 0.04 0.615 0.669 
0.167 0.03 0.565 0.606 
0.250 0.02 0.515 0.545 
0.333 0.01 0.465 0.481 
 
We could similarly compute values for each of the three additional eventualities outlined 
in Scenario Three. 
 
2.4 Partial Collusion 
We have outlined scenarios in which collusion could hypothetically occur despite the 
presence of a maverick firm. However, as we have mentioned, successful collusion in 
these cases requires not only greater patience among non-mavericks but also the 
capacity to “transfer” market share amongst firms; in other words an ability to collude 
with market shares that differ from the proportionate distribution. Given that we are 
operating in the context of tacit collusion where there is no explicit communication 
between firms such a redistribution of market share may be difficult to achieve. A 
proportionate distribution may be intuitive because it is ‘focal’, however it is less clear 
how alternative arrangements would arise (Leahy and Pavelin, 2003). Whether such 
alternative allocations of market share are possible would vary from market to market. 
In some contexts other divisions of market share may be obvious to firms, but this would 
depend on the specific dynamics of a given market. 
Rather than engage in full collusion (involving all firms), an alternative possibility is that 
non-mavericks engage in partial collusion (also known as “semicollusion”) without the 
maverick. This would effectively involve “ignoring” the maverick firm, allowing it to 
produce to its full capacity and then colluding over the residual demand. Intuitively, non-
mavericks may wish to consider this possibility where the maverick presented too great 
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a barrier to coordination; in other words, in cases where the transfer of market share 
proved impossible to administer or where the maverick was insurmountably averse to 
collusion. Indeed, in the latter, omitting the party from collusive activities may be the only 
possibility available to would-be colluding non-mavericks. 
Where full collusion is rendered impossible, it is interesting to analyse the impact of being 
limited to partial collusion on non-mavericks’ payoffs. By doing so we are able to quantify 
the impact a maverick would have on its rivals. The greater the impact, the more likely a 
non-maverick would conceivably wish to acquire a maverick and remove them from the 
market, as merger guidelines suggest. 
Engaging in partial collusion would clearly decrease the amount of demand faced by 
non-mavericks. In terms of the specific 3-firm example depicted earlier this would 
amount to colluding over M − k3. In more general terms this would be M − m, where 
subscript m denotes the maverick. The firms involved in partial collusion would have a 
total capacity of K − m. 
Importantly, firms’ critical discount factors for partial collusion differ from those for full 
collusion. Recall that by “critical discount” we refer to the level of discount above which 
collusion gives a greater payoff than deviation. For full collusion the critical level was δ* 
= kl / K. In the case of partial collusion, the critical discount factor is given by30: 
  (2.9) 
Note that this again depends on the capacity of the largest firm, this time in relation to 
the total capacity of the semicolluding firms. Recall that in our specific example the three 
firms’ capacities were k1 = 5, k2 = 4, and k3 = 3. If we again assume that the maverick is 
the smaller firm, Firm 3, we find that the critical discount factor required for Firms 1 and 
2 to engage in partial collusion is 5/9, or 0.556. This is in comparison to the full collusion 
critical discount of 0.417. It is immediately apparent that this difference in the critical level 
will be of significance, since there will be a number of discount factor combinations for 
which full collusion yields a higher payoff than deviation but where partial collusion does 
not. This is because it will always be true that δ*pc > δ*.  
Consider the following inequality: 
                                                          
30 The derivation of this is shown in Appendix B. 
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  (2.10) 
For all actual discount factors that satisfy this inequality, we can immediately state that 
non-maverick i would favour full collusion over partial collusion, provided that transfers 
of market share could be made in order to incentivise the maverick to collude. Where 
such transfers proved impossible, partial collusion would not arise since in this example 
uncooperative behaviour (deviation) would provide a higher payoff to the partial option. 
Next, consider the inequality: 
  (2.11) 
In cases where this inequality is satisfied, both forms of collusion would be preferred to 
deviation. In such cases, it is intuitive that full collusion would be preferred over partial. 
To appreciate why this is the case, note that one can essentially think of partial collusion 
as “full collusion with maximal transfers”. By this it is meant that, under partial collusion, 
non-mavericks essentially surrender the maximum amount of market share to the 
maverick (up to its full capacity). In other words, ignoring the maverick and allowing it to 
produce to its full capacity is akin to making a transfer so large that the portion of the 
collusive market assigned to the maverick equates to their full capacity. Clearly, if it is 
possible for firms to achieve coordination whilst sacrificing a smaller amount of market 
share then they will of course regard this as preferable31. 
 
2.4.1 The “Transfer” of Market Share 
Before considering which collusive alternative non-mavericks would prefer and under 
what circumstances, it is worthwhile defining more clearly the “transfer” of market share 
that needs to occur in order to encourage a maverick to participate in collusion. Let us 
denote this as T. Clearly, the amount of market share a non-maverick must sacrifice 
impacts upon the attractiveness of full collusion. The more they have to transfer to the 
maverick, the greater the decrease in their collusive payoff. 
                                                          
31 Note that it is possible for some subset of non-mavericks to receive a higher payoff from partial collusion but that this 
can never be true for all non-mavericks. The relative attractiveness of the two collusive alternatives depends on how 
much market share a particular firm has to give up. In the case of partial collusion, firms would give up a proportional 
share of the maximal transfer. Accordingly, it is intuitive that a higher payoff would be received where full collusion could 
be achieved whilst giving less than a proportional share. However, if one non-maverick were transferring less than their 
proportional share then some other must be transferring more. It follows that partial collusion will never yield a higher 
aggregate payoff to non-mavericks than full collusion with transfers (though the two could be equal). 
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We can describe, in general terms, the size of T. It is simplest to consider this from the 
maverick’s perspective. Given that they receive this transfer upon colluding, the 
maverick will collude if: 
  (2.12) 
In other words, the maverick favours coordination if the extra amount of market share T 
tilts the inequality in favour of the left hand side term. We can solve (2.12) for T in order 
to derive the size of the transfer needed to sustain full collusion. Doing so yields32: 
  (2.13) 
Where (2.13) holds with equality we have the minimum transfer of market share that 
could sustain collusion33.  
Recall that under Nash punishments the critical discount factor required for collusion is 
equal to the capacity of the largest firm relative to total capacity. From the expression for 
T given above, it follows that as δ̂m → δ* we find that T = 0. In other words, when the 
maverick’s actual discount factor is at the critical level no transfer is required. This is by 
construction. If δ̂m = δ* then firm m would not be a maverick in the sense that we have 
defined; they would not have an actual δ below the level needed for collusion and would 
therefore present no barrier to coordination. By definition, δ* is the discount factor level 
at which collusion (absent any transfers) yields a higher payoff than the one-shot gain 
from deviation followed by punishment. Hence where the smallest firm’s discount is 
equal to the critical level, we have a required transfer of zero and no maverick problem.  
As δ̂m → 0, we find that: 
  (2.14) 
A discount factor of δ̂m = 0 would represent the extreme case where firm m places no 
value on future payoffs whatsoever. As a result, as the maverick’s actual discount tends 
to zero the maximal transfer is required; their market share in the present period must 
equal their full capacity. When δ̂m = 0, in order to achieve full collusion non-mavericks 
would have to give a transfer of a level such that the maverick again sells its full capacity; 
                                                          
32 The derivation of this is shown in Appendix C. 
33 Importantly, T is the total transfer (i.e. the sum of the market shares that non-mavericks must collectively sacrifice), not 
the transfer that each firm would have to give. 
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this is what we earlier referred to as full collusion with maximal transfers. It is easy to 
see how this is comparable to partial collusion. 
 
2.4.2 Full versus Partial Collusion 
We have explained that partial collusion will never be preferable to full collusion for all 
non-mavericks. It is intuitive that non-mavericks would always prefer to achieve full 
collusion whilst giving up some amount of market share lower than the maximal transfer, 
as opposed to allowing the maverick to sell its capacity and colluding over the residual. 
However, here we seek to formalise this assertion. We wonder under what 
circumstances would a single non-maverick prefer partial collusion? Moreover, what 
would be the impact on firm payoffs of being restricted to partial collusion?  
The share of the transfer fulfilled by each non-maverick affects the mode of collusion 
they would favour. Let βi denote the share of T that is paid by non-maverick i. Moreover 
note that ∑βi = 1. Rather than work with a specific example, here we present the analysis 
in general terms. From firm i’s perspective partial collusion is profitable if: 
  (2.15) 
In other words, partial collusion is profitable if the payoff to partial is greater than the 
payoff to full collusion with the required transfers. Here it is implicitly assumed that δ̂i ≥ 
δ*pc. In other words, it is assumed that actual discount factors are sufficiently high so that 
partial collusion is a feasible option. If this were not the case then discussion of the partial 
alternative would be moot. It is straightforward to show that the inequality is never 
satisfied if βi = 0 34 . If firm i does not have to make a transfer then they would always 
receive a higher payoff from full collusion.  
What about when firm i does have to make a transfer to achieve full collusion? For 
positive values of β, consider first the case where δ̂m → 0. This is where the maverick is 
extremely averse to coordination and the “maximal” transfer is required. Firstly, if firm i 
makes the full transfer T, it can be shown that the payoff to partial collusion is greater so 
long as other non-mavericks possess positive capacities. That is, when δ̂m → 0 and βi = 
1, the payoff to partial collusion is strictly greater than that of full so long as kj > 0 where 
j ≠ i ≠ m 35. Therefore, if βi = 1 firm i would prefer partial collusion. In line with the intuition 
                                                          
34 This is shown in Appendix D. 
35 This is shown in Appendix E. 
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given earlier, firm i prefers partial because the transfer they have to make under full is 
more than their proportional share. δ̂m = 0 implies that the maverick must be allowed to 
produce to their full capacity. Therefore, a non-maverick would clearly prefer for this to 
be given up proportionally by all firms rather than having to account for the whole amount 
themselves36. 
Note that βi = 1 implies that all βj = 0, i.e. that if one firm is making the full transfer then 
other firms do not have to give up any market share to achieve full collusion  . In such a 
case, firm j would favour full collusion37. From this it is evident that non-mavericks have 
different preferences over collusive alternatives depending on whether they have to 
make the transfer or not. Where the full transfer T is singularly fulfilled by one non-
maverick, rivals’ incentives are misaligned with one another. What about when the 
transfer is divided amongst several firms? Where δ̂m → 0 and 0 < βi < 1, we find that 
partial collusion is preferred where38: 
  (2.16) 
In other words, partial collusion yields a greater payoff than full where the proportion of 
the transfer given by firm i would exceed the market share they enjoy under partial39. 
These findings concerning firms’ preferences over full and partial collusion are 
summarised in Table 2.3 below. Note that so far we have considered cases where the 
maverick has no interest in future payoffs and is extremely averse to collusion; in other 
words, where its discount factor is zero. 
Table 2.3: Summary of non-mavericks’ preferences over full and partial collusion 
when δm̂ = 0 
Transfer required of 
non-maverick i (βi) 
Firm’s preference Notes 
βi = 0 Full collusion Full collusion is preferred for 
any δ̂m  
βi = 1 Partial collusion Subject to some other non-
maverick j having positive 
capacity 
0 < βi < 1 Partial collusion Subject to firm i’s transfer under 
full being greater than their 
market share under partial 
                                                          
36 Recall that in the case of partial collusion non-mavericks effectively give up a proportional amount of market share. 
37 This follows from Appendix D. 
38 This is shown in Appendix F. 
39 Note that it is possible that this holds with equality for all firms, but it is impossible for all β’s to be greater than this 
level. 
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Next, consider the case where the maverick has some interest in future payoffs. When 
δ̂m > 0 they no longer require the maximal transfer to collude, and we revert to the more 
general form seen earlier (Equation 2.13). It is still true that when βi = 0 firm i finds full 
collusion to be unambiguously favourable. For positive β’s, it can be shown that partial 
collusion is (strictly) preferable to full collusion when40: 
  (2.17) 
Again, in this context, we can show that partial collusion can never be strictly preferred 
by all non-mavericks41. The aggregate payoff to partial collusion will always be lower for 
non-mavericks. 
To summarise our findings on the subject of full versus partial collusion, we have shown 
that firms that are not required to make a transfer would always prefer full collusion whilst 
firms that need to make the full transfer would always get a higher payoff from partial. 
For cases where T is divided amongst non-mavericks with each contributing some 
positive β, the relative profitability of collusive alternatives depends on the distribution of 
this transfer. Whilst it may be possible for some non-mavericks to possess a strict 
preference for partial collusion it is impossible for all to hold this preference. Moreover, 
where a single firm enjoys a strictly greater payoff from partial, some other firm must 
receive a strictly lower payoff. When full collusion is possible the only case in which all 
non-mavericks would find the partial option acceptable is where the maverick has a 
discount factor of zero and requires a maximal transfer. Then, they would be indifferent 
between the two collusive alternatives. Full collusion with the maximal transfer (divided 
proportionately) is effectively analogous to partial collusion. In all other cases, including 
all positive δ̂m values, partial collusion would confer a lower (aggregate) payoff to the 
non-mavericks.  
To reiterate the intuition, it makes sense that partial gives a lower combined payoff than 
full collusion. In the former the maverick is allowed to sell their entire capacity whereas 
in the latter non-mavericks can potentially sustain collusion whilst giving up a lesser 
amount of market share. Clearly the latter is preferable if transfers are possible. If 
collusion can be achieved with the maverick selling less than their full capacity then this 
will always be better for its rivals. If transfers are not possible, then the presence of a 
maverick creates an insurmountable barrier to full coordination. Colluding firms are then 
                                                          
40 This is shown in Appendix G. 
41 See Appendix H. 
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restricted to the partial alternative (provided that δ̂i ≥ δ*pc). Consequently, the maverick’s 
presence can be seen to decrease non-mavericks’ collusive profits. Since one firm is 
averse to coordination, full collusion cannot be achieved and so the other firms are 
restricted to a lower collusive payoff. Moreover, from this it follows that it is plausible that 
rivals would seek to acquire or merge with the maverick to enable full collusion. Thus, 
the stance of competition authorities (to mergers that result in the removal of the 
maverick) may be at least conditionally supported by our findings. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have begun to develop a formal theory of mavericks by expanding 
upon the Ivaldi et al (2003) example. To model the maverick as a smaller firm we have 
incorporated asymmetric capacities into a repeated games model of the same type as 
Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002). We portrayed the firm as being averse to collusion, by 
having a lower discount factor than the level necessary for collusion to give a higher 
payoff than deviation. What we found was that collusion could still theoretically be 
achieved if two conditions were met. First, it is necessary for non-mavericks to be 
sufficiently patient to counteract the maverick’s impatience. Second, “transfers” of 
market share must be possible between firms. By the latter, we refer to any movement 
away from a proportional distribution of collusive market share. As we have mentioned, 
it is not obvious that transfers of market share would be possible in a tacit collusion 
context given that firms do not communicate. Thus we can conceive of situations where 
an impatient maverick would indeed present a genuine barrier to collusion as existing 
papers and guidelines suggest. 
Where full collusion proves to be impossible, partial collusion is an alternative option for 
non-maverick firms. We explored the implications of this in Section 2.4. What we found 
was that in the context of the repeated games model partial collusion was never 
preferred by all non-mavericks. Involving the maverick in collusive activities yielded a 
higher aggregate payoff to non-mavericks. Thus in situations where a maverick is 
insurmountably averse to collusion and rivals are forced to settle for the partial variant, 
profits are negatively impacted. This could be cited as a rationale for maverick mergers. 
Where a maverick presents an insurmountable barrier to collusive activity, it is 
conceivable that non-mavericks may wish to acquire it in order to achieve collusion. 
However, note that in the event of such a merger taking place, the acquirer would incur 
a cost whilst other non-mavericks would not; yet all non-mavericks would enjoy the 
benefits of such a merger via successful collusion. Hence, we can perceive of an 
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incentive problem when it comes to the acquisition of mavericks for the purposes of 
facilitating collusion. Why would a non-maverick undertake such an acquisition if rivals 
could simply “free-ride” on the benefits? This is a question we will revisit in the overall 
conclusion to the thesis. 
When it comes to competition authorities’ stance of preventing mergers that involve 
mavericks, our findings offer conflicting evidence. On the one hand, we have found 
evidence of situations where a maverick presents a barrier to collusion. On the other, we 
have outlined scenarios where collusion could occur in spite of their presence. Moreover, 
of importance is whether or not a merged firm ceases to be maverick. This is something 
which is debatable and has not been captured within our model as it stands. Consistent 
with Kwoka (1989), authorities typically assume that following a merger the maverick 
would be removed from the market. In other words, the merged firm does not adopt the 
maverick’s pre-merger behaviour42. Whether or not this is true would influence the 
conclusions we draw from our model. 
Along these lines, a natural extension of the work presented here could be to explore 
hypothetical mergers within the model. In other words, if Firm 1 or Firm 2 merged with 
Firm 3, how would this impact their payoffs and the prospects of collusion? This could 
be considered in a context where the merged party takes on the discount factor of the 
maverick and where the merged party takes on the discount factor of the non-maverick, 
for example. In general, the model presented in this chapter can certainly be expanded. 
We will discuss this further in Chapter 8. 
In this chapter we have discussed theory and hypothetical scenarios, but now it is 
appropriate to consider real-life applications of the maverick concept. To this end, we 
will turn our attention to past merger cases. In Chapter 3 we will examine the wording of 
the maverick concept in European merger guidelines and analyse its use in EC merger 
cases. In doing so, we can better-align the theory we have presented here with the way 
the notion is actually used by authorities. Are the two consistent? Should our model be 
adapted in any way as a result of the real-world use of the concept? These are questions 
we hope to address. 
  
                                                          
42 This is a topic we will discuss further in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: An Analysis of EC Merger Cases 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the use of the maverick concept in EC merger decisions during 
the period 2000 to 201343. As we mentioned in the introduction to the thesis the concept 
has long been included in horizontal merger guidelines, yet despite this fact there has 
been little analysis of the extent to which it has been applied to cases (Lyons, 2008)44. 
Thus, this chapter provides some overall statistics on how the concept has been applied 
in Europe since 2000, accompanied by a discursive analysis of some of the key cases 
and themes that arise from our statistics. This work provides an indication of how the 
idea is perceived and understood by competition authorities. We are particularly 
interested in whether or not the EC’s application of the concept is consistent with the 
theoretical depiction of mavericks in the literature; in other words, whether it is applied 
in the context of tacit collusion. Moreover, an understanding of how authorities view the 
concept is essential in order to achieve the objective of the final part of this thesis: to 
develop an empirical method of maverick identification. 
The first mention of the maverick concept arose in the 1992 version of the US horizontal 
merger guidelines: “In some circumstances, coordinated interaction can be effectively 
prevented or limited by maverick firms - firms that have a greater economic incentive to 
deviate from the terms of coordination than do most of their rivals (e.g. firms that are 
unusually disruptive and competitive influences in the market). Consequently, 
acquisition of a maverick firm is one way in which a merger may make coordinated 
interaction more likely, more successful, or more complete.” (DoJ and FTC, 1992). 
Unsurprisingly, this wording was entirely consistent with the treatment of maverick firms 
described in Kwoka (1989), the only maverick paper published prior to that date. Kwoka 
(1989) assumed that following a merger the merged entity would adopt the behaviour of 
the least rivalrous merging party45. It follows that where a transaction involves a maverick 
the end result would be the removal of the maverick from the market. The prospect of 
this happening is prevalent in merger guidelines.  
                                                          
43 Parts of this chapter were written in conjunction with my supervisor, Matthew Olczak. 
44 One exception is Coate (2006), who looked at US horizontal merger cases spanning 1993 to 2003 and found that 
those which applied the maverick firm concept were more likely to result in enforcement. 
45 Though Kwoka (1989) was the first published academic paper to refer to mavericks, the notion of a maverick firm 
shares many similarities with the earlier “third firm hypothesis” (Kwoka, 1979; Mueller and Greer, 1984). The third firm 
hypothesis is where the presence of some smaller firm or group of firms imposes competition on larger rivals. 
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However, US guidelines also acknowledge a contrasting possibility, specifically that 
“…incremental cost reductions may make coordination less likely or effective by 
enhancing the incentive of a maverick to lower price or by creating a new maverick firm.” 
(DoJ and FTC, 2010, p.30) This is a somewhat different perspective. The quote contains 
two ideas. The first is that the fact that one of the merging firms has maverick tendencies, 
combined with the larger size of the merged firm, may lead to a more effective maverick. 
The second is that a merger of two hitherto non-maverick firms may produce a party that 
has maverick tendencies post-merger46. These acknowledgements open up a wider 
array of applications for the concept. However, the common themes across the two 
quotes are that the maverick affects the likelihood of coordination and that they are either 
a party to, or created as a result of, a merger. It should also be noted that although US 
guidelines refer to possible positive efficiency effects stemming from maverick mergers, 
they do so whilst acknowledging that such mergers often have other anti-competitive 
effects. 
The focus in this chapter is on European merger cases and so it is appropriate to 
consider the wording of the concept in EC regulation. EC merger guidelines define a 
maverick as a “firm that has a history of preventing or disrupting coordination, for 
example by failing to follow price increases by its competitors, or has characteristics that 
gives it an incentive to favour different strategic choices than its coordinating competitors 
would prefer” (EC, 2010, p.182). The emphasis is on the need for a firm to have a track 
record of hindering collusion in order to be identified as the party; as in the US guidelines, 
the focus is on coordination rather than unilateral effects. Moreover, as with the US 
version, the EC guidelines stress that “a merger may involve the elimination of a 
maverick in a market.” (EC, 2013, p.207). They also go beyond a horizontal scope and 
consider a vertical possibility: “The vertical integration of the maverick may alter its 
incentives to such an extent that coordination will no longer be prevented.” (EC, 2013, 
p.207). Again, the concern is that the merger will ultimately result in the removal of the 
maverick from the market. 
Crucially, in the above quotes the maverick is assumed to be an insider to the merger in 
question. This is the traditional way in which such firms are considered and certainly the 
way the concept is allowed for in guidelines. However, Baker (2002) considered a 
scenario where the industry maverick was not one of the firms involved in a merger. 
Where the maverick was an outsider to a given merger, Baker argued that it may act as 
a shield against any harm a merger may have on competition. Broadly, the intuition is 
                                                          
46 This is a largely unexplored notion. Only Jacobs (2001), Kolasky (2002) and Sabbatini (2014) mention it within the 
maverick literature. 
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that if there is a maverick that is external to the transaction then that firm will continue to 
constrain coordination post-merger just as it did pre-merger47. This view is supported by, 
for example, Kovacic et al (2007) and Billard, Ivaldi and Mitraille (2011), both of which 
emphasised that outsider mavericks made coordinated effects less likely. Indeed, it is 
somewhat surprising that this possibility is not explicitly recognised in merger guidelines. 
One of the objectives of this chapter is to establish whether or not the maverick concept 
has been applied in this alternative way. 
In general, we are interested in exploring whether the concept has been applied in a 
manner that is consistent with guidelines. Within this objective, we are interested in both 
whether mavericks were identified as insiders or outsiders, and also whether the concept 
was applied to coordinated effects (as stipulated in guidelines) or to unilateral effects (for 
which guidelines make no allowance). 
In order to address these objectives, we conduct a detailed search for the use of the 
maverick concept in all EC merger decisions in which there were competitive concerns 
during the period spanning the calendar years 2000 to 2013. Prior to 2000, the concept 
was not applied in Europe48. Furthermore, it should be noted that the period contains 
within it a time (2002-2004) during which EC merger regulation was reviewed and 
changed as a result of a number of merger decisions being overturned by the Court of 
First Instance (CFI). We will discuss this in due course, but the ultimate outcome was 
that EC regulation placed greater emphasis on unilateral effects after 2004. In our 
context, it is interesting to explore how the maverick concept was applied throughout this 
period of transition.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides analysis of the overall application 
of the maverick concept in EC cases spanning 2000-2013. The sample of cases is 
outlined and statistics are produced illustrating the use of the concept in these cases. As 
well as considering whether mavericks were insiders or outsiders and whether 
coordinated or unilateral effects were the concern, we examine elements such as the 
industries involved and the ultimate case decisions. Section 3.3 then provides a 
discursive account of three mergers where the EC’s decision report included an 
interesting discussion of the concept. We consider these in detail since they reveal 
further information regarding the authority’s interpretation of the idea. Section 3.4 
provides a discussion of our findings and considers in more detail the 2004 change in 
merger regulation. Finally, Section 3.5 makes some conclusions about the use of the 
                                                          
47 Baker (2002) also discussed the possibility that its degree of maverickness may be affected (positively or negatively) 
as a result of the merger and that it may even be excluded from the market. 
48 Lyons (2008) confirms that the term was not used in a single European case in the 1990s. 
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term to date, and motivates the rest of this thesis. Briefly, the ambiguous and at times 
inconsistent application of the concept in the past adds weight to the goal we hope to 
achieve in the remainder of the thesis; it supports the case for the development of an 
empirical method of maverick identification. 
 
3.2 The Maverick Concept in EC Merger Cases 
This section provides a comprehensive analysis of the nature of use of the maverick 
concept in European merger cases between January 2000 and December 2013. This 
analysis is done in a manifest style, with relevant cases being established by searches 
for keywords (initially and most importantly, the word “maverick”). During the time period 
under consideration there were over 4000 cases examined by the EC49. Of these, over 
90% were cleared at the “Phase I” stage, meaning they were allowed in their proposed 
state. It is important at this point to outline the EC system of merger analysis and in 
particular to explain what is meant by “Phase I” and “Phase II”. 
The EC examines merger transactions that involve significant operations within the 
European Community. EC analysis consists of two phases. Phase I is an initial short 
investigation during which the authority gathers information from the notifying parties 
and their customers/competitors via questionnaires. After this the authority can make 
one of three broad decisions: to allow the merger in its proposed form, to allow the 
merger subject to commitments offered by the notifying parties, or to refer the merger to 
Phase II for further investigation. When a case is referred to Phase II, the authority 
conducts a more detailed assessment of the case. This involves considering companies’ 
internal documents, the analysis of economic data, and more detailed questionnaires to 
customers/competitors. Again, at this stage the EC has three broad decisions it can 
make: approval, approval subject to remedies, or prohibition 
(ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/procedures_en.html)50. Remedies are typically 
proposed by the notifying parties rather than by the authority and can be either 
behavioural or based upon the divestiture of particular assets (EC, 2010). 
Each of the decision types are assigned an “Article” under EC merger regulation. Those 
that are allowed in Phase I come under Article 6.1(b). Since cases under Article 6.1(b) 
were quickly cleared with no competitive concerns it is highly unlikely that authorities 
                                                          
49 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf for detailed statistics. The exact number depends on what 
date one uses. The date we use in this thesis is the decision date – i.e. the date on which the EC published its ultimate 
decision regarding a given case. 
50 Following this, there remains the possibility that the decision could be reviewed by the European Court of First Instance, 
and ultimately the European Court of Justice, should parties choose to appeal the decision. 
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would regard the maverick concept as relevant during their investigation. Therefore, 
there is little value in exploring these cases for their use of the maverick term. Moreover, 
in those cases that did refer to the notion, it was evidently dismissed very quickly. As a 
result these cases are omitted from our in-depth analysis; we focus our attention on 
instances in which the authorities felt the need for detailed investigation51. In addition, 
we further omit the handful of cases for which no English report was available. The 
sample we are left with comprises of 274 cases. These are summarised in Table 3.1, 
broken down by decision type. The table also indicates the relevant article numbers for 
the other case types52. 
Table 3.1: Total cases by decision type 
Decision Type No. of cases 
Phase I remedies  
(Art 6.1 (b) compatible 
with commitments) 
 
 
163 
 
Phase II clearance 
(Art 8.1 compatible) 24 
Phase II remedies 
(Art 8.2 compatible with 
commitments) 75 
Prohibition (Phase II) 
(Art 8.3) 12 
TOTAL 274 
 
We are interested in whether the maverick concept was applied in our sample of cases. 
To investigate this, each case report was searched for reference to a maverick. This 
revealed that there was reference to the existence (or possible existence) of a maverick 
firm in only 22 (8%) of the 274 merger cases. Having identified 22 cases where the 
concept was mentioned in the EC’s case report, we then conducted an in-depth reading 
of the decision in each case. The findings make up the analysis in this section53.  
Figure 3.1 below shows how often the concept was applied, by year of the case decision. 
                                                          
51 We conducted a search on a random sample of 5% of the 6.1(b) cases and found that the maverick term only appeared 
in 1.5% of cases (3 out of 196). In these cases, the maverick term was used only fleetingly and the prospect was 
immediately dismissed. 
52 In addition to those present in the table, cases where a transaction is deemed to be outside the scope of EC regulation 
come under Article 6.1(a) and cases that are referred to Phase II are initially classed under 6.1(c) but this is ultimately 
superseded by the subsequent Phase II designation. 
53 The content analysis was conducted as follows. Initially, relevant cases were identified by searching each of the 274 
cases for the word “maverick”. This established the 22 “maverick cases”. These were then read comprehensively to 
ascertain the markets involved, the context with which the term was used, the identity of the maverick, and so on – these 
subsequent findings are documented throughout this chapter. The approach follows Posner (1970). 
32 
 
 
Over the period 2000-2013 the frequency of maverick cases was relatively consistent at 
between 1-3% (of total cases) per year54. The notable exception is 2002-2004, where 
the concept was not used at all. One explanation for this is that it was a time when EC 
merger regulation came under review55. The absence of reference to the maverick 
concept during this period may therefore be explained by the uncertainty surrounding 
the impending changes in policy. In other words, we may speculate that the EC was 
exercising caution during this time. We will further discuss the 2002-2004 review in 
Section 3.4 of this chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Sectors 
Next, let us consider the industries involved in maverick cases. Appendix I provides 
information on the prevalence of maverick cases across different sectors56. Obviously, 
some sectors experienced a lot less mergers than others, and so the column showing 
the percentage of cases that referred to mavericks is somewhat deceptive. It is therefore 
appropriate to consider both the number and proportion of such cases in order to get a 
more accurate picture. The sectors that had more than a single maverick case and also 
accounted for a significant portion of all cases in the sector were “Information and 
                                                          
54 As a percentage of the 274 cases that warranted further investigation this percentage was more variable but this is a 
consequence of the small sample size. 
55 The outcome of this review was that in 2004 the previous dominance test was replaced by a significant impediment to 
effective competition test, in order to correct a perceived gap in merger legislation. See, for example, Röller and De La 
Mano (2006) or Monti (2008). 
56 The table in the appendix is constructed using the NACE codes attached to each case. Often, cases have NACE codes 
in multiple categories. In such instances, we count each category only once. For example, a case with a single K code 
and two C codes would count once under K and once under C. 
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Communication”, “Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning” and “Wholesale and 
Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles”. 
With regard to Information and Communication, there were five maverick cases. 
Specifically, these related to the mobile telecommunications industry (two cases)57, 
portable navigation devices58, databases59, and contact line engineering (for railway 
lines)60. In the Electricity and Gas category there were three maverick cases, all related 
to gas supply or gas products61. Finally, there were four cases within the Wholesale and 
Retail Trade category which covered a broad range of markets with no clear common 
features62. Overall, we note that the concept was applied to a diverse range of industries, 
including both retail products supplied to final customers and upstream wholesale 
markets. 
 
3.2.2 Cases Where the Concept Was Applied 
We now focus on the 22 cases in which the maverick concept was applied. Table 3.2 
provides an outline of the type of decision in these cases. 
Table 3.2: Application of the maverick concept by decision type 
Decision Type No. of cases 
Phase I remedies 8 
Phase II clearance 4 
Phase II remedies 10 
Prohibition  0 
TOTAL 22 
 
The table shows that over one third of instances corresponded to cases where remedies 
were imposed in Phase I. However, as a proportion of total decisions the maverick 
concept was more likely to be applied in the more detailed Phase II enquiries (13% 
compared to 5%). This is what we would expect. Intuitively, cases where there was a 
potential maverick are more likely to require closer investigation and thus pass through 
                                                          
57 M.3916 T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring (2006) and M.5650 T-Mobile/Orange (2010). 
58 M.4854 TomTom/TeleAtlas (2008). 
59 M.5529 Oracle/Sun Microsystems (2010). 
60 M.3653 Siemens/VA Tech (2005). 
61 M.3868 DONG/Elsam/Energie E2 (2006), M.4141 Linde/BOC (2006) and M.5467 RWE/Essent (2009). Moreover, in 
two other cases (M.2389 Shell/DEA and M.2533 BP/E.ON, both 2001) the product in the market of concern was ethylene, 
a gas, although these classified under manufacturing. 
62 The cases here cover wholesale of electrical products, household appliances and construction materials and sanitary 
equipment (M.4963 Rexel/Hagemeyer, 2008), wholesale of computer equipment (M.4854 TomTom/TeleAtlas, 2008), 
retail of fuel (M.4919 StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips, 2008), and wholesale of sugar (M.6286 Südzucker/ED&F Man, 2012).  
34 
 
to the second phase. Other factors notwithstanding, the maverick issue itself usually 
requires further examination; if a maverick is suspected then the authority should closely 
examine whether the firm in question does indeed fulfil the role, in line with the wording 
of guidelines. Additionally, from Table 3.2 we note that the concept has been applied 
more frequently in cases where remedies were imposed but not, to date, in cases where 
the merger was prohibited outright63. This seems to indicate that whilst the involvement 
of a maverick may present an issue, this is not insurmountable; it is a concern that can 
seemingly be addressed via remedies. 
Though remedies were clearly more common in maverick cases, as a proportion of total 
cases the maverick concept was applied in more clearance decisions than intervention 
decisions (17% compared to 7%). However, the “decisions” we refer to here are 
decisions in the case overall. Typically, multiple markets are analysed in any given 
merger case. Thus, for these cases, the maverick concept was usually applied in just 
one of the markets under consideration, and this was often a market that was peripheral 
to the main operations involved in the concentration. Given the multi-market nature of 
many merger cases examined by the EC, for the intervention cases it is the decision in 
the particular market in which a maverick was identified that is of interest to us. Further 
evidence on this is provided below. 
There are a number of explanations regarding why the concept may be frequently 
applied in cases where the merger is eventually cleared. First, as we outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, whilst guidelines discuss the concept in terms of a maverick 
being an insider to a merger, another possibility is that the party is an outsider. In the 
case of the latter, this should make it less likely that intervention would be deemed 
necessary. We will distinguish between cases of insider and outsider mavericks in due 
course. Second, the cases we have identified so far are those in which the possibility of 
a maverick was explicitly considered by the authority. That is, we are basing our analysis 
on references to the concept that appear in official correspondence. However, it may be 
that the maverick concept was briefly considered but dismissed and not deemed 
significant enough to include in the report. In cases where the maverick is an insider, in 
particular, this should decrease the likelihood of intervention. Finally, there is also the 
possibility that whilst the concept may be considered by the EC, it is not in fact 
determinative of their decision. This would be consistent with Baker (2002) who 
                                                          
63 According to http://chillingcompetition.com/2013/04/05/thoughts-on-the-commissions-decision-in-upstnt/, the maverick 
concept was applied in M.6570 UPS/TNT (2013) and this merger was prohibited by the EC. However, this case is not 
included in our sample because the final report was not in the public domain. Note that this indicates that the concept 
may have been used even more widely than our statistics imply, which only serves to reinforce the motivations behind 
this thesis: that the concept is important and worthy of further study. 
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concludes that mavericks have been treated as a special case and something of an 
afterthought in contemporary anti-trust practice. It would also be consistent with the fact 
that we have observed that those cases in which there was concern resulted in remedies 
but not prohibition. 
 
3.2.3 Cases Where a Maverick Was Established 
Not every case that discussed the concept resulted in a maverick being conclusively 
established. We have stated that the concept was mentioned in 22 cases, yet the identity 
of the maverick was only ultimately established in 5 of these cases64. These were T-
Mobile Austria/tele.ring (2006), Linde/BOC (2006), StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips (2008), 
Oracle/Sun Microsystems (2010) and T-Mobile/Orange (2010). In the other 17 cases, 
the EC typically either suggested that a particular firm could be such a party and then 
ruled this out65 or more broadly discussed the potential for mavericks in the industry66. 
In the remainder of the cases, there are instances where notifying parties suggested a 
maverick outside of the merger or a third party suggested that one of the merging parties 
was a maverick; the EC then ruled these out. This implies that the maverick concept 
may, in some cases, be used spuriously by involved parties in order to aid the chances 
of a decision in their favour67. Finally, in two cases the merging parties suggested that 
an insider was not a maverick and the EC agreed with their assertions68. Overall, note 
that whilst it is rare that the concept was considered in cases, it was even rarer that the 
EC was able to establish a clear maverick69. 
Focusing on the 5 cases with established mavericks, we can make observations about 
the nature and size of the party in each case. First, the EC often portrays maverick 
                                                          
64 We impose strict criteria for the EC establishing the existence of maverick. To illustrate, take for example M.3333 
Sony/BMG (2007). In response to third parties’ claims that there would be collusion post-merger, the EC stated that EMI 
and Warner were “…significant ‘mavericks’ and would still have the power to jeopardy any attempt of collusion” (page 
119). However, we do not include this as a case in which the EC established the existence of a maverick because it is 
not discussed further by the EC, with other arguments instead used to rule out coordinated effects. 
65 See for example M.3653 Siemens/VA Tech, para 174, where the EC considers VA Tech as a possible maverick but 
that there is insufficient evidence to label them as such. 
66 For example, in M.2420 Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi (2001), the EC claimed the potential for a maverick but did not explicitly 
name the party. They simply concluded that the conditions of the market were such that if collusion were to arise then 
several parties would have an incentive to deviate and behave in a ‘maverick’ manner. By contrast, in M.1939 Rexam/ANC 
(2000), the EC decided that there could not be a maverick due to the nature of the market; it was very symmetrical and 
characterised by substantial overcapacity. They suggested that any maverick could therefore be retaliated against and 
would not present a credible barrier to collusion. 
67 In this respect it is noteworthy that the eventual decision by the EC was almost always contrary to what would have 
been more likely had the maverick argument been convincing. For example, where the merging parties tried 
unsuccessfully to persuade the EC that there was a maverick outside the merger, the EC eventually intervened.  
68 M.6214 Seagate Technology/Samsung (2011) and M.6455 SCA/Georgia-Pacific Group (2012). Agreement was 
implicit, by not responding to parties’ arguments. 
69 It is interesting to note that all five of these cases were post-2004. This suggests that despite the evidence in Figure 
3.1, the maverick concept may be becoming a more established phenomenon. 
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players as aggressive competitors. For example, in the case of Linde/BOC: “The removal 
of Linde as an aggressive ‘maverick’ increases the risk of tacit collusion in this market 
and thereby raises serious doubts as to the compatibility of the merger with the common 
market.”70 In addition, the firms identified as maverick were typically small; in the case 
of Linde with a market share of less that 5%. In general, the average market share of 
the maverick in these in these 5 cases was around 9%71. Alternatively, in cases where 
the maverick was largest (10-20%), the EC argued that this still underestimated their 
importance in the market. For example, in StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips: “The 
Commission has considered whether JET Sweden has played a particular role as a low-
price competitor putting downward pressure on prices in Sweden. If JET Sweden has 
acted as a "pricing maverick" in the Swedish market, the company has played a role in 
the market which is greater than its market share would imply at first glance.”72 
Generally, in the 5 cases identification of a maverick usually centred on whether they 
had been increasing their market share in the recent past. This is taken as evidence that 
they are an aggressive rival and capable of taking custom from the larger firms. For 
example, in T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring: "The analysis of market shares alone shows not 
only that tele.ring has played an active role in the market in the last three years but also 
that it has been the only company to play such an active role, in terms of increased 
market share."73 This is consistent with the wording of EC guidelines, which we outlined 
in the introduction to this chapter – it is evidence that the firms have displayed a tendency 
for (a “history” of) competing aggressively. Moreover, in the Linde/BOC case, Air Liquide, 
another rival, was also referred to as an aggressive competitor, but the Commission 
doubted its ability to expand due to issues relating to acquiring inputs. The distinguishing 
factor between the two firms, which led the Commission to assert that Linde was the 
maverick, was that Linde had larger future quantities that Air Liquide. Thus there was 
emphasis not only on aggressive pricing but also the potential to expand market share. 
 
3.2.4 Insiders and Outsiders 
We stated in the introduction to this chapter that guidelines are typically phrased in terms 
of the maverick being an “insider” to a merger; i.e. one of the merging parties. We now 
                                                          
70 M.4141 Linde/BOC (2006), page 35. In this case the maverick was an insider to the merger and the quote makes clear 
that the concept was clearly linked to collusive behaviour. For all of the cases, below we further examine whether the 
context was as a merger insider or outsider, and applied to collusion or unilateral effects. 
71 Market shares are typically reported as a range in case reports. For the purposes of reporting statistics, we take the 
midpoint of the range as a firm’s market share. When it is reported as less than 5% we record this as 5%.   
72 M.4919 StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips (2008), page 20. 
73 M.3916 T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring (2006), page 10. 
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return to consider whether the maverick in each case was indeed an insider or rather an 
outsider, external to the merger transaction. Table 3.3 summarises whether the maverick 
was an insider or an outsider for each case in which the concept was applied. As we 
have stated, though there were 22 cases in which the concept was discussed, a 
maverick was only ultimately established in 5 of these. The insider/outsider status of the 
5 is highlighted in the third column of the table.  
Table 3.3:  Established mavericks - insider and outsider distinction 
  Total Maverick established 
Insider 13 4 
Outsider 9 1 
 
Table 3.3 suggests that the EC was more confident in applying the maverick concept in 
its more standard setting where the firm was an insider to the merger. Moreover, it is in 
exactly these cases where we expect the concept to contribute to a decision to intervene. 
In all of the cases where an insider was established as the maverick, remedies were 
required in that particular market74. These were typically structural divestments75. 
However, the EC did not go as far as to state that the remedy would restore the pre-
merger level of competition by creating a new maverick. 
Arguably the closest they came to this was in T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring where remedies 
were geared towards boosting Hutchison 3G (“H3G”, a smaller rival). The implication 
was that this was with a view to H3G assuming a maverick-like role of competitive 
constraint: "Given the similar incentives and very similar communications profile of H3G 
and tele.ring customers, there is strong evidence that H3G will in future pursue an 
aggressive price strategy similar to that pursued by tele.ring in the past."76 "H3G will 
probably come to play a bigger role in this market, offering an alternative to the other 
network operators once 3G-capable mobile telephones become more widespread and 
once it has built up a nationwide network, something which the commitments given 
makes possible."77 In Linde/BOC, divestments were designed to promote ongoing 
competitive pressures to offset those lost when BOC was acquired. The divestments 
were intended to remove the additional risk of tacit coordination. In none of these cases 
                                                          
74 This is in contrast to the other 9 cases (in which no maverick was established). The EC only intervened in 2 of these.   
75 The one exception is M.5529 Oracle/Sun Microsystems (2010), in which commitments were offered by the parties at 
the time of the notification. 
76 M.3916 T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring (2006), page 38. 
77 Ibid. page 39. 
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was it explicitly stated that the aim was to encourage a new maverick to replace one that 
was being eliminated. 
T-Mobile/Orange was the single case in which the EC concluded that there was a 
maverick that was an outsider to the merger. Theoretically, in such cases the presence 
of this type of firm should go some way toward alleviating authorities’ concerns. 
However, despite this, the EC still identified a problem in the market and required a 
divestment remedy. This is somewhat surprising78. We will further consider aspects of 
the T-Mobile/Orange case in greater depth in Section 3.3.  
 
3.2.5 Theories of Harm 
As outlined in the introduction, both the theoretical foundations and wording of guidelines 
relate the maverick concept to coordinated effects. There is no allowance in guidelines 
for the concept to bear any significance in cases of unilateral effects concerns. In the 
Linde/BOC merger it was clear that the EC applied the concept to coordinated effects. 
“The removal of Linde… increases the risk of tacit collusion.”79 However, the examination 
of the theories of harm used in the other four established maverick cases provides a 
much less clear picture and it is apparent that the EC does not stick rigidly to its 
guidelines. 
In StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips the EC applied the concept to unilateral effects analysis 
and this was the only theory of harm considered. Likewise, in Oracle/Sun Microsystems 
it appears that the EC also used the concept in a unilateral effects context, whilst still 
referring to merger guidelines to justify their arguments. As a result, Oracle were highly 
critical of the theory of harm adopted, arguing that the EC had neither established that 
the merger would create or strengthen a dominant position (as required) nor that the 
merging parties were close competitors. Interestingly, the Commission countered this by 
making clear that the 2004 change in merger regulation meant that the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position was no longer required and by arguing that 
closeness of competition is only one relevant factor for unilateral effects. We will discuss 
both the impact of the 2004 change in regulation and the role of the maverick concept 
within unilateral effects analysis in the discussion section of this chapter. 
In T-Mobile/tele.ring, the maverick concept was first applied in relation to the EC’s main 
unilateral effects theory of harm. The EC then made clear that it also could not rule out 
                                                          
78 Interventions followed in 7 of the 8 cases where mavericks outside the merger were considered but not established.  
79 M.4141 Linde/BOC (2008), page 35. 
39 
 
the possibility of coordinated effects and the maverick concept was again referred to. 
However, given the commitment offered by the merging parties, they did not need to 
come to a final decision on this. The EC’s stance in this case is consistent with more 
general evidence that unilateral and coordinated effects analysis have been used 
somewhat simultaneously since 2004 (see for example Baxter and Dethmers, 2005 or 
Dethmers, 2005). However, it also runs contrary to economic theory which suggests that 
market factors such as symmetry that facilitate collusion also lessen competitive 
concerns when coordination is not possible, and vice versa (see for example Kuhn, 
2001, or Frontier Economics, 2004). Commenting on the T-Mobile/tele.ring case, 
Charles River Associates (2006) made clear that running both theories of harm 
simultaneously at the very least requires careful consistency checks.    
Finally, in T-Mobile/Orange the EC moved away from the traditional horizontal theories 
of harm through unilateral and coordinated effects and instead was concerned about the 
possibility of foreclosure via future monopolisation of the mobile phone network. Prior to 
the merger there were agreements between the industry maverick (3UK) and the 
notifying parties concerning the sharing of mobile network spectrums. The EC’s primary 
concern was that post-merger these agreements would be terminated or quality would 
be compromised. Thus, the key theory of harm in this instance was the foreclosure of 
the maverick. "3UK is considered by several market players as an important 
competitive force in the UK market... The possible disappearance of 3UK or the 
degradation of its competitive position could consequently have a serious impact on the 
UK retail mobile communication market"80 We will consider the T-Mobile/Orange case in 
greater detail in the following section. However, the case provides an example where 
the impact to an outsider maverick increases concern about a merger. 
Overall, we therefore note that in only one of the 5 cases was discussion of the maverick 
firm concept confined to coordinated effects. More often the maverick firm concept was 
applied either solely or predominantly to unilateral effects, despite the fact that there is 
no allowance for this in merger guidelines81.  
 
 
                                                          
80 M.5650 T-Mobile/Orange (2010), page 20. 
81 It is interesting to note that by 2010 the EC guidelines arguably became less clear on whether the maverick firm concept 
applied to unilateral or coordinated effects as it was also included in a general section on evidence of adverse effects to 
competition (EC, 2010). It is also interesting to note that in all of the pre-2004 cases in our sample the maverick firm 
concept was considered (but not established) only in the context of coordinated effects.   
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3.3 Interesting Cases 
In this section, we will consider in more detail three cases in which the discussion and/or 
eventual application of the maverick firm idea revealed interesting information about the 
EC’s attitudes toward the concept. The three cases comprise of one in which no firm 
was ultimately established as maverick, Travelport/Worldspan (2007), and two of our 
five maverick cases, StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips (2008) and T-Mobile/Orange (2010). 
For each, we briefly outline its features before discussing the interesting aspects of the 
case report. 
 
3.3.1 Travelport/Worldspan (2007) 
Case M.4523 involved the acquisition of Worldspan by Travelport. Worldspan 
Technologies Inc. (“Worldspan”) was a company that provided travel distribution 
services, as well as IT services to airlines. Travelport LLC (“Travelport”) aggregated 
content from airlines and other holiday service providers for final consumers. The parties’ 
operations primarily overlapped in global distribution systems (GDS) – via the 
"Worldspan GDS’ and Travelport’s ‘Galileo’. 
Travelport/Worldspan was not one of the cases in which a maverick was ultimately 
established yet the case warrants our attention since it provides a relatively lengthy 
discussion of the subject. The case is one of the instances where a potential maverick 
was mooted and ultimately dismissed by the EC. In most such cases the prospect is 
dismissed briefly with little elaboration, and so we are unable to glean much insight into 
the EC’s viewpoint. However, in Travelport/Worldspan the view of the Commission was 
explained thoroughly. Moreover, the possibility that one of the notifying parties 
(Worldspan) was maverick and might be eliminated as a result of the transaction was 
one of the key theories of harm on which the case was based. Accordingly, the EC’s 
rationale for dismissing this prospect was one of the key reasons for allowing the merger 
without remedies. 
In assessing the compatibility of the merger with the common market, the EC considered 
several theories of harm spanning both coordinated and unilateral effects. One of these 
concerned whether the merger would eliminate a "pricing maverick’, which it suggested 
was Worldspan. The report states that “During the market investigation, concerns were 
expressed that, following the loss of competition between the merging undertakings, 
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Worldspan's prices would be increased and aligned with those charged by Galileo.”82 
The report did not state who held these concerns. Nonetheless, in ruling out Worldspan, 
the EC documented the criteria by which it identified a pricing maverick: they stated that 
they would need to show that Worldspan’s prices were significantly lower than those of 
its competitors prior to the merger83. Furthermore, they also outlined the criteria under 
which the concept would be relevant to merger prevention: they stated that they would 
have to establish that the merging parties had the incentive and ability to increase 
Worldspan’s prices post-merger. 
The EC asserted that Worldspan was not charging lower prices. In reaching this 
decision, they considered pricing data and the opinions of travel service providers 
(“TSPs”). The GDS market was not one with a clear price; pricing was complex since the 
product was not straightforward and firms had unique agreements with different parties. 
However, the EC suggested that the most appropriate proxies for price were “net 
average price per booking” and “net price (list price less discounts) for active 
segments”84. The notifying parties submitted a comparison of the prices charged by 
Galileo and Worldspan for both of these proxies, which suggested that Worldspan’s 
prices were not consistently lower than Galileo’s. Moreover, most respondent TSPs did 
not think Worldspan had charged consistently lower prices over the last few years and 
major European and US airlines stated that they thought Worldspan’s prices were 
comparable to those of its rivals. Furthermore, the analysis implicated another party as 
the cheapest alternative on the market, though this third party was not named in the 
report. 
The notifying parties went a step further by suggesting that Worldspan actually behaved 
as a price taker, thus precluding the possibility of it being maverick. This suggestion was 
reinforced by British Airways, a customer, who indicated that it was the market leader 
(Amadeus) that had been instrumental in guiding price changes, citing an example of a 
change implemented by Amadeus in 2005 and adopted by Worldspan in 2006. The 
report also identified Lufthansa as another customer who regarded Worldspan as a price 
follower. 
Relatedly, data provided from notifying parties suggested that Worldspan had lost 
market share over recent years. Worldspan had been the smallest GDS provider in the 
EEA for the past 5 years and had shown little signs of growing. The report suggested 
                                                          
82 M.4523 Travelport/Worldspan (2007), page 22. 
83 They explicitly named Galileo, Travelport’s GDS provider, as a firm that Worldspan would have to be shown to price 
lower than.  
84 The latter refers to a monthly charge imposed by a GDS on an airline based on the net number of bookings (bookings 
minus cancellations) made in relation to that airline’s inventory in each month. 
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that in the upstream market their share had decreased by [0-5%] between 2003 and 
2006 whilst in the downstream market their share had fluctuated around a stable point 
in every country except Hungary (where they had experienced some growth). Moreover, 
in 2007, Worldspan had lost two of its main customers in the EEA. The report stated that 
“Therefore, contrary to what one would expect from a company which is alleged to be a 
maverick, Worldspan's markets share does not show general signs of growth.” (EC 
2007a, p.26). Indeed, charging lower prices than rivals and demonstrating a propensity 
to capture rivals’ market shares are two characteristics outlined in guidelines as 
descriptors for a maverick firm. Thus, in showing that Worldspan displayed neither of 
these behaviours, the EC was consistent with guidelines in this regard85. 
As to whether Worldspan’s prices might increase post-merger, the EC concluded that 
this would be unlikely. This was again based on the evidence of the notifying parties and 
the perceptions of TSPs. The EC’s market investigation indicated that Galileo was 
perceived to be stronger for corporate travel whilst Worldspan was stronger in leisure 
travel and online travel agencies, suggesting that they were not close competitors. The 
opinions of customers (travel agents) further confirmed that Galileo and Worldspan were 
not one another’s closest competitors. This and the fact that margins were decreasing 
pre-merger were cited as reasons to doubt the scope for post-merger price rises. 
Moreover, the EC pointed out that upstream price rises would likely cause TSPs to 
withdraw content from Worldspan’s GDS, which would have a knock-on effect on their 
success in the downstream market. 
 
3.3.2 StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips (2008) 
A second notable case, M.4919, involved StatoilHydro ASA (“SH”) acquiring the 
Scandinavian petroleum business of the ConocoPhillips Company (JET Scandinavia, 
“JET”). SH’s operations encompassed the exploration and production of both crude oil 
and natural gas, as well as the refinery and sale of fuels and their derivatives. They 
predominantly operated in Norway. ConocoPhillips was a US company whose subsidiary 
JET operated fuel stations in Scandinavia. JET Sweden also possessed petroleum 
storage facilities. SH was an integrated company, meaning that the fuel sold in their 
stations predominantly came from their own refining operations. By contrast, JET was a 
non-integrated company, obtaining its fuel on an “ex-refinery, ex-cargo or ex-terminal 
(ex-rack) basis, through a mix of short and long-term agreements and ‘spot’ deliveries.” 
                                                          
85 It was not however consistent with guidelines in the sense that the maverick concept was applied to non-coordinated 
effects. 
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(EC 2008, p.6). Interestingly, Conoco had previously been regarded as a maverick by 
competition authorities in an earlier case (Massey, 2010). 
In defining the market, the EC settled upon the broad definition of “the market for retail 
sales of motor fuels”, citing the fact that JET did not possess niche outlets such as 
motorway stations. In terms of geographic scope the EC argued that this was national. 
The relevant nations were Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and the EC analysed the 
impact of the transaction on competition in the retail motor fuel markets of each of the 
three countries. In the case of Denmark, the EC’s market investigation confirmed that 
there were no competition concerns. The fact that none of the main suppliers of motor 
fuel had a market share greater than 25%, as well as the strong presence of Shell to 
mitigate unilateral effects, were cited as justifications for this stance. However, this was 
not the case in Sweden and Norway, where concerns were expressed. 
In Sweden, SH was the largest supplier as a result of the merger of Statoil and Hydro in 
2007. JET was a smaller player (the sixth-largest), with a market share of [10-20%]. The 
EC estimated that the merger of SH and JET would have resulted in the merged 
company holding a [40-50%] market share in Sweden. SH disputed this, pointing out 
that following the Statoil/Hydro merger they had closed a considerable number of fuel 
stations, something they would repeat following the proposed merger. Thus they 
suggested a post-merger share of around [30-40%]. Nonetheless, the EC reiterated the 
fact that SH was already the largest supplier and the transaction would make them 
larger. Moreover, SH’s market share would become more than twice that of OKQ8, the 
next largest competitor. Thus the EC had concerns over unilateral effects in the Swedish 
market. 
The Commission investigated whether the removal of JET as an independent player 
would impede effective competition in Sweden through strengthening SH’s market 
position. In so doing, the EC explicitly referred to JET as the maverick. “If JET Sweden 
has acted as a ‘pricing maverick’ in the Swedish market, the company has played a role 
in the market which is greater than its market share would imply at first glance.”86 
SH argued that JET was not a maverick but a price follower. They stated that JET gave 
the impression of being a low-cost supplier but that this was not accurate. The 
Commission disagreed, stating that “Contrary to SH's claims, a number of circumstances 
indicate that JET Sweden plays a unique role in the Swedish market for retail sales of 
motor fuels and that the removal of JET as an independent player would hamper 
                                                          
86 M.4919 StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips (2008), page 20. 
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competition.”87 In refuting the claim that the firm was a price follower the EC cited various 
factors. They stated that JET had repeatedly shown a tendency to undercut its rivals 
whereas a price follower would accept the price of its competitors. Moreover, JET had 
exhibited a willingness to increase its price differential in response to competitors’ price 
rises – i.e. it had refused to follow price increases. In addition, due to its superior 
efficiency, JET was able to credibly engage in these behaviours; they were well placed 
to defend their price differential. The Commission therefore considered JET to exert a 
strong constraint over its rivals’ behaviour. This viewpoint was furthermore supported by 
internal SH documents, which actually described JET as their most important 
competitive constraint. 
The Commission used econometric analysis to establish the maverick in this case. 
Specifically, they conducted daily cross-sectional OLS analysis of the effect of certain 
factors on Statoil’s prices over the period January 2004 to December 2007. The 
dependent variables were logs of Statoil’s prices for petrol and diesel. The explanatory 
variables were a series of competition and control factors (such as number of fuel 
stations and population density). The primary competition variable, and the key variable 
of interest, was a binary indicator of JET’s presence amongst nearby rivals. The results 
found that the presence of JET constrained the prices of Statoil – they were significantly 
lower when a JET station was in the local ‘cluster’88. They found this to be true for both 
petrol and diesel. SH contested that this was not unique to JET and that the presence of 
other smaller competitors had the same effect. The EC tested this claim by including 
dummies for another firm as well; they produced a second set of analysis with a dummy 
for when JET alone, the other firm alone, and where both were in the local cluster. The 
results showed that the presence of the other firm had a lesser effect on Statoil’s prices89.  
The Commission justified the special significance of JET by citing various factors. Since 
its creation JET had continuously expanded its network, predominantly opening stations 
in prime locations and densely populated regions. They consistently charged net prices 
with no rebate schemes (which were otherwise common in the market). They had a 
history of being innovative, for instance being the first company in Sweden to have fully 
automated petrol pumps. Moreover, JET was incredibly efficient, with a much higher 
throughput per station than its competitors. The EC reinforced its belief that JET was the 
                                                          
87 Ibid. page 20. 
88 Similar analysis was conducted by Kovacic et al (2007) with respect to the US vitamins industry. They used econometric 
analysis to consider whether a potential maverick firm (Rhone-Poulenc) constrained industry prices. 
89 SH raised further queries related to the analysis, which the EC addressed. Overall, the analysis stood up to critique. 
Moreover, SH put forward descriptive analyses refuting the findings of the EC regression analysis, but the EC argued that 
their regression approach was more appropriate. 
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maverick via a survey of consumer perceptions. The survey findings suggested that the 
firm was perceived as a low-cost supplier and a strong brand. Moreover, most customers 
believed that the acquisition would result in the disappearance of JET and a decrease in 
competition. Overall, with regard to JET (as opposed to other smaller parties) fulfilling 
the maverick role, “[In terms of new entrants] there is no example of any other service-
station chain being close to JET in terms of number of stations, throughput and 
profitability.”90 Thus in the context of Sweden, the EC doubted the compatibility of the 
merger with the common market on the basis of the removal of an important competitive 
constraint. 
In Norway, the EC was similarly concerned about the loss of JET as an independent 
player. In the Norwegian market, the four main retailers (SH, Shell, Esso and YX Energi) 
all had a number of fuel depots in the country and the retailers all had agreements in 
place to access each other’s depots. However, JET Norway (the fifth-largest competitor 
with a market share of only [0-5%]) had been unable to conclude agreements with the 
four. JET had no depots despite entering the market many years earlier (1992). Rather, 
JET Norway got its fuel from a JET Sweden depot near the border between the two 
countries. SH argued that JET’s small presence in Norway meant that the increase in 
market share SH would enjoy upon completing the merger was limited. They further 
argued against the idea of JET representing a strong competitive constraint pre-merger, 
given that their fuel supplies came from their depot in Sweden. Moreover, just as they 
did in the Swedish market, SH claimed that JET was a price follower. Contrary to these 
claims, the EC ruled that JET did exert a significant competitive constraint over its rivals. 
Whilst they did not refer to the maverick term, their arguments were well-aligned with the 
maverick concept and similar to those made in the case of Sweden, where the concept 
was explicitly referred to. 
Firstly, the EC argued that JET’s incentives were different to those of the four major 
retailers – a notion that is central to much maverick theory. JET was the only player with 
purely automated fuel stations. Since automated stations have lower costs, this enabled 
JET to price aggressively in comparison to full-service stations. Additionally, just as in 
Sweden, JET offered simple net prices whereas their rivals commonly offered rebates 
and loyalty schemes. Moreover, the lack of agreements with rivals over depots affected 
JET’s incentive structure. 
Secondly, the EC argued that JET constrained the behaviour of its rivals, which was of 
particular importance since the market was characterised by high barriers to entry. As in 
                                                          
90 M.4919 StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips (2008), page 17. 
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the Swedish case, they highlighted the efficiency and profitability of the company, as well 
as the fact that JET systematically undercut its rivals. The firm’s ability to respond to its 
competitors was apparent in SH’s internal documents and consumer perceptions 
revealed that JET was viewed as a low-cost supplier. Furthermore, the EC conducted 
econometric analysis and found that the presence of a JET station had constrained 
Statoil’s prices. This followed the same format as the analysis of Sweden and was 
subject to the same robustness checks in response to SH’s critique. Moreover, in the 
case of Norway the results of the EC’s pricing analysis were consistent with an 
independent study by PFC Energy, which found JET to be the main driver of petrol prices 
in southeast Norway. 
Thus, in both Sweden and Norway, the EC’s concerns over the merger were oriented 
around the maverick concept, despite the fact that the maverick terminology was not 
used in the latter. In both markets the EC established that JET represented a significant 
constraint over its rivals and expressed concern over its potential elimination from the 
market. By contrast, in the case of Denmark, “econometric analysis of pricing data 
carried out by the Commission did not show that JET Denmark had any significant impact 
on Statoil’s prices.”91, and so the EC had no competitive concerns in the Danish market. 
Overall, the EC’s portrayal and treatment of JET in the case is consistent with the 
depiction of the maverick concept in guidelines. However, the fact that in both markets 
concerns were related to unilateral effects deviates from the wording of guidelines. 
 
3.3.3 T-Mobile/Orange (2010) 
Case M.5650 involved the creation of a new company via a joint venture (JV) between 
T-Mobile UK (wholly-owned by Deutsche Telekom) and Orange UK (wholly-owned by 
France Télécom). The JV was to encompass the mobile businesses of both T-Mobile 
and Orange as well as the broadband business of the latter. Each of the parent 
companies would hold a 50% stake in the venture. The EC investigated the case 
following a referral request from the UK’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT). The OFT had two 
primary concerns. First, they were concerned that the transaction would affect the ability 
of another company (3UK), to compete in the UK mobile market. Second, they 
expressed concern over the 1800MHz band of the radio spectrum, which was important 
for the emerging fourth generation (4G) mobile network. They felt that transaction might 
result in the JV holding a monopoly over the 4G network. 
                                                          
91 Ibid. page 12. 
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The EC considered four markets in their analysis of the case: “Mobile 
Telecommunication Services to End Customers”, “Wholesale Access and Call 
Origination on Public Mobile Telephone Networks”, the “Wholesale Market for 
International Roaming” and the “Wholesale Market for Mobile and Fixed Call 
Termination”. The EC ultimately concluded that each market would remain competitive 
post-merger. However, they decided that their rulings in the first two markets (“Mobile 
Telecommunication Services to End Customers” and “Wholesale Access and Call 
Origination on Public Mobile Telephone Networks”) could not be disconnected from the 
concerns expressed by the OFT. The EC’s report stated that decisions regarding the 
first two markets were “…subject to the analysis of 3UK’s RAN sharing agreement with 
T-Mobile and the spectrum concentration”92 The EC ultimately found issues in both of 
these dimensions. Of particular relevance to our subject is the former since 3UK was 
identified as the maverick. 
Prior to the proposed transaction, 3UK had a radio access network (RAN) sharing 
agreement with T-Mobile. The agreement was a JV to integrate the RANs of the two 
companies, with the objective of creating a single 3G network. In addition to this 3UK 
had a 2G national roaming agreement with Orange. The Mobile Network Operator 
(MNO) side of 3UK exclusively consisted of a 3G network and so the company relied on 
the 2G agreement to ensure it had the necessary coverage to satisfy its customers93. 
3UK expressed concern that following the transaction these existing agreements might 
be in jeopardy since Orange would have an incentive to refuse to renew the roaming 
agreement, or impose higher roaming charges, and T-Mobile might terminate the RAN 
sharing arrangement. Thus, they argued that the merger potentially threatened their 
status as a maverick competitor. 
The EC focused its analysis on the RAN agreement, since 3UK’s business plan was 
oriented around the 3G network. Upon analysis, the EC concluded that post-merger the 
notifying parties “might have the ability to terminate or, at least, compromise the 
functioning of the existing 3G RAN sharing agreement to the detriment of 3UK”94 
Moreover, the EC accepted that without the agreement 3UK would struggle to remain 
profitable; it would be extremely difficult to create a separate nationwide network in a 
timely and cost effective manner and so they would likely lose custom and potentially 
                                                          
92 M.5650 T-Mobile/Orange (2010), pages 13-14. 
93 MNOs were the owners of mobile networks, as opposed to Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) who offered 
services to customers. Some companies were integrated (encompassing both), whilst some companies were MVNOs 
with agreements with MNOs (who acted as ‘hosts’). In the case of 3UK, they had their own network for 3G services but 
relied on Orange as the host MNO in the case of 2G. 
94 Ibid.  page 18. 
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exit the market. As a result the EC stated that it had doubts over the transaction’s 
compatibility with the common market on the basis that the notifying parties had the 
ability and incentive to eliminate 3UK. 
The Commission used market shares and switching data to establish the maverick in 
this case. The concept arose in the EC’s preliminary analysis of the structure and 
characteristics of the market for the provision of “Mobile Telecommunication Services to 
End Customers”. In considering the parties as important competitive forces the 
Commission first ruled out the notifying parties as potential mavericks. Neither Orange 
nor T-Mobile were considered a maverick because both had lost market share in recent 
years. By contrast, the EC stated that 3UK had increased its number of customers. 
Moreover, 3UK had captured a disproportionate amount of the custom lost by Orange 
and T-Mobile. “3UK could be considered more as a ‘maverick’ in the market since it 
captures more customers from Orange and T-Mobile than its market share would 
suggest.”95 Moreover, with regard to pricing, neither of the notifying parties was the 
cheapest provider. 3UK was cheapest in two key sub-markets (the “business segment” 
and “long-term post pay contracts”, whilst O2 charged the lowest prices in the “prepay 
segment”). Based on this evidence, the Commission identified 3UK as a more likely 
maverick and “an important driving force for competition on the UK mobile market”96 
In its referral request, the OFT hinted at the potential maverick status of 3UK. The 
request explicitly expressed concern over the impact of the merger on 3UK97. “The OFT 
was concerned that the parties might have the incentive and ability to foreclose or 
marginalise 3UK. This would result in a risk that 3UK could be significantly weakened as 
a competitor or exit the UK mobile market. This would effectively reduce the vertically 
integrated competitors from five to three and could cause significant detriment to 
competition in mobile retail communication.”98 The OFT clearly felt that 3UK imposed 
competitive constraint on the notifying parties, and that if the merger was allowed this 
constraining role would be compromised. 
Moreover, there was agreement amongst market participants that 3UK was something 
of a maverick. The firm was “considered by several market players as an important 
competitive force… driving innovation… and lower prices for consumers”99. These 
descriptors are consistent with the portrayal of maverick behaviour given in horizontal 
                                                          
95 Ibid. page 13. 
96 Ibid. page 13. 
97 It should be noted however, that the OFT did not explicitly describe 3UK as a maverick. It was the Commission that 
labelled the firm in this way. 
98 Ibid. page 3. 
99 Ibid. page 20. 
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merger guidelines, thus the EC was consistent in this regard. Furthermore, the report 
highlighted the fact that 3UK had a relatively low market share [5-10%] but played a 
more significant role than this market share would suggest. This is consistent with the 
application of the concept in the maverick literature. However, the EC’s classification of 
3UK as the maverick was not consistent in other regards. Recall that in EC guidelines 
the maverick is only mentioned as an insider to the merger, and yet 3UK was external 
to the transaction. However, as we have shown, the concept is often applied to outsiders 
– this case is not alone in this regard. 
In most cases where a third party maverick was considered, such as 
DONG/Elsam/Energie E2 and Südzucker/EDFM the EC ultimately decided that the firm 
was not fulfilling the role100. This was typically due to a lack of evidence of aggressive 
pricing, a lack of evidence that a firm could capture market share from its rivals, or an 
overall assessment that market conditions were not compatible with the concept. Thus, 
T-Mobile/Orange was unusual in the sense that an outsider maverick was actually 
established. In general, evidence suggests that on balance the EC prefers to avoid false 
positive/Type I errors when it comes to mavericks. In T-Mobile/Orange, the OFT’s 
concern over 3UK likely reinforced and guided the EC’s decision to label the firm as a 
maverick. This is one explanation. Another can be derived from earlier EC cases into the 
mobile communications industry. Recall that in T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring the maverick 
concept was also applied and so the EC had a precedent for relating the concept to the 
market. Moreover, though it corresponded to a different national market, the T-Mobile 
Austria/tele.ring case culminated with a set of remedies geared towards marking 
Hutchison 3G (the same company as 3UK) the new maverick in the Austrian mobile 
telecommunications market.  
 
3.3.4 Concluding Remarks on These Cases 
From considering the wording of Travelport/Worldspan we observed that in order to 
identify a firm as maverick the EC required evidence that its prices were significantly 
lower than those of its rivals, as well as evidence of a tendency to increase market share. 
Indeed, in T-Mobile/Orange the EC ruled out the merging parties as candidate mavericks 
because they had no track record of market share growth. By contrast, the maverick 
(3UK) had a history of increasing its market share, and in particular taking custom from 
the two notifying parties (T-Mobile and Orange). This latter fact underscored the 
                                                          
100 M.3868 DONG/Elsam/Energie E2 (2006) and M.6286 Südzucker/EDFM (2012). 
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authority’s decision in the case. Moreover, in Travelport/Worldspan we noted that in 
order for the concept to raise concerns the EC needed to establish that the merged firm 
would have reason to raise prices post-merger. This is consistent with existing theory, 
for example Baker and Shapiro (2007)101. 
In both Travelport/Worldspan and StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips the notifying parties’ 
counter-arguments to the suggestion that a particular firm was maverick revolved around 
arguing that the proposed party was in fact a price follower rather than an instigator of 
price decreases. The success of arguments generally depended on the available 
evidence. In the StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips case, the EC established a maverick since 
they had evidence from customer opinions102, internal documents, and their own 
econometric analysis – a strong body of evidence. By contrast, in the Travelport case, 
the opinions of market participants refuted the idea of Worldspan being the maverick 
and ultimately the EC had insufficient evidence to establish the firm as such. 
In the first two cases we discussed, the concern was clearly the removal of a maverick 
(i.e. concern over a firm no longer fulfilling the maverick role post-merger). This is 
consistent with guidelines. Yet the concept was related to unilateral effects in these 
cases, which is contrary to guidelines103. Moreover, recall that in Section 3.2 our own 
statistics on the population of cases showed that applying the maverick concept to 
unilateral effects was not uncommon. We will discuss this further in Section 3.4. In the 
final case, T-Mobile/Orange, the concern was somewhat different, relating to the 
foreclosure of an external third party (3UK). However, 3UK was regarded as the 
maverick and so the issue was still based on the transaction affecting the maverick’s 
ability to fulfil a role of constraint. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
In Section 3.2 we presented our analysis of the use of the maverick concept in EC 
merger cases during the period 2000-2013. In Section 3.3 we discussed three interesting 
cases in which the concept was discussed at some length. Here, we consider in greater 
                                                          
101 Baker and Shapiro (2007) outlined two approaches for establishing harm to competition through coordinated effects. 
Under the first, the authority must identify the likely maverick, discuss how a given merger would alter that firm’s 
incentives, and explain how this would make collusion more likely. Under the second, the maverick need not be explicitly 
identified but the authority must show that it is highly probable that a maverick would favour collusion post-merger. 
102 Customers may be privy to certain information that implicates a firm as maverick. Customers have direct, first-hand 
knowledge of the prices and quantities that suppliers offer, as well as insightful information regarding the reputation of 
firms (Tucker, Reiter and Yingling, 2007). 
103 However, it is worth noting that Sabbatini (2014) took the view that the StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips merger “clearly 
involved a maverick firm and should probably [have been] forbidden because of its coordinated effect” (Sabbatini, 2014, 
p.3). 
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detail two important issues that have arisen as a result of this work. Note that these 
issues are related to one another. First, we have noted an increase in the use of the 
maverick concept following the 2004 change in merger regulation. Thus, it is appropriate 
to consider the nature and consequences of this change in further detail. Second, we 
have noted inconsistencies when it comes to applying the concept to coordinated or 
unilateral effects. Thus, it is appropriate to consider whether we can reconcile the 
maverick concept with unilateral effects analysis. These two issues are related to one 
another because the 2004 policy change resulted in greater emphasis on the prospect 
of unilateral effects arising from a merger, and prompted the suggestion that coordinated 
and unilateral effects be considered alongside one another (Baxter and Dethmers, 
2005). 
 
3.4.1 Change in Merger Regulation 
European supra-national competition law has been in place since the mid-20th Century 
(Motta, 2004). However, the implementation of the original regulations was not 
consistent (Neven et al, 1993). In particular, there was ambiguity over the interpretation 
of the ‘substantive test’ in merger control. One interpretation was that a merger should 
be prohibited if it created or strengthened a dominant position and also impeded effective 
competition. Another was that mergers that created or strengthened a dominant position 
automatically resulted in the impediment of competition. This confusion broadly led to 
under-enforcement. Mergers that produced anti-competitive effects but which did not 
align precisely with the wording of regulation were permitted (Röller and De La Mano, 
2006). Essentially, the problem was how to treat mergers that potentially impeded 
competition but did not create a dominant position. 
Consequently, in 2004 the EC adopted new merger regulation following a two-year 
review process. We have noted that the review coincides with a period in which there 
were zero mentions of the maverick concept in EC merger case reports. This may 
suggest a hesitance on the part of the EC to apply niche concepts, such as that of the 
maverick, during this period of review. Moreover, in general, the number of decisions 
published during this time was lower, suggesting a broad reluctance to intervene during 
the period of uncertainty. 
Following the review the new regulation rephrased the substantive test, placing greater 
emphasis on the impediment of effective competition. The change clarified existing ideas 
whilst broadening the parameters of merger analysis. Instead of considering whether a 
merged firm would have significant market power, emphasis shifted to considering 
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whether the degree of market power increased significantly as a result of the transaction 
(Röller and De La Mano, 2006). What we note with respect to mavericks is that the 
change appears to have stimulated an increase in the use of the concept and also a 
widening of its application in merger cases. For instance, we observed that the maverick 
concept is now regularly applied to unilateral effects. In general, evidence suggests that 
the change in policy resulted in an increased reliance on unilateral effects analysis and 
limited application of coordinated effects (Dethmers, 2005; Davies et al, 2011). Indeed, 
in our data, we find that maverick cases earlier in the sample were related to coordinated 
effects whilst later ones tended to be concerned with unilateral effects, or both. 
The five cases which established mavericks all came after 2004. In these cases we note 
that three related the concept to unilateral effects, one to coordinated effects and one 
concerned foreclosure. An explanation for this is that EC thinking on the subject of 
mavericks has evolved alongside the general changes to the substantive test. However, 
these changes clearly have not yet filtered through to the wording used to depict 
mavericks in guidelines, which still do not relate the concept to unilateral effects (EC, 
2013). We may speculate that future editions of guidelines may link the maverick concept 
to both types of effects, given that this already appears to be the stance that the EC has 
adopted in practice. 
However, existing theoretical literature has not yet explained exactly how the concept 
relates to unilateral effects104. Whereas mavericks have clearly been shown to influence 
successful collusion via asymmetry, it is less clear that the acquisition of a maverick 
would necessarily produce a unilateral increase in prices. For example, as we mentioned 
in the introduction to this chapter, merger guidelines themselves have suggested that 
efficiency savings and cost reductions could hypothetically enhance the effectiveness of 
a maverick post-merger (DoJ and FTC, 2010). Note that this was in the US version of 
guidelines. Nonetheless, if this were the case, one would not expect to observe higher 
prices but in fact the opposite. 
 
3.4.2 Reconciling the Concept with Unilateral Effects Analysis 
In our sample of cases we have observed that the maverick concept has often been 
applied within unilateral effects analysis, despite this being contrary to existing maverick 
theory. Indeed, it has attracted at least some criticism. For example, commenting on the 
T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring case, Charles River Associates (2006) describe the use of the 
                                                          
104 Note that our attempt in the preceding chapter strictly related the concept to coordination. 
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maverick concept as misleading because “Any unilateral effects analysis must model 
accurately any firm which adopts a business strategy of low cost/low-price. The word 
“maverick” adds nothing to the analysis.” (Charles River Associates, 2006, p.1). It is 
therefore debatable whether the change in merger policy means it is now appropriate to 
apply the concept to unilateral effects (as we expounded in the previous subsection) or 
whether explicit identification of the maverick is just not necessary when it comes to 
unilateral effects analysis. 
Use of the term “maverick” would certainly seem to be unnecessary when the concept 
is being applied to an outsider to a merger. Ceteris paribus, we would expect a maverick 
outsider to remain so post-merger, at least in the short term. It is not immediately 
apparent why a merger of two non-mavericks would cause a third party maverick to 
cease to fulfil this role. The notion of unilateral effects is based on the idea that the 
merging parties internalise an externality and that this results in higher prices. In other 
words, whereas before they were setting prices individually, post-merger they set them 
jointly. The size of this effect crucially depends on the degree of substitutability between 
insiders and outsiders to a merger. Hence, unilateral effects analysis should take into 
account the business models of outsiders, irrespective of whether those outsiders are 
labelled as maverick or not. The concept therefore adds little to unilateral effects analysis 
when the maverick in question is an outsider. 
What about when the maverick is an insider? Unilateral effects analysis has been 
criticised for the fact that it assumes that both merging firms continue to operate post-
merger (Froeb, Scheffman and Werden, 2004). It does not, therefore, take into account 
product repositioning or the possibility that one firm exits the market altogether. This, of 
course, is precisely the worry authorities have with the removal of a maverick firm. 
Hence, it is possible that by using the maverick concept alongside unilateral effects 
arguments the EC may be strengthening its case for one of the firms exiting the market. 
In other words, perhaps identifying one of the merging parties as a maverick helps the 
EC to establish that that firm will be closed down post-merger, as opposed to the 
traditional view that the outcome of the transaction is simply a change in ownership. This 
was certainly the case in T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring, where unilateral effects were the 
main concern and where the EC assumed that tele.ring would be removed from the 
market following the merger. Likewise, in Oracle/Sun Microsystems, the EC argued that 
the maverick (a subsidiary of Sun Microsystems) could be “downgraded” post-merger, 
and the remedies imposed in the case addressed this concern. 
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Based on our analysis it is difficult to conclusively state whether the increased use of the 
maverick concept in relation to unilateral effects is the result of an evolution in the 
understanding and interpretation of mavericks or an evolution in the understanding of 
unilateral effects. As unilateral effects have been given greater prominence since the 
2004 policy change, it may simply be a case of maverick theory lagging behind broad 
changes in competition policy enforcement105. Alternatively, it may be that the maverick 
concept is being used to address a gap in unilateral effects analysis. This is a subject 
that requires further investigation in order to be fully understood. It is worth noting that 
Baker (2002), one of the most influential maverick papers to date, advocated a bigger 
role for mavericks in merger analysis in general. Baker’s whole paper was geared 
towards championing the idea of giving the maverick concept a central role in merger 
analysis overall. Perhaps this is precisely what authorities have attempted to do in recent 
years. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the use of the maverick concept in EC merger cases 
during the period 2000-2013. Section 3.2 detailed statistics demonstrating the extent 
and nature of its application during this time. What we found was that the concept was 
applied relatively sparingly. Of those cases where remedies and/or further analysis were 
required by the authority, the concept was referred to in just 8% of case reports. 
Moreover, of those cases that applied the concept, only just over one fifth resulted in the 
EC conclusively establishing a maverick firm. 
In addition, we have observed that the manner in which the notion is typically used in 
practice is misaligned with the way it is currently depicted in merger regulation. In 
particular, the concept is often applied in the context of unilateral effects, something 
which at present is not allowed for in guidelines. Given the shift in EC merger policy 
toward more of a unilateral effects focus after 2004, we have speculated that this is a 
case of guidelines being slow to catch up with practice. However, in the previous section 
we proposed an alternative possibility, that the maverick concept may be being used 
(perhaps wrongly) to simply address a gap in unilateral effects analysis. 
Via our analysis of specific cases, and the information this has revealed about the EC’s 
attitudes towards mavericks, we can see that the identification of particular behaviours 
                                                          
105 Though, in an ideal world, the direction of causality is wrong if this is true. Ideally, theory should inform competition 
policy enforcement and not the other way around. 
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is central to establishing a firm as maverick. As we outlined in Section 3.3, the EC clearly 
requires evidence of historically favourable behaviours (from a consumer point of view) 
in order to classify a firm as maverick. In the cases we surveyed this has included 
evidence of charging lower prices (or being proactive in lowering prices), evidence of 
constraining the prices of rivals, and evidence of expanding market share. The presence 
of one or all of these behaviours is seemingly needed to definitively establish a maverick. 
This finding is of interest for our purposes given the objective of the remainder of this 
thesis. In the coming chapters, our aim is to develop an empirical means of identifying 
maverick firms. Thanks to our findings in this chapter we now know what kinds of 
behaviours we wish to identify. Moreover, the EC’s strong desire for evidence of these 
behaviours underscores the fact that an empirical method of maverick identification 
would be desirable. No such method currently exists. As we have seen, the EC more 
commonly relies on qualitative evidence such as the opinions of market participants to 
“identify” a maverick. However, these are subjective and potentially open to abuse. 
Therefore, if we were able to develop an objective empirical test of maverickness this 
would be extremely valuable to authorities conducting merger analysis. 
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Chapter 4: Data 
4.1 Introduction 
An issue we have not yet addressed is the lack of an empirical means of maverick 
identification. As we have illustrated, mavericks are often classified by qualitative 
reasoning - using prior knowledge of an industry and the perceptions of rival firms and 
customers in order to argue the maverick status of a given firm. For example, in the case 
of SCA/Georgia-Pacific Europe the notifying parties argued that GPE was not a maverick 
and the EC agreed after their argument was corroborated by third party opinion106. 
Decisions of this type are common in EC cases. EC merger analysis has occasionally 
adopted empirical methods in order to prove the “maverickness” of a certain firm, yet in 
all such cases the party was initially implicated by qualitative means. For instance, in 
StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips econometric techniques were used to show that the 
presence of JET fuel stations constrained the prices of Statoil, but this analysis came 
after the EC had reasoned that JET was a maverick that might pose a constraint to its 
rivals107. 
Thus, the EC have in the past relied on their perception of industry dynamics alongside 
somewhat anecdotal evidence in order to implicate potential mavericks. On the contrary, 
it would be preferable to have a clear and objective empirical approach to identification 
that does not rely on preconceptions or conjecture. “Although the analysis of unilateral 
effects relies a great deal on economics and econometric techniques developed over 
the last two decades, the analysis of coordinated effects is not approached with the same 
scientific rigor… Indeed, there are no known techniques to identify maverick firms” 
(Breunig and Menezes, 2008, pp.811-812)108. A quantitative test of maverickness would 
be desirable in order to remove any bias, improve the clarity of decisions and to minimise 
disagreement. Such a test could reduce the costs of the merger process for notifying 
parties and authorities alike. 
The remaining chapters of the thesis are therefore devoted to developing and testing 
empirical strategies for maverick identification. As we mentioned in the introduction to 
the thesis, the only existing objective attempt at empirical identification was that of 
Breunig and Menezes (2008), who sought to identify the maverick in the Australian 
                                                          
106 M.6455 SCA/Georgia-Pacific Europe. 
107 M.4919 StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips. 
108 This quote is interesting given the findings of the preceding chapter. If it is believed that it is appropriate to relate 
mavericks to unilateral concerns then this quote could be taken as support for the need for an empirical method of 
maverick identification. Alternatively, considering it from another angle, we could argue that mavericks have begun to be 
related to unilateral effects as a consequence of the lack of “scientific rigour” in coordinated effects analysis. 
57 
 
mortgage market109. Our approach therefore begins with a replication of the BM method. 
However, as we shall see, the method has certain limitations. As a result, two alternative 
methods are proposed and tested. These alternatives utilise cointegration and 
asymmetric cointegration, respectively. The three attempts are chronicled in chapters 5, 
6 and 7. However, before we begin it is first appropriate to give an account of the dataset 
upon which our analysis will be conducted. This is presented in the current chapter. 
Our analysis is focused on the UK banking industry. More specifically, we will attempt to 
identify the maverick in the UK instant access bank and building society (deposit) 
account market. Our reasons for choosing this market are threefold. First, it is closely 
aligned with the market analysed by Breunig and Menezes (mortgages), meaning we 
can apply the BM method to our data with only minimal changes. This is valuable since 
we can more easily compare our findings with those of Breunig and Menezes (2008). 
Second, it is a market in which prices are relatively transparent and readily available, 
since rates are published by banks and compiled and disseminated by financial 
organisations110. The BM method attempts to identify mavericks on the basis of their 
pricing behaviour, and so the availability of price data is crucial to the method’s 
successful implementation. Third and most importantly, the industry is one in which 
mergers are commonplace. UK banking has undergone considerable consolidation 
during recent years. There have been multiple building society mergers and some very 
large acquisitions, such as Halifax/Bank of Scotland in 2001, Lloyds TSB/HBOS in 2008, 
and the acquisitions of Abbey National, Bradford & Bingley and Alliance & Leicester by 
Banco Santander. Since the maverick concept is first and foremost a consideration of 
merger policy (maverick identification would be conducted by authorities as part of the 
analysis of a merger) it makes sense to choose a market in which mergers often occur.  
 
4.2 The Dataset 
The data have been constructed using historical figures from Moneyfacts PLC, who 
provide a rich source of data on interest rates (i.e. “banks’ prices”)111. Moneyfacts 
compile, report and analyse the interest rates offered by UK banks and building societies 
on various financial products such as savings accounts, loans and mortgages, and print 
                                                          
109 Ivaldi, Mitraille and Mueller (2012) attempted to prove the maverickness of a particular firm by showing that said firm 
constrained the prices of its rivals – just as in the handful of EC cases mentioned above. Similarly, Kovacic et al (2005) 
used empirical means to show that a particular firm influenced industry prices. However, Breunig and Menezes (2008) is 
the only paper to date that attempts to identify a maverick with no preconceptions about the maverick’s identity. 
110 Ultimately, we want to be able to generalise our methods to a wide range of industries, however it is sensible to start 
with a market in which prices are relatively transparent. If the methods are unsuitable for such an industry then this would 
naturally preclude their application to more complicated contexts. 
111 Appendix J contains a list of all of the banks in our sample, alongside the abbreviations they have been assigned. 
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these in a monthly magazine alongside other financial data and economic commentary. 
As a data source, Moneyfacts is comparable to Cannex, which was the source of data 
for the Breunig and Menezes (2008) study. It is an excellent source of product-level data, 
the like of which is not available in many other nations, and it has been used by UK 
competition authorities as well as the Bank of England and the Treasury112. Moreover, 
note that there is a precedent for using Moneyfacts data in academic work, with studies 
such as Costanzo and Ashton (2006), Fuertes and Heffernan (2009) and Elliott and Wei 
(2010) having utilised their data to explore a variety of topics – in the named studies: 
product innovation and consumer choice, interest rate transmission, and regulatory 
intervention, respectively. 
Our dataset has been built retrospectively using figures on “Bank and Building Society 
Accounts” that were reported in 120 editions of Moneyfacts magazine during the 
calendar years 2000 to 2009113. The full dataset comprises 79674 observations of 
interest rates on 2402 different accounts (i.e. “products”) offered by 168 different banks 
and building societies. Accounts differ in terms of notice periods, perquisites, penalties, 
terms and conditions. Moreover, rates for a given account usually varied according to 
deposit level, with higher deposit customers typically afforded better rates of interest. As 
a consequence, each observation includes the rate offered at nine different deposit 
levels ranging from £1 to £100,000, where applicable114.  
The most common notice terms were Instant Access, no notice (“None”) and 30 Day115. 
Of the 79674 total observations, 28461 relate to instant access accounts, 15458 to no 
notice accounts and 7063 to those with a 30 day notice period. The remaining 28692 
observations correspond to accounts of numerous other notice periods, varying from 
those with less than two weeks’ notice to multi-year bonds or a fixed future notice date. 
The majority of accounts paid interest on an annual basis however some paid interest 
monthly, quarterly, and so on. As a result, in some cases the dataset includes different 
versions of the same account116. 
                                                          
112 See for example the Bank of England: www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2010/fsr10jun1.ppt or 
www.moneyfactsgroup.co.uk/publications/reports. 
113 Banking regulation is very complex, particularly during the period that we analyse in this thesis. From April 2013 
onwards the Financial Services Act 2012 implemented a new regulatory framework for financial services in the UK, 
however during the period under consideration UK banks were regulated by several different authorities including the 
Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England, and the Treasury, each of with had different remits (Competition and 
Markets Authority, 2015). Banks are also subject to the Basel Accords, an international regulatory framework that covers 
capital adequacy and market liquidity (www.bis.org). 
114 Not all accounts were offered at all deposit levels. 
115 In the case of both instant access and no notice, money can be withdrawn from an account without prior notice. 
Effectively, the difference between the two is that with the former the customer has a bank card with which to withdraw 
cash from automated teller machines, whereas in the latter they have to go into a branch to withdraw their money. 
116 For instance, Woolwich’s “Branch Saver” and “Branch Saver Monthly” appear separately in the raw data.  
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Direct comparisons between accounts are complicated by the slight differences brought 
about by the varying notice periods, terms and so on. For example, it would be 
inappropriate to compare an instant access account with a 30 day notice account since 
customers who require immediate access to their money are typically given a lower rate 
of interest. Similarly, it would be inappropriate to compare an account that pays interest 
annually with one that pays it monthly since the former usually give a higher rate in order 
to compensate for accruing interest less frequently. This poses problems for our analysis 
since, for example, a bank that offered a high number of instant access/monthly interest 
accounts would naturally appear to offer worse rates of interest than a bank that had a 
high number of long-term/annual interest products117. Thus, whilst we would obviously 
like to include in our analysis as much data as possible to get a more complete picture 
of bank pricing, it is necessary to narrow the product scope118. 
There are other non-price characteristics that differentiate the products in the sample. 
One source of such differentiation is via deposit insurance. In the UK, the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) protects customers against bank insolvency, 
to some extent119. However, many banks and building societies operate under the 
umbrella of a larger banking group. Any customers with existing accounts that are 
looking to open subsequent ones may not regard two potential products as direct 
substitutes if one of them is offered by a bank in the same network as their existing 
accounts, since their level of protection would be a factor in their decision. Thus two 
accounts that appear near identical in our data might not be perceived as such by all 
customers. 
Moreover, the fact that some banks in the sample are part of wider branch networks, 
and others are foreign banks, should be acknowledged. These features contribute to 
differentiation in the sample. Products that are offered by firms that are part of the same 
network may follow similar pricing trends, or may be subject to strategic pricing 
behaviour. Thus we may question whether there is genuine competition between 
products that are offered by entities within the same group. In terms of foreign banks, 
their operations in other markets may impact their behaviour as well as the way these 
products are perceived by customers. These factors contribute towards the fact that not 
all products in the sample are strictly like-for-like substitutes. 
                                                          
117 The rates offered on accounts would not be the only factor considered by prospective customers. Factors such as 
account fees and levels of staffing would also have an influence (Dick, 2008). Moreover, as we discuss in this chapter, 
there are many other non-price factors that distinguish between products. 
118 Narrowing the product scope allows us to be more confident that our results are valid, and increases the likelihood 
that our ultimate assertions over the identity of the maverick(s) will be accurate. Breunig and Menezes (2008) made a 
similar judgement call by limiting their analysis to “ordinary variable rate” mortgages – as we will explain in Chapter 5. 
119 The protection is currently £75000 per person per authorised bank or building society (FSCS.org.uk). 
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Finally, the age of accounts differentiates products in the sample. Often, new products 
come with promotional offers and perks that confer additional benefits for a limited time. 
More generally they are typically priced more competitively. For these reasons, ‘newer’ 
products may not be directly comparable with ‘older’ ones, and customers that have 
recently switched to a product may receive different terms to those that have held an 
account for some time. Indeed, Anderson, Ashton and Hudson (2014) found that the age 
of a product was negatively correlated with the interest rate on offer. This is something 
we will discuss further later in the thesis, alongside the prospect of inertia in customer 
switching, but at this point it should be noted as a complicating factor which contributes 
toward product differentiation in the sample120. 
In sum, the sources of slight differentiation in the sample emphasise the importance of 
market definition. We have stated that it is necessary to narrow the product scope in 
order to minimise the effect of the slight differences between accounts and for our 
eventual conclusions to be valid. Later, we will give consideration to the geographical 
dimension of market definition, since the UK is composed of different nations: England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, the vast majority of firms in our sample 
operate across the whole of the UK and so product characteristics are of more pressing 
concern. It is necessary to narrow the product scope, but it is most feasible to do so on 
the basis of broad characteristics (account type, interest payment intervals) rather than 
the complex array of non-price characteristics we have alluded to above. It was important 
to note and appreciate these other non-price characteristics, but from a practical 
perspective they will not be factored into our narrowing of the market. 
With these considerations in mind, we focus our analysis on instant access accounts 
that paid interest on an annual basis, of which we have 24028 observations for 461 
different accounts offered by a total of 112 banks and building societies121.  The choice 
of this account type is driven by two factors. First, it is the most common type of account, 
allowing us to retain as large a sample as possible. Second, it is one of the least 
differentiated product types, since most firms offered at least one basic instant access 
account. Figure 4.1 below shows the evolution of the average rate offered on this type 
of account for each of the nine deposit levels in each month of our sample. It is clear that 
rates varied considerably during the period, until their well-documented decrease 
following the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. The rates offered at each deposit level 
                                                          
120 It is also important to appreciate that customers are not homogenous either.  
121 We do not discard the rest of the sample. We ultimately run the analysis on the full dataset for the purposes of 
robustness. 
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followed broadly the same pattern, although there was considerable difference between 
the rates offered at the highest and lowest deposit levels, particularly prior to the crisis. 
 
Table 4.1 below gives the average rate offered at each deposit level in each calendar 
year. As we would expect, on average banks offered higher rates of interest to customers 
with larger deposit amounts; in the table, rates increase as we move from left to right. 
From this we note that it may be necessary to conduct analysis at different deposit levels. 
If we were to average across deposit levels to produce a single “representative” interest 
rate for each bank, then any banks that did not offer their products at every deposit level 
would have a skewed representative rate. For example, Butterfield Private Bank (“BPB”) 
only offered accounts to customers with deposits of £10,000 or more. Thus, if we were 
to produce a representative rate, BPB would naturally appear to offer higher rates than 
banks that served customers across the full deposit spectrum. This becomes a problem 
where we are interested in the levels of prices, as is the case in part of the BM approach. 
Table 4.1: Yearly average interest rates by deposit level 
YEAR DEP1 DEP500 DEP1000 DEP2500 DEP5000 DEP10K DEP25K DEP50K DEP100K 
2000 2.92 3.39 3.57 3.88 4.23 4.53 4.75 4.92 5.03 
2001 2.74 2.96 3.10 3.34 3.64 3.93 4.14 4.30 4.41 
2002 1.90 1.96 2.06 2.23 2.47 2.71 2.90 3.04 3.14 
2003 1.77 1.80 1.89 2.02 2.25 2.44 2.62 2.75 2.85 
2004 2.45 2.46 2.55 2.65 2.86 3.05 3.22 3.34 3.45 
2005 2.86 2.92 3.01 3.09 3.28 3.47 3.63 3.75 3.85 
2006 2.85 2.92 2.98 3.05 3.21 3.38 3.54 3.67 3.76 
2007 3.75 3.82 3.92 3.96 4.10 4.26 4.41 4.53 4.62 
2008 3.56 3.63 3.74 3.78 3.89 4.03 4.18 4.29 4.37 
2009 0.96 0.95 1.01 1.03 1.06 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.30 
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Figure 4.1: Average instant access/annual interest 
rates over time, at each deposit level
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In addition to data on individual banks’ interest rates, our dataset also includes the Bank 
of England base rate122. Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the base rate during the 
period. Note that the base rate follows a similar pattern to the average bank rates shown 
in Figure 4.1. This is to be expected; in theory, commercial banks’ rates should track the 
central bank rate, as we will explain.  
 
The relationship between the central bank rate and banks’ rates (known as the “interest 
rate channel of monetary policy”) can be explained as follows. Briefly, the base rate 
represents a cost of funds for banks. Central banks typically ensure that there is a daily 
shortage of cash so that they are able to supply the shortage at whatever price they 
choose – the base rate, otherwise known as the “policy” or “official” rate (Hofmann and 
Mizen, 2004). Since banks are charged this rate it is assumed that it directly affects the 
rates they pass on to their customers123. At the simplest level, if a bank has to pay a 
higher price for funds then it will naturally charge more for lending those funds to 
customers, in the form of higher interest rates on loans and mortgages. With regard to 
interest rates on savings, these also tend to move in the same direction as the policy 
rate. One can think of customer deposits as an alternative source of funds for banks, 
and one that they favour. As the policy rate goes up banks are able to offer their deposit 
customers a better rate of interest because it is offset by the higher rates they charge on 
lending. Policy rate changes are ultimately intended to influence the performance of the 
economy (and consequently the level of inflation) via Aggregate Demand. Higher (lower) 
rates on savings accounts have the effect of decreasing (increasing) the levels of 
consumption and investment in the economy (see for example Mankiw, 2014). 
                                                          
122 As we will explain in the coming chapter, the central bank base rate has an important role to play in the BM method. 
123 See www.bankofengland.co.uk for example. 
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Figure 4.2: Bank of England base rate, 2000-2009
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Despite a broad correlation between the average bank rate and the policy rate, at the 
firm level there were differences in the level and timing of rate changes. To illustrate 
these differences, Figure 4.3 shows the rates of one large bank (HSBC), one building 
society (Furness BS) and one “alternative provider” (Sainsbury’s), alongside the base 
rate. Though these are the rates of specific firms, Figure 4.3 gives an indication of 
variations in the pricing practices of different types of provider.  
 
The levels of the rates offered by the three firms are distinctly different. Moreover, there 
are also noticeable differences in rate adjustments, particularly in the case of HSBC and 
Furness. Whilst the rate of Sainsbury’s appears to broadly follow the base rate, those of 
HSBC and Furness display many more small deviations.  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2
0
0
0
m
1
2
0
0
0
m
5
2
0
0
0
m
9
2
0
0
1
m
1
2
0
0
1
m
5
2
0
0
1
m
9
2
0
0
2
m
1
2
0
0
2
m
5
2
0
0
2
m
9
2
0
0
3
m
1
2
0
0
3
m
5
2
0
0
3
m
9
2
0
0
4
m
1
2
0
0
4
m
5
2
0
0
4
m
9
2
0
0
5
m
1
2
0
0
5
m
5
2
0
0
5
m
9
2
0
0
6
m
1
2
0
0
6
m
5
2
0
0
6
m
9
2
0
0
7
m
1
2
0
0
7
m
5
2
0
0
7
m
9
2
0
0
8
m
1
2
0
0
8
m
5
2
0
0
8
m
9
2
0
0
9
m
1
2
0
0
9
m
5
2
0
0
9
m
9
Figure 4.3: The rates of HSBC, Furness BS and 
Sainsbury's 
BofE HSBC FURN SAIN
64 
 
Chapter 5: The Breunig and Menezes Approach 
 
5.1 Introduction 
We have given an account of our dataset. We now turn to our first attempt at empirical 
maverick identification, a replication of the BM approach. Breunig and Menezes (2008) 
sought to identify the maverick firm in the Australian mortgage market. This chapter 
presents an attempt at applying their methods to an alternative market (UK instant 
access bank accounts), using the dataset we outlined in the preceding chapter. Such a 
replication provides a natural starting point in the exploration of empirical strategies for 
maverick identification. Testing the BM method allows us to fully appreciate the rationale 
behind the only previous identification attempt and helps clarify exactly what we hope to 
achieve when we state that we wish to “identify a maverick”. Thus, replicating the BM 
method is a crucial step on the road to developing an objective empirical test of 
maverickness. 
Breunig and Menezes (2008) adopted a “revealed preferences” approach to 
identification (Baker, 2002)124. They sought to detect the maverick party based on 
observable behaviour; they analysed mortgage providers’ interest rates with a view to 
establishing pricing behaviours that would be considered favourable from a consumer 
point of view. To achieve this they proposed two measures. The first sought to identify 
firms that offered the most favourable rate of interest over the period (the “relative rate 
measure”). Since mortgages are a form of loan and interest is paid by the customer to 
the firm, a low rate of interest was better from a consumer perspective. In addition, 
Breunig and Menezes posited that the timing of rate changes could also be interpreted 
as favourable or unfavourable to consumers. They therefore suggested a second 
measure based on the responses of firms to changes in the central bank policy rate (the 
“responsiveness measure”). Again, since interest is paid by the customer to the firm, 
being quick to follow central bank decreases (or slow to follow central bank increases) 
was favourable to consumers. 
                                                          
124 Baker (2002) suggested three possible approaches to maverick identification. He termed these ‘revealed preferences’, 
‘natural experiments’ and ‘a priori factors’. The first two involve quantitative analysis. ‘Revealed preferences’ amounts to 
observing that one firm is clearly behaving differently to its rivals; for instance where a particular firm prices consistently 
lower than the norm. ‘Natural experiments’ searches for a link between a single firm’s cost conditions and the prevailing 
industry price. The idea is based on the maverick’s supposed ability to constrain its rivals; if market prices increase 
following a unilateral increase in one smaller firm’s costs, then this may indicate that firm as the maverick. Finally, ‘a priori 
factors’ is qualitative and represents the typical approach of authorities; it is the identification of a maverick simply based 
on knowledge and understanding of the relevant market.  
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The composition of Breunig and Menezes’ dataset was similar to our own. Their dataset 
comprised of weekly data on the interest rates offered by individual mortgage providers 
during the period January 2003 to October 2006. The source of their data was Cannex 
(now known as Canstar, a company that compiles and distributes information on 
financial products). They acquired data on a variety of mortgage products but focused 
their analysis on the “ordinary variable rate”, a basic product offered by almost all 
providers. Not all products were offered by all firms. By focusing their attention on the 
“ordinary variable rate” they were able to consider a larger amount of firms in their 
analysis, giving the best chance of accurately identifying the maverick. They augmented 
their dataset with data on the policy rate. The policy rate should impact all banks in the 
same way and so they posited that contrasting responses to changes in this rate would 
be indicative of relative maverickness. The relevant policy rate was the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) cash rate. 
The two BM measures were derived as follows. The relative rate measure was achieved 
by calculating the mean “ordinary variable rate” at each point in time and regressing the 
difference between this and each bank’s rate against dummies for each provider. This 
produced a coefficient for each bank simply representing its position relative to the 
average over the period; i.e. the average difference from the mean rate after controlling 
for time. Accordingly, negative (positive) coefficients indicated that a provider charged a 
rate that was lower (higher) than the mean. Given the mortgage context, those with the 
lowest coefficients were interpreted as potential mavericks. Lower coefficients implied 
that they charged mortgage customers lower rates of interest on their repayments. 
For the responsiveness measure, Breunig and Menezes devised a ranking system which 
incorporated banks’ responses to RBA rate changes as well as “unprovoked” changes 
(those that were not associated with central bank action). For the former, for each 
provider they interacted the number of rate changes following a RBA change with the 
average number of weeks that bank took to react. Increases were assigned positive 
values whilst decreases were assigned negative ones. Greater positive values were 
apportioned to parties that were slower to increase their rate, whilst greater negative 
values were given to those who were slower to follow a decrease. Ignoring central bank 
increases gave firms a positive score whereas ignoring decreases impacted the score 
negatively. For unprovoked changes, a decrease (increase) was assigned a positive 
(negative) value125. The ultimate outcome of the ranking system was that providers that 
instantly responded to central bank changes but were otherwise inert got an overall 
                                                          
125 We will formally state Breunig and Menezes’ ranking metric in the next section, alongside our own interpretation. 
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score of zero. Firms with positive scores were regarded as behaving more favourably 
from a consumer point of view. Those with the highest scores were viewed as potential 
mavericks.  
In terms of results, though there was broad correlation between the outcomes of their 
two measures, Breunig and Menezes regarded themselves as relatively unsuccessful in 
their attempts at identification. Although a particular provider (“ASHL”) scored highest 
under both measures, the authors looked more closely at the most likely mavericks and 
noted that “ASHL ignore the two interest rate increases of the RBA in 2003, but then 
have a large one-off increase…After that point, ASHL appears to follow RBA changes 
as much as the large banks do.” (Breunig and Menezes, 2008, p.826). They found similar 
evidence counting against their other candidate mavericks. Moreover, many firms that 
scored highly by one measure did not score highly by the other. Importantly, they 
concluded that timing played a crucial role in framing maverick behaviour. Though some 
firms appeared to be more maverick in the period overall, the extent to which their 
behaviour would be regarded as maverick varied during the period under 
consideration126. We will discuss these issues, and other problems with the approach, in 
the final section of this chapter. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the BM method as it is applied to 
our dataset. Some augmentations are made to their approach; this is primarily to account 
for the fact that our market of interest is deposit accounts rather than mortgages. Broadly, 
this means that higher rates, rather than lower rates, are regarded as favourable to 
customers. Section 5.3 presents the results for our market and highlights potential 
mavericks in our data. Section 5.4 provides further discussion of the results and 
problems with the method. Where possible, we attempt to address these problems. In 
general, the results of Breunig and Menezes (2008) were not particularly satisfying and 
by applying the method to our own data we are able to observe first-hand the issues they 
encountered. Moreover, we are able to appreciate the difficulties with attempting to 
classify “favourable behaviour” in general. Section 5.5 concludes by considering whether 
the analysis of interest rates (prices) is truly the best medium through which to achieve 
objective maverick identification. 
 
                                                          
126 The time period is important. Firms may act in a seemingly maverick-like manner for some but not all of the period 
under consideration. The implication of this is that under the BM method the set of firms that appear relatively more 
maverick would depend on the time period chosen. Since Breunig and Menezes compute each provider’s score for each 
of their measures for their entire time period, arbitrary changes in period would likely completely change the results. We 
will discuss this limitation in due course. 
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5.2 Methodology 
Our method follows Breunig and Menezes (2008) with some slight alterations due to the 
difference in geographic location and product market. With regard to the former, the 
relevant policy rate for our purposes is the Bank of England base rate rather than the 
Reserve Bank of Australia cash rate. With regard to the latter, the interpretation of 
“favourable” (and consequently “maverick”) behaviour differs for deposits in comparison 
to mortgages. As we have explained, in the context of mortgages a low rate of interest 
is favourable to consumers. This is because interest is paid by the customer to the 
financial institution. In contrast, in the case of deposits, interest payments flow in the 
opposite direction. As a result, behaviours that would be considered favourable or 
unfavourable are broadly inverted. This is important for our interpretation of which firms 
might be maverick. 
As we have outlined, the BM method is composed of two parts: the “relative rate 
measure” and the “responsiveness measure”. For the relative rate measure our 
approach is identical to that of Breunig and Menezes. We calculate the mean interest 
rate for instant access accounts at each point throughout our sample, compute the 
difference between this and each bank’s rate, and regress this against a set of bank 
dummies. The only difference between our application and that of Breunig and Menezes 
is in the interpretation of the coefficients. Since a positive (negative) coefficient implies 
that a bank offered a higher (lower) rate of interest than the mean, banks that have higher 
values for this measure are perceived as more maverick in our case. A positive 
coefficient indicates that a given bank offered above-average interest rates to their 
deposit customers, which is clearly “favourable”. 
For the responsiveness measure, Breunig and Menezes’ ranking took the form: 
ri = I+RBA,i*wI,i – D+RBA,i*wD,i + I-RBA,i*w(0.9)I – D-RBA,i*w(0.9)D + k1Dii*w(0.9)D – k2Iii*w(0.9)I    (5.1) 
Where ri denoted the responsiveness score of mortgage provider i, I+RBA,i represented 
the number of increases by provider i in response to RBA rate increases, wI,i was the 
average number of weeks it took to react to an RBA increase, I-RBA,i was the number of 
occasions where a provider ignored an RBA increase and Iii represented unprovoked 
increases.  D+RBA,i, wD,i, D-RBA,i, and Dii were defined similarly but corresponded to 
decreases.  w(0.9)I and w(0.9)D were weightings that represented the 90th percentile of the 
distribution of average time taken to respond to the RBA rate (across all firms). These 
were included in order to differentiate between instances where firms ignored RBA 
movements and instances of slow response. Unprovoked changes were similarly 
weighted. k1 and k2 were further weightings for the significance of unprovoked changes 
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relative to RBA responses; in other words, k1 = k2 = 1 would relate to the case where 
equal weight was given to both types of change.  
We adapt the BM ranking system in two ways. First, we reverse the sign of terms. The 
outcome of this is that, as in Breunig and Menezes (2008), a positive score is still 
indicative of favourable rate-setting. By doing so we ensure that relatively higher 
(positive) values are consistently indicative of maverickness, both in this chapter and in 
the subsequent chapters. Second, we omit the weighting k. Breunig and Menezes found 
that changing these weightings had no significant effect on the eventual results and so 
we omit them for simplicity. Thus our ranking takes the form: 
ri = D+BofE,i*wD,i  – I+BofE,i*wI,i + D-BofE,i*w(0.9)D – I-BofE,i*w(0.9)I + Iii*w(0.9)I  –  Dii*w(0.9)D (5.2) 
The components of this expression are defined in a subtly different way to those in 
Equation (5.1). The reason for this is that in our sample we typically have multiple 
products (multiple accounts) for each bank. Thus, I+BofE,i is the average number of 
increases by bank i in response to Bank of England policy rate increases, wI,i is the 
average number of months a bank took to react to central bank increases, I-BofE,i is the 
average number of occasions where a bank ignored central bank increases and Iii are 
the average number of unprovoked increases. D+BofE,i, wD,i, D-BofE,i, and Dii are defined 
analogously. By “average” in these definitions, we mean the average across a bank’s 
accounts. Note that an implication of this is that a bank may have adjusted some of its 
accounts in line with policy rate changes whilst leaving others unchanged. Consequently, 
the ultimate values for the components of Equation (5.2) are generally on a much lower 
scale to those in Breunig and Menezes (2008)127. This does not matter per se because 
the comparison of firms is relative. 
There is one other methodological difference between our responsiveness measure and 
that of Breunig and Menezes. In our sample, changes in the policy rate are higher in 
number and much more frequent than in the BM study, and occasionally occur in 
subsequent months. Resultantly, we cap the number of months it could conceivably take 
to respond to a central bank change at 3. If a bank changed its rates more than 3 months 
after a Bank of England adjustment this was treated as an unprovoked change. 
Moreover, where subsequent policy rate changes occurred we assume that individual 
banks’ changes are in response to the last central bank change, since there is no 
                                                          
127 To illustrate this, consider the following example. Take the component that represents increases following a central 
bank increase. In Breunig and Menezes’ original paper each provider had a single product. So if a provider followed all 
five of the RBA increases in their sample, and took on average two periods to do so, they would score 5 x 2 = 10 for this 
component. Now suppose that the provider had two products, and that the rates of the second product did not change in 
line with policy rate changes. Then, the value for the component would be (10+0)/2 = 5. 
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discernable way of knowing for sure. We discuss this issue further in Section 5.4 of this 
chapter. 
 
5.3 Results 
As we outlined in the preceding chapter there is a tendency for banks to offer better rates 
to higher deposit customers. Moreover, not all banks offered products at each deposit 
level. For these reasons, rather than conducting analysis on a single “representative” 
rate for each bank, we apply the BM method to three different deposit levels representing 
“low”, “medium” and “high” deposit customers. We use the deposit levels £500, £5000 
and £50,000 to represent these three categories. These are the second, fifth and eighth 
of the nine deposit levels in the data; we avoid using the extreme deposit categories as 
these are most likely to produce unusual results. Applying the method to different deposit 
levels is particularly important for Measure 1 (the relative rate measure), but we conduct 
analysis on the three deposit levels for Measure 2 as well, for ease of comparison. 
The full results of applying BM Measure 1 to our data are given in Appendix K. Banks 
are sorted by the average coefficient across deposit levels, but results for each deposit 
level can be seen separately. Recall that this coefficient effectively captures the relative 
interest rate a bank offered and that higher values are better for customers. Table 5.1 
below displays the top ten scoring firms by this measure. Similarly, the full results of 
Measure 2 appear in Appendix L with the top ten in Table 5.2 below. Recall that for 
Measure 2 the value represents a bank’s score according to the ranking metric for bank 
responsiveness, and that higher positive values are again better for customers. 
Table 5.1: BM Measure 1 
Bank 
Low 
(£500) 
Medium 
(£5000) 
High 
(£50K) Average 
PO 2.28 2.00 1.66 1.98 
NATC 1.60 1.52 1.40 1.51 
TSCO 1.33 1.34 1.60 1.43 
SBI 1.49 1.40 1.31 1.40 
SUN 1.60 1.28 1.10 1.33 
SAIN 1.25 1.00 0.92 1.06 
TCHR 1.50 1.04 0.44 0.99 
ABBE 0.93 1.00 0.77 0.90 
OTB 1.42 0.87 0.25 0.85 
NEWB 1.55 0.84 0.11 0.83 
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Table 5.2: BM Measure 2 
Bank 
Low 
(£500) 
Medium 
(£5000) 
High 
(£50k) Average 
NWDE 11.71 13.08 13.09 12.63 
IPS 12.73 11.64 6.85 10.40 
TSCO 10.00 8.59 10.02 9.54 
CUMB 10.26 9.41 8.81 9.49 
EARS 9.29 9.24 8.49 9.01 
COD 8.08 8.96 8.90 8.64 
LEEK 8.09 9.05 8.39 8.51 
MANS 7.16 10.23 7.81 8.40 
SCOT 9.16 7.31 7.91 8.13 
TCHR 8.76 7.41 7.41 7.86 
 
First let us consider overall trends in the results. With respect to Measure 1, the average 
coefficient was small and negative: -0.20, -0.17 and -0.12 for the respective low, medium 
and high deposit levels. The majority of banks had negative coefficients, which would be 
regarded as unfavourable for consumers. Only 39, 50 and 51 banks had non-negative 
values, increasing through the respective low, medium and high deposit levels.  
In terms of Measure 2, most banks had a positive coefficient but this is difficult to 
meaningfully interpret. The coefficient is a product of the ranking metric shown in 
Equation (5.2) and the values mean little in isolation; the comparison is strictly relative. 
Since our sample period contains more policy rate decreases than increases and the ‘D’ 
terms are positive in Equation (5.2), it is unsurprising that most of the coefficients were 
positive. Indeed, strictly speaking, zero would not be an appropriate benchmark for 
comparing bank behaviour. Rather, the average coefficient (3.09) would provide a better 
point of comparison128.  
The Post Office (“PO”) scored highest for Measure 1 but was ranked only 23rd in terms 
of Measure 2 with an average score of 3.80 – considerably lower than the top ten 
depicted in Table 5.2. Similarly, Nationwide BS (“NWDE”) scored highest by Measure 2 
but ranked only 35th in terms of Measure 1, averaging 0.22. In general, the banks that 
scored the highest tend to vary from one measure to the other. This is similar to the 
findings of the original paper. Breunig and Menezes noted that, “some [firms] are very 
aggressive on the price dimension but not as aggressive on the time dimension and vice 
                                                          
128 Of note, recall that the outcome of the ranking system was that those banks that responded instantly to policy rate 
changes but were otherwise inert received a score of zero. In our sample, we can see from Appendix L that only 9 banks 
receive such a score for all three deposit levels. This may be an indication of the relative complexity of bank pricing; 
seemingly few banks operate a simple pricing rule based on the policy rate. 
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versa… A maverick may exert steady pressure to keep prices lower, as captured by 
[Measure 1]. Or, the maverick may engage in more frequent cost-cutting that is not long-
lasting but nonetheless exerts downward price pressure on the market. This type of 
behaviour is picked up by [Measure 2].” (Breunig and Menezes, 2008, p.829). In our 
market (as in theirs) it is difficult to reconcile these two behaviours or to determine which 
is more favourable for consumers. As a result, it is difficult to conclusively assess 
maverickness using the BM method. 
That said, Tesco (“TSCO”) and Teacher’s BS (“TCHR”) appear in the top ten for both 
measures. TSCO in particular score very highly in both measures129. This is encouraging 
from the point of view of maverick identification since TSCO is a supermarket for whom 
banking operations represent a peripheral activity, distinct from its core area of business. 
Accordingly, the firm fits the profile of what we might expect a maverick to look like. In 
banking products, TSCO is not a large player. Moreover, as a supermarket, TSCO’s cost 
and management structure would clearly differ from the majority of firms in our sample. 
It is clear from the results of Measure 1 that they chose to offer broadly higher interest 
rates than most firms, and as a relatively new entrant in the realm of financial services 
such higher rates would make sense in order to penetrate the market130. This could be 
facilitated by profits made in their core area of business; we may speculate that they 
could afford to make lower profits in their banking arm because of their success in other 
areas, and that they may have chosen to do so in order to acquire market share. 
Moreover, the fact that we find a relatively new entrant as a candidate maverick is 
consistent with the literature. For example, Tucker and Sayyed (2006) aligned the 
maverick concept with the idea of new entrants, whilst Motta, Polo and Vasconcelos 
(2007) stated that mavericks are rarely long-run competitors. 
Can we glean any further insight by looking more closely at the behaviour of TSCO, our 
candidate maverick? Figure 5.1 below plots the Bank of England base rate against the 
representative rate of TSCO at the low, medium and high deposit levels. 
                                                          
129 TCHR only appear very early on in the data, exiting the sample in October 2002. It is therefore unsurprising that they 
score highly by the BM measures. Rates were generally higher at that time and the period during which they appeared in 
the data coincided with far more policy rate decreases than increases. 
130 Similar practices are commonly employed by new entrants who often operate at a loss in the early stages in order to 
expand their customer base. 
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If we examine the rates of TSCO, we note that their high score for Measure 2 is driven 
by the timing with which they engaged in rate changes. They had few unprovoked 
changes in either direction – their only unprovoked increase was at the high deposit level 
in November 2000, whilst they engaged in unprovoked decreases at all deposit levels 
on two occasions, September 2007 and July 2009. Indeed, their high score in Measure 
2 is not down to unprovoked changes but rather a product of the fact that they quickly 
followed rate increases whilst being slower to follow decreases. Such behaviour is 
favourable to consumers, however, ultimately, would we regard TSCO as the maverick? 
Whilst they offered relatively higher rates (Measure 1) and their responses were 
apparently broadly favourable (in Measure 2), the fact that they only instigated one 
unprovoked increase in rate is at odds with the theoretical depiction of a maverick. One 
would expect a true maverick to deviate from the policy rate and introduce additional, 
favourable rate changes. Furthermore, the fact that TSCO had a greater number of 
unprovoked decreases than increases counts against its identification as a maverick. 
Moreover, recall that theory and guidelines emphasise the constraining effect of the 
maverick. Can we say that TSCO constrained the behaviour of its rivals? We cannot say 
for sure, but the answer is probably no. TSCO was a relatively minor player in the market, 
as evidenced by the fact that each only offered a single account whereas most banks 
and building societies had numerous products on offer. We can only speculate without 
market share and volume data, but it is unlikely that this firm had any great influence 
over other firms in the industry. The ability to constrain rivals is a crucial feature of 
mavericks in the theoretical literature. Indeed, in Chapter 2 we made it central to our 
theoretical discussion and in Chapter 3 we noted that it was important in the EC’s 
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interpretation of maverick firms. Thus, the probable lack of an ability to constrain is 
another reason to doubt TSCO’s maverick status. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
With the initially intuitively pleasing finding of TSCO as a potential maverick, our use of 
the BM method appears somewhat more successful than in the original paper. However, 
on the basis of pricing data alone we cannot conclusively and convincingly confirm the 
identity of the maverick. We would need to consider elements such as market shares 
and the breadth of products on offer. In addition, we can note several criticisms of the 
approach - some of which were addressed by the authors in their original paper, whilst 
others have been mitigated in our replication. Yet, some remain an issue. Moreover, new 
problems have arisen as a consequence of the fact that our dataset is more complex 
than that of the original paper. These criticisms go some way to explaining why the BM 
method may be insufficient as a means of objective empirical maverick identification. 
An issue that Breunig and Menezes (2008) acknowledged is the fact that under Measure 
2 the responses of firms are right-censored. In other words, the response (or non-
response) of firms to central bank changes are impacted by subsequent central bank 
action. Instances of non-response lasted until the next central bank change or the end 
of the sample period. Breunig and Menezes addressed this by weighting instances of 
non-response by the 90th percentile of the distribution of waiting times – something we 
maintain in our replication. However, our data contains many more central bank changes 
than Breunig and Menezes’ sample. As a result, we also capped the possible time of 
response at 3 months. Yet, the greater number of central bank changes creates issues 
in the application of Measure 2. In particular, since policy rate changes often occur in 
subsequent periods there is ambiguity concerning how we should treat subsequent rate 
changes on the part of the firm131. Moreover, our interpretation of these subsequent 
changes impacts the interaction term with the timing of rate changes132.  
Another criticism of the original Breunig and Menezes dataset is that their sample period 
included only increases in the policy rate. A consequence of this is that it was impossible 
to factor in the reactions of firms to decreases in the central bank rate. It is of course 
                                                          
131 For example, suppose a bank increased its rates in subsequent periods during a time when the policy rate was also 
increasing in subsequent periods. There are several possible explanations for the bank’s actions. Subsequent rate 
changes could be (i) additional responses to the original policy rate change, (ii) responses to subsequent policy rate 
changes, or (iii) pre-emptive changes based on expectations about the policy rate. Depending which of these we believed 
to be true, we could calculate the responsiveness measure differently. 
132 In the example given in the previous footnote, if we believed the second change by the firm was an additional response 
to the first policy rate change, then it would not count as a reaction to the second change in policy rate. 
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possible that firms in their market behaved in a consistently maverick way; in other 
words, those firms that were slow or resistant to follow central bank increases may also 
have been quick to follow central bank decreases. However, it is arguably more likely 
that firms that were slow to follow increases would also be slow to follow decreases. In 
other words, the “more maverick” firms in Breunig and Menezes (2008) might simply 
have been those that were broadly inert, and their apparent maverickness may simply 
have been driven by the fact that their sample happened to include only increases in the 
policy rate. Without analysing a dataset that contains both increases and decreases, it 
would be impossible to say for certain. Thus, our replication, using a sample that includes 
movements in both directions, is better suited to capture a more rounded picture of 
maverickness. However, we still have an issue in that the number and magnitude of 
increases and decreases is not equal in our sample – though this is not something that 
can be corrected without reducing the sample length. 
A criticism which applies to both the original study and to our replication is that in 
narrowing the product scope we are unfortunately omitting much data. In the previous 
chapter we outlined our reasons for limiting analysis to instant access/annual interest 
accounts. However, a consequence of this is that we cannot hope to draw conclusions 
in terms of the identity of the overall “maverick bank” during the time period, but rather 
the maverick in the specific “market for instant access accounts that pay interest 
annually”. This is not necessarily a problem. In practice, maverick identification would 
occur as part of the analysis of a proposed merger and authorities would first define the 
relevant market of concern. Thus, provided that the market was accurately defined, the 
methods could still be valid for identifying the maverick in that market133. 
A related issue with Breunig and Menezes’ (2008) original paper is that by limiting their 
analysis to “ordinary variable rate” mortgages they omitted several mortgage providers 
altogether. Moreover, they omitted many of the smaller firms. Given that theory typically 
portrays mavericks as smaller parties, the maverick in Breunig and Menezes’ market 
may have been absent from their analysis altogether. However, as we have explained, 
the actual narrowing of the product scope itself is not an issue per se. 
Nonetheless, Appendices M and N give the results of applying the two BM measures to 
our entire dataset – i.e. data on all types of accounts, rather than just those that were 
                                                          
133 When a competition authority analyses the acceptability of a merger, one of the first actions it takes is to define the 
relevant market in terms of product and geographical scope. This is done in order to establish the parameters of the 
market that the merger is perceived to impact, and plays an important role in the ultimate decision regarding whether a 
merger is acceptable or not (Motta, 2004). Since markets are routinely defined in merger cases our decision to narrow 
the market is not a problem in itself. The key point to note is that it is particularly important to define the market properly 
if an authority wishes to claim a given firm is acting as a maverick, since they could only ever conclusively establish a 
maverick in the specific market that was defined. 
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instant access with annual interest. This acts as a robustness check and a test of 
concerns about limiting analysis to a subset of our data. In terms of Measure 1, what we 
find is that all of the top banks from Table 5.1 slip significantly in the rankings when the 
whole dataset is taken into account. PO, the top ranked bank by the relative rate 
measure, slips to 19th when the full sample is used. TSCO is 43rd. In terms of Measure 
2, some of the top banks from Table 5.2 retain this position in Appendix M. NWDE, the 
top ranked bank, only slips to 3rd and TSCO, which was 3rd in Table 5.2, only slips to 7th. 
However, IPS (the second placed bank in Table 5.2) falls all the way to 75th when the 
full dataset is used134. Overall, we observe that firms that offered favourable terms on 
instant access accounts were not necessarily those that offered favourable terms on all 
accounts. The fact that many firms’ rankings change significantly when the full sample 
is used highlights the importance of product market definition. The products one chooses 
to include and exclude have a bearing on which bank(s) appear more or less maverick. 
This emphasises the need for authorities to carefully consider market definition before 
embarking on attempts at maverick identification. 
One of the biggest issues with Breunig and Menezes’ (2008) attempt is that the time 
period under consideration was arbitrary. The study looked at a period spanning January 
2003 to October 2006 and sought to establish the maverick in the entirety of this period. 
This is also true in our replication (for the period January 2000 to December 2009). 
However, contrary to this, existing maverick theory suggests that the identity of the 
maverick changes over time; different firms may fulfil the role at different points. 
Therefore, attempting to identify a maverick within an arbitrary time period is likely 
misguided. Identification would be unsuccessful unless the parameters of the data 
happened to coincide with the duration of one maverick. Moreover, concerns over the 
arbitrary time period are increased by the fact that we found TSCO, a new entrant, to be 
a strong candidate maverick. New entrants may operate at a loss initially in order to 
expand their customer base, however in the long-run they would likely increase their 
prices. Thus, if we are to accept the coupling of the maverick concept with that of a new 
entrant we must take the view that mavericks only remain so in the short-term (Motta, 
Polo and Vasconcelos, 2007). If maverick status changes regularly it makes them more 
difficult to identify and the chosen time period is crucial. 
We can go some way to addressing this issue by breaking down the time period into 
shorter blocks. If the market under consideration had some natural breaks, or we had 
                                                          
134 To an extent, these results allow us to distinguish those banks that offered favourable rates across all their accounts 
from those that only behaved favourably when it came to their instant access accounts. However, it should be noted that 
some firms only offered instant access accounts. 
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some theoretical basis for believing that the identity of the maverick might change 
following a particular event, then we could divide the data accordingly. One possibility is 
consolidation in the market; we may theorise that the identity of the maverick would 
change after each merger. However, this would not be strictly consistent with theory. As 
we discussed in Chapter 3, mergers are only believed to change maverick status where 
a maverick is an insider to a merger. An outsider maverick is typically assumed to 
continue to fulfil the role (Baker, 2002; Baker and Shapiro, 2007). 
Thus, in the absence of some natural break the best we can do is to subdivide our ten 
year period into smaller (albeit still arbitrary) time periods. The obvious subdivision is by 
individual calendar years. Note that there may be merit to doing so with Measure 1 (the 
relative rate measure) but there is less value to doing so with Measure 2 (the 
responsiveness measure). When we divide the time period the number of changes in 
the policy rate in each period becomes much smaller and so the responses of firms to 
these changes become more extreme; whereas Measure 2 gave us an indication of 
overall behaviour when applied to the whole period, applying it to short periods would 
give a much skewed depiction of bank behaviour. Therefore, Appendices O, P and Q 
present the results of applying BM Measure 1 to individual years in our sample at the 
respective low, medium and high deposit levels. Tables 5.3-5.5 below present the top-
scoring firm in each calendar year for each deposit level. 
 
Table 5.3: BM Measure 1 by year, low deposit level 
Year Bank Measure 1 2000-2009 Rank 
2000 EGG 2.81 14 
2001 EGG 2.18 14 
2002 NEWB 1.83 4 
2003 CITI 2.62 20 
2004 ABBE 1.79 16 
2005 COV 1.79 12 
2006 PO 2.61 1 
2007 PO 2.62 1 
2008 PO 2.74 1 
2009 CITI 2.15 20 
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Table 5.4: BM Measure 1 by year, medium deposit level 
Year Bank Measure 1 2000-2009 Rank 
2000 EGG 2.25 22 
2001 TSCO 1.76 4 
2002 LAMB 1.65 16 
2003 TSCO 1.27 4 
2004 BOS 1.79 11 
2005 BOS 1.71 11 
2006 PO 2.27 1 
2007 PO 2.29 1 
2008 PO 2.38 1 
2009 CITI 2.05 39 
 
Table 5.5: BM Measure 1 by year, high deposit level 
Year Bank Measure 1 2000-2009 Rank 
2000 TSCO 1.83 2 
2001 TSCO 1.89 2 
2002 TSCO 1.62 2 
2003 TSCO 1.58 2 
2004 TSCO 1.59 2 
2005 TSCO 1.52 2 
2006 PO 1.82 1 
2007 PO 1.86 1 
2008 PO 1.99 1 
2009 CITI 1.94 19 
 
These tables emphasise the problem with analysing an arbitrary time period. We can 
see apparent periods in which a particular firm offered the best rates, with instances of 
the same firm scoring highest in subsequent years. For example, during 2006-2008 PO 
clearly offered the highest rates across all three deposit levels, and we can see a clear 
period (2000-2005) when TSCO offered the most favourable rates for high deposit 
customers. These patterns were not picked up when we analysed the ten year period as 
a whole. Thus, we can see why the choice of time period may have a significant impact 
on maverick identification135. 
Returning to criticisms of the BM method, and with regard to Measure 2 specifically, an 
additional comment is that whilst the responsiveness measure captures 
                                                          
135 Moreover, these tables also validate our decision to separate analysis into different deposit levels, since different 
firms clearly offered the best rates to low, medium and high deposit customers. 
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increases/decreases in rates it does not take into account the magnitude of those 
changes. Magnitude is likely to be important. By Measure 2 in its present state a firm 
that made a series of small increases would be perceived as more maverick than a firm 
that made a single large increase of a greater amount. Whether they truly are more 
maverick may or may not be true – the answer relates to the debate over whether the 
level or timing of rates is most important for qualifying maverick behaviour136. However, 
regardless, it would be desirable to incorporate magnitude into our approach. This is 
something we strive to achieve in the upcoming chapters. 
Finally, one last criticism is that we can question the simplicity of the BM measures. 
Whilst the relative rate measure is understandable given the broad intuition that a higher 
(lower) rate of interest is better for deposit (mortgage) customers, financial products are 
more complicated than this. In Chapter 4 we mentioned that there are an array of perks, 
penalties, terms and conditions that differ across products in our sample. Likewise, in 
the case of mortgages as in Breunig and Menezes (2008), these are not straightforward. 
Mortgages are bespoke in the sense that they differ in length, duration of fixed term, etc. 
and their rates depend on aspects such as creditworthiness and the amount of deposit 
a homebuyer has. Thus the relative rate measure, in particular, may be an overly 
simplistic method of capturing the prices of banks. In the context of deposit accounts, it 
is possible that rather than offering higher rates a maverick might offer better perks or 
more lenient penalties on its accounts137. If this were true then maverick behaviour would 
manifest itself in a way other than offering a favourable rate of interest. Thus, we can 
question whether other, less easily quantifiable factors in fact shape maverickness. We 
debate this point further in the conclusion to this chapter. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
With the exception of TSCO, the firms implicated as maverick under one measure of the 
BM method differed from those implicated as maverick under the other. This largely 
parallels the results of Breunig and Menezes (2008). Moreover, as in the original paper, 
when we look more closely at the data we find reason to doubt the maverick status of 
TSCO. In particular, the firm made more unprovoked rate decreases than increases, 
with only one unprovoked increase in the entire ten-year period. Moreover, as we have 
discussed, it is difficult to reconcile the two measures or to establish which of these is 
                                                          
136 In other words, whether greater emphasis should be placed on the relative rate measure or the responsiveness 
measure when identifying candidate mavericks. 
137 In the case of mortgages, we could speculate that a maverick might offer to supply mortgages to consumers with 
lower initial deposit amounts, for example. 
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the most appropriate in the context of our market. We further identified several criticisms 
of the method, some of which we attempted to address in the previous section. However, 
none of these amendments wholly solve the issues. In fact, in addition to problems 
stemming from the original paper, further problems arose due to the complexity of our 
dataset. For these reasons it is desirable to explore alternative methods of maverick 
identification. 
A point of debate is whether price is the most appropriate dimension to assess maverick 
behaviour. Maverick behaviour could theoretically manifest itself in one of several 
different ways. In general, a maverick could offer a lower (or “more favourable”) price 
than its rivals, which in the context of savings accounts translates to offering higher rates 
of interest. However, alternatively, they could offer a product of superior quality. 
Moreover, in some contexts a maverick might innovate more than its rivals. In Breunig 
and Menezes (2008), and thus in our replication, the underlying assumption is that price 
is the dimension through which a firm would be maverick in the context of a banking 
product. This is based on the premise that when depositing one’s savings the rate of 
interest one receives is the key consideration138. However, in the preceding section we 
questioned whether qualitative dimensions such as the perks and penalties attached to 
accounts might provide a better indicator of true maverickness.  
A key point to consider is that “quality” is not easily quantifiable and often subjective. 
This is an issue given that our aim is to develop an impartial and objective method of 
maverick identification. In the context of our market, there may be scope to catalogue 
the perks and penalties associated with different accounts in order to produce some 
proxy of quality. However, in other markets this may be much more difficult139. Given that 
we ultimately wish to generalise our methods so they could be used in any market, 
incorporating non-price characteristics could pose significant problems. Whilst it is true 
that in some industries pricing data may be less transparent than in banking, in general 
prices are more easily obtainable than measures of quality. Moreover, the non-price 
characteristics we mentioned earlier are specific to the particular market. Since non-
price factors are often industry-specific it makes it difficult to devise a method of maverick 
identification based on them that could be applied to any market. 
                                                          
138 An issue that should be acknowledged is that of switching. In our discussions about how maverick behaviour manifests 
itself, we implicitly assume that banks are competing and that customers will choose the ‘best’ account for them; we 
hypothesise that price is the most important characteristic. However, studies have found that some subsets of consumers 
may be relatively inert when it comes to switching bank accounts (Kiser, 2002; Dick, 2008). Hence, competition may not 
be as intense as we are supposing, and price may not be as important as it initially seems. This should be acknowledged 
since it potentially limits the extent to which a ‘maverick’ bank could benefit from offering favourable rates. 
139 Similarly, innovativeness can be a difficult thing to quantify (see for example Swann, 2009). 
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In terms of our market, if we were to develop methods that draw upon the qualitative 
aspects of bank accounts we would introduce subjectivity into our analysis. How do we 
determine whether “Perk A” is more favourable than “Perk B”, or to establish the effect 
of a building society being part of a particular branch network? It is important that we 
maintain objectivity since we wish to develop a means of identification that does not hold 
any preconceptions about the maverick’s identity. Yet, if we were to rank perks and judge 
other qualitative aspects of products, we would be introducing preconceptions. 
Therefore, for these reasons, in the forthcoming attempts at identification we will 
continue to focus on prices as an indicator of maverickness, as opposed to non-price 
alternatives140. 
To conclude on the appropriateness of this method, the approach has several 
deficiencies when it comes to testing for mavericks as such firms are described in the 
theoretical literature. The BM approach has some value in identifying certain crude 
pricing behaviours, but as a method of maverick identification this is of limited value. In 
order for the BM approach to provide a suitable empirical test of maverickness, one 
would have to be certain about the nature of a maverick’s behaviour in a given market, 
and this behaviour would have to be relatively one-dimensional and manifest itself solely 
through pricing. Unfortunately, the literature and our observations from earlier chapters 
imply that this is not the case; maverick behaviour is regarded as more complex. 
Therefore, the method is unsuccessful in testing the theory. Nonetheless, the replication 
proved a useful exercise since it draws attention to the ways in which subsequent 
attempts at identification can be improved. 
In the next two chapters we propose and test alternative methods of maverick 
identification. In exploring other methods, an issue to overcome is the fact that the BM 
method involves two distinct measures which capture different aspects of behaviour. The 
relative rate measure considered the levels of interest rates whilst the responsiveness 
measure captured the timing of rate changes. On the contrary, it would be preferable to 
have a single measure incorporating both of these dimensions. This is something we will 
strive for in our subsequent attempts at identification. 
  
                                                          
140 Moreover, in Chapter 3 we noted that in past cases the EC has stated that it requires evidence that a particular firm 
priced lower than its rivals when conclusively establishing a maverick. This reinforces our view that it is appropriate to 
focus on price. 
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Chapter 6: An Error Correction Approach 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Applying the BM method to our data was a natural starting point in exploring empirical 
strategies for maverick identification. Conducting the replication had certain benefits. It 
allowed us to gain an appreciation for the sentiments behind the only previous attempt, 
and to discover which banks offered the highest rates for instant access/annual interest 
deposit accounts, and which adjusted their rates most favourably according to the BM 
metric. These were the firms that appeared in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. However, 
as we outlined in the preceding chapter our results were subject to many of the same 
issues as Breunig and Menezes (2008). Most pertinently, the two BM measures largely 
implicated different firms as candidate mavericks. We also experienced additional issues 
due to the fact that our dataset was less straightforward than that of the original paper, 
given the greater number of policy rate changes and multiple accounts per bank. 
Moreover, the BM measures arguably over-simplify a mechanism (bank pricing) which 
is fundamentally complex. Thus we strive to explore alternative methods. 
In considering other approaches, it is appropriate to contemplate the following. When we 
state that we wish to identify a maverick, what exactly are we trying to achieve? To 
reiterate, mavericks are often characterised as acting unlike the norm and, specifically, 
behaving more favourably from a consumer point of view. Thus, we are trying to detect 
firms that exhibit favourable behaviour in comparison to their rivals. What would be 
considered “favourable”? In general terms, charging a lower price or offering a superior 
product would be regarded as favourable to consumers. Thus, price and quality are the 
two main dimensions we could consider141. Breunig and Menezes (2008) opted for the 
former in the case of a financial product, an assumption we discussed and agreed with 
in the final section of the preceding chapter. However, favourable behaviour is a relative 
construct. In order to compare the behaviours of rival firms we must either compare firms’ 
prices against the average or use some common factor(s) or cost(s) as a yardstick. 
Breunig and Menezes’ responsiveness measure treated the policy rate as such a 
yardstick. However, is the policy rate the most appropriate choice in our market or should 
we use some other variable? 
Given our market of interest (UK bank and building society accounts) it is appropriate to 
consider the existing literature on banking in order to answer this question. Banking has 
                                                          
141 We have also referred to greater innovativeness as a third possibility. 
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been the subject of countless empirical studies on a wide array of topics. These include 
the analysis of the relationship between market structure and competition (Bikker and 
Groeneveld, 1998; Bikker and Haaf, 2002), studies of efficiency (Aly et al, 1990; Berg 
and Kim, 1994; Sathye, 2001), ownership structure and performance (Iannotta, Nocera 
and Sironi, 2007), and the effect of horizontal mergers on interest rates (Prager and 
Hannan, 1998), in addition to broader studies of pricing behaviour (Hannan and Berger, 
1991; Gambacorta, 2008). Our primary interest in reading this literature is to discover 
what factors affect bank pricing, and in particular which of those factors are firm-specific 
and which are common, since the latter provide possible yardsticks against which to 
compare bank behaviour. 
For firm-specific factors, studies typically used balance sheet information. For example, 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) used ratios such as the ratio of annual interest expenses to total 
funds (as a proxy for the unit price of funds) and the ratio of personnel expenses to the 
total balance sheet (a proxy for the unit price of labour) to approximate marginal costs. 
Similarly, Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) used balance sheet items, such as the log 
of total assets and the ratio of retail deposits to total funding, as controls, and both papers 
also used total assets as a scaling factor. We could therefore use similar proxies to 
explain what drives differences in interest rates across banks – but this is not our goal. 
Rather, our interest lies in identifying contrasting responses to common factors. 
In terms of common factors, Gambacorta (2008) suggested real GDP, inflation, and the 
policy rate as possibilities. The way each of these should affect banks’ rates is as follows. 
First, commercial banks’ deposit rates should depend negatively on real GDP. Higher 
output is synonymous with higher income, which naturally leads to higher savings, 
ceteris paribus. This therefore reduces the incentive for banks to offer a high rate of 
interest to savings customers since as incomes rise the level of deposits is higher 
anyway; banks need not offer a high rate to attract deposits142. Second, banks’ rates 
should also relate negatively to the price level. One explanation for this is that as prices 
rise, so too do bank costs. The greater the level of inflation, the higher the number of 
transactions, and so banks incur additional labour and administrative costs (Hanson and 
Rocha, 1986; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). Finally, with regard to the policy rate, 
Gambacorta (2008) argued that the link between savings rates and money market rates 
(proxies for the monetary policy rate) should be positive. As the money market rate 
increases, risk-free securities become more attractive, thus reducing demand for savings 
                                                          
142 Relatedly, studies have found that bank profitability is pro-cyclical (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008; Albertazzi 
and Gambacorta, 2009). During downturns there is increased risk and so lending tends to decrease – banks hold more 
reserves and offer higher rates on deposits. 
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accounts. Subsequently, one would expect banks to increase their rates to offset any 
reduction in deposits. The link between the policy rate and banks’ rates is also supported 
by the interest rate channel of monetary policy, which we outlined in Chapter 4. 
Of these common factors we are particularly interested in the policy rate, not least 
because of its prominent role in Breunig and Menezes (2008), but also because there is 
a vast literature examining the relationship between policy rates and individual banks’ 
rates – known as the interest rate pass-through (IRPT) literature. Such papers have 
analysed the dynamics of retail and/or corporate interest rates with respect to changes 
in policy rates. Some of the most prominent include Heffernan (1993, 1997, 2002), 
Hofmann and Mizen (2004), De Graeve et al (2007) and Fuertes and Heffernan 
(2009)143. The common aim of these papers was to assess the effectiveness of the 
interest rate channel of monetary policy: to what extent do the actions of monetary 
policymakers influence bank behaviour? 
In order for monetary policy to be effective, changes in policy rates should be passed-
through to commercial rates on a one-for-one basis. We can refer to this as the 
“completeness hypothesis” (De Graeve et al, 2007). Policymakers adjust the policy rate 
by an amount they believe will ultimately produce the desired change in Aggregate 
Demand (AD). For this to be successful financial institutions must pass on any changes 
to customers in full. Incomplete pass-through would weaken the influence of policy since 
AD would not be affected to the extent that policymakers intended. Moreover, rates 
should be passed-through relatively quickly (ideally immediately). If banks were slow or 
resistant to follow changes, or if there was heterogeneity in the speed and extent of 
banks’ responses, then the effectiveness of monetary policy would be compromised. 
Thus, the proliferation of IRPT studies was borne out of the desire to examine the extent 
to which complete and timely pass-through was achieved, typically by assessing pass-
through at the aggregate level144. 
We can immediately observe complementarities between the IRPT literature and the 
work of Breunig and Menezes (2008). The BM method suggests that maverick behaviour 
can be identified in financial institutions via contrasting reactions to policy rate changes, 
whilst the IRPT literature examines the nature of the relationship between banks’ rates 
and policy rates. Thus, on this basis, we are given an indication that the methods 
                                                          
143 With the exception of De Graeve et al, the named studies are focused on the UK and are therefore highly relevant to 
our context. We refer to some studies of other countries below, but we intentionally focus on the UK. 
144 
By implication, policymakers must have faith in the completeness hypothesis, otherwise reviewing the policy rate with 
such regularity (e.g. once a month by the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee) would be of questionable value. 
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prominent in the IRPT literature may inform and guide our approach to maverick 
identification. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the IRPT literature. Ultimately, we 
develop and test an empirical strategy that is based on the methods commonly used in 
the literature: cointegration and error correction. These methods underlie our 
subsequent approach to maverick identification and so Section 6.2 first introduces the 
well-established notion of cointegration. Section 6.3 describes the methodology, 
outlining our assumptions and formally depicting the error correction models we employ. 
We effectively capture the adjustment of each bank’s rates to the policy rate and the 
other common factors identified above, with a view to identifying rate-setting behaviour 
that appears to be unlike the norm. Section 6.4 presents the results of applying the 
method to the same dataset used in the preceding chapter. Section 6.5 provides a 
discussion of the findings, including a comparison of the results with those of Chapter 5, 
and outlines problems with the approach. Section 6.6 then concludes and motivates the 
next chapter.  
 
6.2 Cointegration, Error Correction and Interest Rate Pass-Through 
In analysing the relationship between policy rates and bank rates, IRPT papers typically 
exploit the fact that the policy rate and bank rates are cointegrated in order to fit error 
correction models (ECMs). Before we proceed to review the IRPT literature it is therefore 
helpful to define cointegration and to explain what is meant by an ECM. 
Conventional econometric techniques require weak stationarity in order to be valid. This 
is where neither the expected value, variance, nor covariance of successive values of a 
variable depend on time. By contrast, nonstationarity is where time affects the probability 
distribution of a variable, which poses problems for conventional analysis. We can 
categorise variables in terms of their order of integration. Stationary variables are known 
as integrated of order zero, or I(0). By contrast, many time series trend upward over 
time, making them nonstationary. However, we often find that the differenced series of 
such variables is in fact stationary; in other words, first-differencing may produce a 
stationary series. Such variables are known as integrated of order one, or I(1)145. In the 
presence of nonstationarity test statistics may converge to non-standard distributions, 
parameter estimates can be biased, and spurious relationships are likely (Granger, 
1981). Whilst ordinary least squares regression analysis of I(0) variables can produce 
                                                          
145 A variable’s order of integration can be ascertained using unit root tests. We will elaborate on these in due course. 
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meaningful results, the inclusion of the levels of I(1) series would produce spurious 
regressions (Wooldridge, 2012). 
Whilst this is true, regressions using I(1) variables can yield meaningful results thanks 
to the notion of cointegration. If two or more series are I(1) but a linear combination of 
them is stationary I(0) then the variables are said to be cointegrated146. In simple terms, 
this means that the series move together in the long-run; there is a tendency for them to 
gravitate towards one another over time. To illustrate this more formally, consider the 
following long-run specification: 
X1t = α + βX2t + εt  (6.1) 
Where X1 and X2 are two I(1) variables that are believed to be related, α is a constant 
and ε is an error term. Subscript t denotes the time period. Equation (6.1) depicts a linear 
long run relationship between X1 and X2147. If some nonzero parameter β exists such 
that the error term in Equation (6.1) is I(0), then we would describe X1 and X2 as 
cointegrated. The presence of a cointegrating relationship between series facilitates the 
use of cointegration techniques to estimate their relationship (Engle and Granger, 1987; 
Johansen, 1988). In particular, if variables are cointegrated, the Granger representation 
theorem states that their relationship can be expressed as an ECM (Koop, 2008). We 
can re-write (6.1) as: 
εt = X1t - α - βX2t   (6.2) 
ε effectively denotes the deviation in each period from the long-run relationship between 
X1 and X2. If there are deviations then ECMs can be used to study how quickly the 
variables adjust to the long-run equilibrium. The ECM(s) in this case are given by: 
ΔX1t = β1∑ΔX1t-k + β2∑ΔX2t-k + β3εt-1 + γ1t    (6.3) 
ΔX2t = β4∑ΔX1t-k + β5∑ΔX2t-k + β6εt-1 + γ2t    (6.4) 
Showing, respectively, how X1 adjusts to X2 and X2 adjusts to X1. The γt term in each 
equation is an error term. 
In the IRPT literature, policy rates and bank rates were found to be cointegrated and so 
ECMs were employed to study the dynamics of their relationship. Typically, IRPT papers 
                                                          
146 More broadly, if two or more series are I(d) but a linear combination of the series is I(d-b), where b>0, then they are 
said to be cointegrated (Harris, 1995). An I(0) series cannot be cointegrated with an I(1) series since the former would 
have a constant mean whilst the latter would change over time; they cannot possibly follow a similar trend. Thus variables 
need to be integrated of the same order in order to be cointegrated. 
147 X1 and X2 could be, for example, the prices of two similar goods. Koop (2008) gives the example of oranges and 
organic oranges. Consumers may be willing to pay a different price for the organic variant, such that the prices of the two 
goods differ, but their prices should broadly follow a similar pattern. 
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estimate ECMs with the objective of analysing “long-run pass-through” and “short-run 
speed of adjustment”. The former refers to the extent to which changes in the policy rate 
(or a proxy for this such as LIBOR) filter through to the rates that banks offer. The latter 
refers to the speed with which the gap between a product’s rate and a (typically linear) 
function of the policy rate closes from period to period (the error correction term, ECT). 
In the example of cointegration given above, the coefficients β3 and β6 in Equations (6.3) 
and (6.4) capture the extent to which deviations from the long-run relationship in period 
t-1 are error-corrected in period t. In other words, they represent the respective ECTs of 
the two models. 
Take Heffernan (1997) as an example of how error correction was applied to the topic 
of IRPT. Heffernan studied the dynamics of British retail deposit and loan rates over the 
period 1986-1993. The aims of the paper were typical of IRPT papers; under the 
umbrella of testing the effectiveness of monetary policy she sought to provide an insight 
into the speed of adjustment of retail rates to policy rate changes. Accordingly she 
posited that the long-run relationship between a given product’s interest rate and the 
Bank of England base rate could be described by the expression: 
INTj = Aj + Cj(BASE)   (6.5) 
This is the posited long-run equilibrium relationship. The values Aj and Cj were estimated 
from the equation: 
DINTjt = αj + βjINTj-k + δjBASE-k + εjkDBASE-k + μjt   (6.6) 
Where INT denoted the retail rate and BASE denoted the central bank base rate. 
Subscript j denoted the product (deposit or loan), t is time and k is the lag length in 
months. DINTjt is equal to INTjt – INTj(t-k), i.e. the change in interest rate offered on product 
j from time t-k to time t. BASE-k is a lag of the central bank base rate. Finally, DBASE-k is 
equal to BASE-k – BASE(k+l), i.e. the change in the central bank rate. Equation (6.6) is the 
ECM in this case. Since in the long-run steady state DINTjt = DBASE-k = 0, Equation (6.6) 
can be rearranged as -βjINTj-k = αj + δjBASE-k. Parameters Aj and Cj are then given by Aj 
= -αj / βj and Cj = -δj / βj. 
In terms of interpretation, Aj is essentially the “markup” – the amount by which product j 
was priced above (or below, if negative) the central bank rate in the long-run. Cj is long-
run pass-through – the degree to which central bank rates influenced the price level of 
product j. The other point of interest, short-run speed of adjustment, is captured by βj. 
This parameter is the ECT in this setup, capturing how much the difference between the 
rate of product j and the base rate was “error corrected” from period to period. A negative 
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value on the ECT indicates that the rate of the given product converged to the long-run 
relationship with the base rate (Equation (6.5)) over time. 
The work of Heffernan (1997), an early IRPT paper, is broadly indicative of the literature 
as a whole. Subsequent studies differed with regard to the banking products and regions 
they considered and whether they assumed a linear or nonlinear relationship between 
the rates. With regard to the latter, of those papers mentioned earlier, the many studies 
involving Heffernan adopted linear models, whereas Hofmann and Mizen (2004) argued 
that a nonlinear specification more accurately captured bank behaviour. Hofmann and 
Mizen was by no means the only study that adopted a nonlinear or asymmetric approach 
(see for example Sander and Kleimeier, 2004, or Payne and Waters, 2008, amongst 
others). 
Within the literature, methods and their application evolved over time to become more 
sophisticated. For example, Fuertes and Heffernan (2009) adopted the Akaike 
Information Criterion in lag selection whereas the earlier Heffernan papers used arbitrary 
lag lengths. Later papers also shifted focus from studying pass-through on an overall 
level to considering the differences in adjustment speeds of different banking products. 
Moreover, IRPT was tested in a wide range of countries and regions, such as Belgium 
(De Graeve et al, 2007), Eastern Europe (Égert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger, 2007) 
and New Zealand (Liu, Margaritis and Tourani-Rad, 2008), amongst many others. 
Studies also made comparisons, such as between countries within the euro area 
(Sørensen and Werner, 2006) or comparing the euro area with the US (Kwapil and 
Scharler, 2010; Karagiannis, Panagopoulos and Vlamis, 2010). 
In terms of results, the majority of studies found pass-through to be broadly incomplete, 
raising questions about the effectiveness of monetary policy. One exception was 
Hofmann and Mizen (2004) who found complete pass-through in the case of deposit 
accounts148. However, the completeness or incompleteness of pass-through is not of 
direct interest for the purposes of this thesis. What is of interest are IRPT studies that 
considered heterogeneities (in other words, differences in rates of pass-through across 
different products or firms). Crucially, such studies found rates of adjustment to vary (De 
Graeve et al, 2007; Fuertes and Heffernan, 2009). The implication of this is that were we 
to apply IRPT methods to the individual banks in our sample we would likely find 
contrasting rates of adjustment for each bank. This has implications when it comes to 
maverick identification. In the introduction to this chapter we identified a number of 
                                                          
148 Given that Hofmann and Mizen adopted a nonlinear specification, this suggests that the relationship between policy 
rates and bank rates is more complex than many IRPT studies assume. The prospect of nonlinearity or asymmetry is a 
subject we take up in Chapter 7. 
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common factors that should affect banks in the same way: real GDP, the level of prices, 
and the policy rate. However, IRPT studies such as De Graeve et al (2007) and Fuertes 
and Heffernan (2009) found heterogeneities in adjustment rates to the latter. This leads 
us to believe that by applying ECMs to each individual bank we will be able to distinguish 
between the responses of banks to the common factors. If we can do so, then we may 
be able to identify potentially maverick behaviour. 
We are hopeful that individual-firm ECMs can provide a way of establishing firms that 
adjust differently to common factors, but a key question remains: what rates of 
adjustment would be considered more or less maverick? A simple answer is that we 
would expect to see banks’ rates converge toward a long-run equilibrium with the 
common factors; at least, this is what we would expect to see from “normal” banks, given 
our understanding of the relationship between banks’ rates, GDP, prices and the policy 
rate. In the ECM context a negative ECT implies convergence. Thus, we can argue that 
positive ECTs would constitute indicators of abnormal and potentially maverick 
behaviour149.  
 
6.3 Methodology 
Here we outline an empirical strategy for maverick identification that builds on the 
premise and methodologies employed in the IRPT literature. IRPT studies have found 
bank rates to be cointegrated with policy rates. In addition, we have reason to believe 
that the level of prices and real GDP will also share long-run relationships with banks’ 
rates (Gambacorta, 2008). Policy rates, prices and GDP are “common” to all banks. 
Since we expect a long-run relationship between each bank’s rates and these common 
factors, our approach is as follows. We will fit an error correction model (ECM) consisting 
of these four variables for each individual bank in our sample. We will then interpret the 
respective ECTs as indicators of relative maverickness. We expect each bank’s rates to 
converge to a long-run equilibrium relationship with the common factors. Therefore, 
formally, we posit the following long-run relationship: 
Ratet = α1Baset + α2Pricest + α3Outputt + εt   (6.7) 
Where Rate is the interest rate a bank offered, Base is the monetary policy rate (the 
Bank of England base rate), Prices represents the price level, Output is real GDP 
                                                          
149 Note that a similar interpretation was adopted by Nair and Filer (2002), for example. Nair and Filer utilised cointegration 
analysis to compare the behaviour of firms within strategic groups. In that study, the authors postulated a long-run 
relationship between the prices of firms and the prices of their rivals. They used error correction techniques to model the 
relationship, and interpreted the ECT as indicative of convergence toward, or divergence away from, the mean price in a 
given strategic group. Our suggested interpretation of the ECT is therefore consistent with past work. 
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(seasonally adjusted) and ε is an error term. All variables are in logs. Subject to Rate, 
Base, Prices and Output passing the necessary unit root tests, if there exist constants 
α1 α2 and α3 (“cointegrating parameters”) such that εt is I(0) then we are able to state that 
the variables are cointegrated. It is then appropriate for us to fit ECMs to the data. Our 
ECMs will take the form: 
ΔRatet = β1∑ΔRatet-k + β2∑ΔBaset-k + β3∑ΔPricest-k + β4∑ΔOutputt-k + ρ(Ratet-1 – 
α1Baset-1 – α2Pricest-1 – α3Outputt-1) + γt   (6.8) 
Where k denotes lag length. The coefficient of primary interest is ρ, the ECT. This 
captures the speed with which a bank adjusts towards the long-run cointegrating 
equilibrium (Equation (6.7)) when in disequilibrium. Given our expectations regarding a 
long-run relationship between the variables, we expect to see convergence toward the 
equilibrium. Convergence, as indicated by a negative value on the ECT, would be 
considered “normal” since bank rates are believed to respond to changes in the other 
three variables. Divergence, as indicated by a positive value for a bank’s ECT, would be 
considered abnormal – and potentially maverick. Larger positive values would be 
considered more abnormal and therefore more likely maverick. 
Recall that our dataset contains the interest rates that each bank offered on all of their 
accounts at nine different deposit levels (where applicable). In the previous chapter, we 
applied the BM method to three different deposit levels representing low, medium and 
high deposit customers. This was because not all banks offered rates at all deposit levels 
and averaging would have therefore biased BM Measure 1 (the “relative rate measure”), 
which considered the levels of rates. However, this is not an issue here. In applying error 
correction techniques, our focus is on the adjustment of rates rather than actual levels 
(though levels are incorporated via the extent of adjustment toward equilibrium). 
Moreover, for clarity, it is cleaner to have a single coefficient per bank. Consequently, in 
this chapter we conduct our analysis on a single “representative rate” for each bank. This 
rate is computed by averaging across the nine deposit levels for each account, and then 
averaging across accounts for each bank. In taking this approach we are left with a single 
value for each bank in each month, representing the average rate they offered on their 
instant access/annual interest accounts in that particular time period.  
In order for cointegration analysis to be appropriate we must first establish that all 
variables are I(1). The results of unit root tests on the central bank rate, prices and output 
are given in Table 6.1 below. All of these variables are I(1) according to both the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. Lag lengths for 
these tests were determined using Stata’s in-built lag selection function, which runs a 
90 
 
series of unrestricted VARs with different lag lengths and reports the various information 
criteria for each. We imposed a maximum lag of 12 on our monthly data. The information 
criteria (SBIC, HQIC, AIC) were typically consistent in their lag choice. Where there was 
some discrepancy, ADF and PP tests were conducted using all suggested lag lengths. 
These are shown in the table but the choice of lag did not affect the result of the test. 
MacKinnon P values are given in parentheses under each test statistic. 
Table 6.1: Unit root tests for the base rate, prices and output 
Unit Root Tests 
  ADF PP 
Log base rate* 2 lagsφ ψ 10 lagsξ 2 lagsφ ψ 10 lagsξ 
Level -0.781 -2.349 0.916 0.279 
  (0.8246) (0.1567) (0.9933) (0.9764) 
  1 lagφ ψ 5 lagsξ 1 lagφ ψ 5 lagsξ 
First difference -4.193 -3.928 -5.074 -5.323 
  (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
         
Log prices** 1 lagφ 2 lagsψ ξ 1 lagφ 2 lagsψ ξ 
Level -1.213 -1.172 -1.123 -1.149 
  (0.9077) (0.9162) (0.9251) (0.9205) 
  1 lagφ ψ ξ  1 lagφ ψ ξ  
First difference -6.972  -9.541   
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   
         
Log real output** 5 lagsφ 7 lagsψ ξ 5 lagsφ 7 lagsψ ξ 
Level 0.325 -0.955 0.971 0.779 
  (0.9964) (0.9499) (1.0000) (1.0000) 
  3 lagsφ 6 lagsψ ξ 3 lagsφ 6 lagsψ ξ 
First difference -3.769 -2.617 -11.72 -11.802 
  (0.0182) (0.2720) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     
* intercept only     
** intercept and trend    
ξ AIC     
φ SBIC     
ψ HQIC 
     
It was appropriate to conduct cointegration analysis for 88 of the 112 banks and building 
societies that offered an instant access/annual interest account during the period. The 
other 24 providers either had gaps in their data and/or a sample that was too short for 
time series analysis. The reasons for omitting these firms are detailed in Table 6.2. For 
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the remaining 88 firms, ADF and PP tests were conducted on each individual bank’s 
series. As with the explanatory variables, these were also found to be I(1). 
Table 6.2: Firms omitted from time series analysis 
Bank Obs Notes 
AALG 3 Exited after 2000m3 
AIRD 13 Exited after 2001m1 
BAW 69 Exited after 2005m9 
BEV 26 Entered 2007m11 
BMID 69 Exited after 2005m9 
CATH 31 Gap 
CLAY 45 Exited after 2003m9 
COUT 81 Gap 
DAOH 9 Entry and exit 
EGG 67 Exited after 2005m7 
HFC 12 Exited after 2000m12 
MLB 2 Entered 2009m11 
NATC 1 One observation: 2009m12 
NOTI  1 One observation: 2000m1 
OTB 8 Entry and exit 
PO 45 Entered 2006m4 
POP 6 Entry and exit 
SBI 5 Entered 2009m8 
STAF 48 Exited after 2003m12 
SUN 33 Exited after 2002m9 
TCHR 34 Exited after 2002m10 
TRIO 2 Exited after 2000m2 
TURK 5 Entered 2009m8 
WLB 18 Entered 2008m7 
 
Next, the Johansen test was used to test for the presence of a cointegrating relationship 
between each individual bank’s rate, the base rate, prices and output. Lag lengths for 
the tests were determined as above, by comparing the AIC, SBIC and HQIC values for 
a series of unrestricted VARs with different lags. The Johansen test was conducted at 
each of the suggested lag lengths and where a cointegrating relationship was detected 
an ECM was fitted with the appropriate rank. Again, the information criteria were used 
to determine lag lengths for ECMs. Where multiple possible ECMs were fitted for a given 
bank the model with the smallest lag length was selected, subject to the residuals being 
white noise. Thus we conducted the Lagrange-Multiplier test for residual autocorrelation 
after each ECM, accepting the model where the resulting P-value was above 0.05. 
Where there were issues over the correlation of residuals in all possible models we 
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selected the specification with the lowest lag length with the intention of preserving 
degrees of freedom150. 
 
6.4 Results 
The ECT from the ECM for each bank is given in Appendix R. The lag length adopted 
for each model is indicated. Cases with possible autocorrelation issues are marked by 
(*). For cases where the ECM had a rank of two or three the first ECT is reported. This 
is consistent with the literature (see for example Binner et al, 2005). Cointegrating 
relationships with a rank of two (**) or three (***) are indicated in the appendix and in 
Table 6.3 below. Table 6.3 shows the ECT for all banks that had a positive value for this 
term. These are the firms that we regard as “abnormal” given that they do not converge 
to a long-run relationship with the common conditions over the period. 
 
Table 6.3: Error correction terms for the “divergent” banks 
Bank Obs Period ECT 
NBNK 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.977 
ECO 112 2000m1 to 2009m4 0.254 
CHGL (***) 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.110 
PRIN 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.050 
MANS (*) 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.045 
CUMB 116 2000m5 to 2009m12 0.038 
FURN (*) 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.031 
YBNK 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.029 
CLYD 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.028 
LBRO 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.026 
LTSB 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.022 
JHB 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.017 
HLFX 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.010 
CHOR 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.009 
ULSB 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.008 
RBS 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.005 
SAS (**) 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.003 
NOTT 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.003 
HANL 90 2002m7 to 2009m12 0.002 
MONM 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.001 
CHSM 120 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.001 
                                                          
150 Models with potential autocorrelation issues are clearly indicated in the results. 
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The headline result is that 21 firms had a positive ECT over the period. In other words, 
21 firms do not show evidence of convergence toward the postulated long-run 
relationship. However, many of these are close to zero; only four had an ECT greater 
than 0.05. The mean ECT was -0.178, the median was -0.061 and the values ranged 
from -1.311 to 0.977. Therefore, we note that firms typically converged to a long-run 
relationship with the common factors as we expected. Nonetheless, between firms there 
was a lot of variation in the speed of adjustment. This is broadly what we expected to 
find. We were unable to establish a cointegrating relationship for only 6 of the firms in 
our sample, which goes some way to reassuring us that most banks rates truly are 
influenced by the common factors we have identified151.  
 
6.5 Discussion 
Of note, six of the top ten firms in Table 6.3 are building societies: Ecology BS (“ECO”), 
Principality BS (“PRIN”), Mansfield BS (“MANS”), Cumberland BS (“CUMB”), Furness 
BS (“FURN”), and Loughborough BS (“LBRO”). Moreover, a seventh (Cheltenham & 
Gloucester, “CHGL”) is a former building society. Northern Bank (“NBNK”), which was 
by far the most “divergent” bank according to our analysis, operated solely in Northern 
Ireland, which likely had a strong bearing on the result. Also of interest is that for the 
early part of the sample (up until December 2004) NBNK was part of the National 
Australia Bank group, as were Yorkshire Bank (“YBNK”) and Clydesdale Bank (“CLYD”), 
which appear 8th and 9th in the table, respectively. The latter two firms remained part of 
the group for the entire sample. Given this association it is unsurprising that their 
strategies were seemingly aligned. However, assuming that our interpretation of the ECT 
as an indicator of maverick behaviour is valid, this may suggest maverickness as a result 
of managerial decision-making (as alluded to by Langenfeld, 1996) as opposed to such 
behaviour being a reaction to differing economic conditions152. 
With regard to NBNK, the fact that the firm operated solely in Northern Ireland precludes 
their identification as the maverick in the UK on the whole. As we stressed earlier, market 
definition is important. Whenever a competition authority assesses a case they first 
                                                          
151 These 6 firms were Derbyshire BS (“DERB”), National Savings (“NATS”), Portman BS (“PORT”), Shepshed BS 
(“SHEP”), Skipton BS (“SKIP”) and Woolwich (“WOOL”). 
152 To reiterate a point made earlier in the thesis, arguably authorities should distinguish between mavericks whose 
behaviour is a response to economic conditions and those whose behaviour is simply due to managerial preference 
(Carlton, 2010). It is possible that NBNK, YBNK and CLYD belong in the latter category, but we cannot say for sure. Our 
method allows us to identify abnormal behaviour but it stops short of explaining the origins of this behaviour. 
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define the relevant market, and that is what we must do here in order to give context to 
our findings. The UK market encompasses England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Given that it only operated in Northern Ireland, NBNK’s market was much 
narrower than those of the other firms in the sample. Hence, we cannot reasonably argue 
that NBNK is a candidate maverick for the whole of the UK. Many UK customers were 
not served by NBNK. Moreover, the bank could not reasonably be described as having 
a constraint over the other banks in the sample since they were not even a competitor 
in three of the national markets153. Therefore, for geographical reasons, NBNK cannot 
be regarded as the maverick given our decision to define the market as UK instant 
access accounts that paid interest annually. This highlights the importance of market 
definition on the part of a competition authority. It cannot be stressed enough that any 
attempt at maverick identification is limited to identifying the maverick in the particular 
market that has been parameterised. 
Ecology BS (“ECO”) was the second most divergent bank by some distance, and the 
most divergent of those that operated in the whole of the UK. ECO was originally set up 
by members of the Green Party (a political party) with a mission to specialise in activities 
of ecological benefit. According to their own website, their “lending is governed by the 
principles of sustainable development” (www.ecology.co.uk). Thus, they are especially 
concerned with how the funds that they lend are used and accordingly distinguish 
themselves from typical banks. It is therefore apparent that ECO would not be regarded 
as a “normal” bank. Hence, finding that ECO were potentially maverick by our measure 
is particularly promising. We sought to identify behaviours that were different from the 
norm via the proposed long-run relation between banks’ rates, the policy rate, prices and 
output, and the presence of ECO near the top of the list serves to indicate that we may 
have achieved this. With a large positive ECT, in ECO we effectively find that a bank 
that strives to be different is identified as precisely that. This is in support of our approach 
as a method of maverick identification. 
Counting against the approach is the fact that three of the firms with positive ECTs are 
large banks: Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”), Halifax (“HLFX”) and Lloyds TSB (“LTSB”). 
Firms of their size and stature would never be considered maverick by the definition 
given in merger guidelines. However, we can offer alternative explanations for why these 
firms had positive ECTs. A positive ECT suggests that the bank in question did not 
converge to the posited long-run relationship during the period. One explanation for this 
is that these large banks appear in the list because of the difficulties they experienced 
                                                          
153 To an extent these comments are also true of many of the building societies in our sample, whose operations are 
often concentrated in a particular region. 
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during the financial crisis; RBS and HLFX were the worst-affected large UK banks, and 
LTSB subsequently acquired HLFX during the crisis154. The crisis may therefore have 
influenced their pricing behaviour155. Another explanation is that large banks are subject 
to a more complex rate-setting mechanism and so their apparent divergence is due to 
their responding to some other factor(s). Ultimately, banks’ rates are affected by a huge 
number of variables (many of which are firm-specific) and not just the three we have 
considered. 
Although bank pricing is certainly influenced by a wide array of factors, choosing to 
include only few in our ECMs was an appropriate decision. By incorporating the policy 
rate, we have included the most important supply-side element influencing the rate-
setting of banks (www.bankofengland.co.uk). By incorporating prices and GDP, we have 
included what the literature suggests are the most important demand-side elements 
influencing consumers’ demand for deposit accounts (Gambacorta, 2008). Moreover, 
the policy rate, prices and GDP clearly impact all banks in a similar way. By contrast, it 
is less clear that this would be true of other variables that we could include. 
In the preceding chapter we outlined several criticisms of the BM methods. Of these, a 
few issues persisted through our replication. These were the fact that the responses of 
individual banks were right-censored, that the magnitude of rate changes was not 
incorporated into the methods, and that we analysed an arbitrary time period. By 
adopting an error correction approach we have circumvented most of these issues. 
Right-censoring was an issue in the BM method because we were attempting to quantify 
specific reactions of banks to specific policy rate changes. Here, instead we are 
modelling the gradual adjustment of rates toward equilibrium and so we less concerned 
with which rate change is in response to which stimulus. Moreover, magnitude is 
incorporated into our error correction approach. We are focusing on adjustment as in 
BM Measure 2, however, unlike that measure, here the extent of adjustment is also 
captured. For instance, if a bank’s rates were below (above) their long-run equilibrium 
level with respect to the common factors, then a greater rate increase (decrease) on the 
part of the bank would contribute toward a larger negative ECT, in absolute terms. This 
is in contrast to BM Measure 2 where only the occurrence of an adjustment was counted, 
with no allowance for the size of that adjustment. 
                                                          
154 For comparison, note that the ECTs of HSBC and BARC (the other two “big” banks) were both negative. These were 
-0.412 and -0.172 respectively. 
155 Alternatively, perhaps the pricing behaviours identified in our analysis are one of the causes of their difficulties during 
the crisis. 
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Therefore the only issue that carries over from Chapter 5 is the use of an arbitrary time 
period. Indeed, this is something we can never eradicate unless some theoretical 
rationale were devised to explain why maverick status changes. Without such a 
rationale, we will always be restricted to analysing an arbitrary period of time; the best 
we can hope for is that when competition authorities conduct merger analysis they 
properly define the market and the relevant time period that should be analysed. In fact, 
our use of time series methods exacerbates the issue of an arbitrary time period. In order 
for these methods to be applicable the period under analysis needs to be sufficiently 
long; an ECM cannot be fitted to a sample that is too short. This was evidenced by the 
fact that we could not analyse all of the banks in our sample due to a lack of data - recall 
Table 6.2 above. Indeed, this is a key criticism of the approach and in using time series 
methods this issue cannot be overcome. Moreover, this is at odds with merger analysis, 
which typically takes a short-term perspective (Motta, 2004). 
As a result, rather than achieving definitive maverick identification, in using time series 
methods the best we can realistically hope to achieve is to quantify firms’ relative 
maverickness during a particular period. In terms of the analysis we have conducted, we 
can state that during the period January 2000 to December 2009 NBNK was the most 
divergent firm and therefore the “most maverick” of the firms in our sample. Of the firms 
that operated in the whole of the UK, ECO was the “most maverick”. However, this is for 
the period in its entirety. Whether their unusual behaviour persisted for the whole ten 
years is not immediately clear and cannot be ascertained from the ECMs alone. Closer 
inspection of the data would be necessary in order to shed light on this. 
In the preceding chapter we highlighted the fact that Tesco (“TSCO”) was implicated as 
a candidate maverick by the BM measures. However, under the error correction method 
we find that TSCO was ranked only 39th, with an ECT of -0.032. The finding that TSCO 
converges is unsurprising. We saw from Figure 5.1 in the previous chapter than the firm 
seemed to follow policy rate changes and we noted that they initiated few unprovoked 
changes of their own; the high score by BM Measure 2 was simply a result of the fact 
that they took longer to follow policy rate decreases than increases. Hence, though they 
may have taken slightly longer to follow policy rate decreases they did ultimately 
converge toward the postulated long-run relationship, which we do not regard as 
particularly maverick. 
However, as we have stated, the ECTs generated in this chapter quantify firm behaviour 
over the entirety of the time period 2000-2009. Yet, as we noted in the discussion section 
of Chapter 5, TSCO seemed to be especially maverick during the sub-period 2000-2005, 
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with other firms offering more favourable rates towards the end of our sample. Thus, it 
is conceivable that TSCO might have been the maverick early in the sample but that 
their subsequent behaviours meant that they appeared to behave in a “normal” way for 
the sample overall.  
Another key criticism of our approach is that whilst we can identify “abnormal” behaviour 
via our interpretation of the ECTs, we cannot say for certain whether this is abnormal in 
a positive or negative way. We have postulated that firms should converge toward a 
long-run relationship with the common factors, and methodologically we have explained 
that a positive ECT suggests that this is not so. However, from the ECTs alone we are 
unable to tell whether those firms that exhibit divergence are being maverick and (for 
example) resisting rate decreases, or being extremely un-maverick and resisting rate 
increases. Either of these actions would be a move contrary to convergence. Yet, the 
ECM approach is deficient in distinguishing between these behaviours. Recall that 
maverick behaviour is not simply abnormal; it is favourable from a consumer point of 
view. The ECM approach does not go as far as to establish the presence of favourable 
behaviour. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
Where appropriate we have fitted an ECM for each bank in our sample. These models 
gauged the convergence or divergence of each bank’s rates toward or away from a long-
run equilibrium with certain common factors (the policy rate, prices and output). We have 
found that just under a quarter of firms in our sample exhibited divergence, although 
many of the positive ECTs are very close to zero. It is conceivable that if we extended 
the sample, these firms would revert to convergence. Indeed, the overall the tendency 
is for banks to converge, which we regard as “normal”. Many of the most divergent firms 
are as we would expect – smaller building societies, and in the case of ECO, a firm that 
strives to be different. However, some of the firms identified as “divergent” are large 
banks that would not be considered maverick. We have speculated that these banks 
may be affected by a different array of variables, given their different structures, or that 
their unusual results were a consequence of the financial crisis. 
In general, we note that the BM method and our error correction approach do not 
produce consistent results156. In the preceding section we discussed the fact that TSCO 
                                                          
156 It should be noted that many of the firms that appeared more maverick by the BM measures did not appear in the 
sample for the full ten years, and so fitting an ECM was impossible for those banks. 
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(a promising candidate by the BM methods) does not appear to be particularly maverick 
by the ECM approach. Moreover, when we consider the performance of ECO (a 
promising candidate by the ECM approach) in the BM measures, we observe that it 
ranked only 41st in terms of BM Measure 1 and a very low 100th in terms of BM Measure 
2. One explanation for this can be linked to our key criticism of the ECM approach. In 
the previous section we stated that whilst positive ECTs are indicative of unusual 
behaviour, they are not necessarily suggestive of favourable behaviour. Arguably, this 
would appear to be the case with ECO. Through analysing ECO by the BM measures, 
we have seen that the firm did not offer the highest relative rates and scored relatively 
poorly in terms of responsiveness to policy rates. Thus, it would appear that ECO 
provides an example of a firm whose divergence is likely “unfavourable divergence”. This 
brings into focus the fact that the ECM approach is insufficient to identify maverick 
behaviour on its own. 
Ultimately, which do we believe is a better approach to maverick identification, the BM 
method or the ECM approach? The answer to this is that neither is perfect. The BM 
measures quantify specific behaviours that are favourable for consumers, but the 
methods are very simplistic and capture two distinct behaviours. By contrast, the ECM 
method produces a single measure capturing overall convergence toward or divergence 
away from long-run equilibrium with the common factors, but the nature of this 
convergence or divergence is not established. The ECMs allow us to identify firms that 
behaved unusually, but maverick behaviour is more specific than “unusual”. Rather, it is 
“favourable” from a consumer point of view. Divergence could be favourable if the 
positive ECT was a consequence of a bank declining to adjust to decreases in the policy 
rate, for example. However, should a bank decline to follow increases in the policy rate, 
this would also result in a positive ECT, yet in the latter case the behaviour would be 
unfavourable. Thus it is easy to see why a positive ECT in itself is not sufficient to identify 
maverick behaviour. 
Overall, because of its ability to identify divergent behaviour, the ECM approach is more 
successful at testing the theory than the relatively simplistic BM methods. However, 
there is still scope for improvement. Whether a change in rate would be considered 
favourable or unfavourable broadly depends on the direction of change in the common 
factor(s). The ECM specification we have used in this chapter does not allow for this 
direction of change. In order to do so, we need to incorporate asymmetry into our 
analysis. This can be achieved by exploring the category of models known as 
asymmetric error correction models (AECMs), of which there are several variants. This 
is what we explore in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: An Asymmetric Error Correction Approach 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we proposed an approach to maverick identification that was 
based on the principles of cointegration. We applied error correction techniques to fit an 
error correction model (ECM) for each individual firm in our sample, exploiting the fact 
that banks’ interest rates were cointegrated with the Bank of England base rate, the level 
of prices, and real output (“common factors” that affect all banks in the same way). The 
error correction term (ECT) in each regression captured the speed of convergence of 
that bank’s rates to its long-run relationship with the common factors. A positive ECT 
was indicative of divergence away from said relationship. Subsequently, we argued that 
the ECT could be interpreted as an indicator of relative maverickness. We expected 
normal banks’ rates to converge and so divergence was regarded as evidence of 
behaving contrary to the norm. 
The methods presented in the previous chapter assumed that the underlying long-run 
relationship between banks’ rates and the common factors was linear and symmetric. 
This is a simplification adopted in the standard error correction approach. In reality, many 
cointegrated variables have a more complex, nonlinear or asymmetric relation to one 
another (Psaradakis et al, 2004). Examples where this has been found include the 
relationship between exchange rates and prices (Lo and Zivot, 2001), tax and 
government expenditure decisions (Ewing et al, 2006), and oil prices and GDP (Lardic 
and Mignon, 2008). Moreover, asymmetry has been found in the case of interest rate 
pass-through (“IRPT”; Hofmann and Mizen, 2004; Yu, Chun and Kim, 2013). This latter 
point is naturally of particular relevance to this thesis and we discussed IRPT in the 
previous chapter. In general, imposing linearity when a true relationship is nonlinear is a 
key problem for cointegration analysis (Granger and Terasvirta, 1993). In our context if 
there are asymmetries in the rate-setting behaviour of banks then fitting a linear ECM 
would represent a misspecification of the underlying relationship between the 
variables157. 
                                                          
157 In some of the literature, ‘asymmetry’ and ‘nonlinearity’ are used somewhat interchangeably. However, in this thesis 
we adopt the following definitions. By ‘asymmetries’ we refer to cases where the dependent variable exhibits contrasting 
behaviour when one or more of the independent variables is in a different state. An example would be where banks’ rates 
respond differently when policy rates increase compared to when they decrease. By ‘nonlinearities’ we refer to the 
possibility that changes in the dependent variable are not linear transformations of changes in the independent variables. 
In our context an example could be if the change in a bank’s rate was a quadratic function of the change in price level, 
for instance. 
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We have reason to suspect that we must allow for asymmetries when identifying 
mavericks. Breunig and Menezes noted that, “…it is unlikely that useful models to 
understand maverick-like behaviour will be symmetric.” (Breunig and Menezes, 2008, 
p.829). Moreover, existing literature and merger guidelines both suggest asymmetries 
may be important with regard to the maverick because they emphasise “favourable 
behaviour”. For example, Baker (2002) suggested that the behaviour of firms revealed 
their underlying type and that distinguishing between favourable and unfavourable 
behaviour could result in maverick identification. Moreover, recall that horizontal merger 
guidelines suggest that maverick behaviour can be characterised by relatively favourable 
pricing. As we discussed in the preceding chapter, linear ECMs allowed us to identify 
rate-setting that differed from what we expected to observe, but the method did not allow 
us to distinguish whether this was favourable or unfavourable from a consumer 
perspective. In order to do so, asymmetry must be incorporated into the model. 
Why is asymmetry crucial for identifying the maverick? In general, whether a given 
behaviour is favourable or unfavourable depends on the nature of change in the common 
factor against which it is being measured. In the context of banking, “favourable pricing” 
depends on, for example, the direction of change in the policy rate. Banks are broadly 
bound to follow the policy rate but have some control over the speed with which they do 
so. In the case of savings, being quick (slow) to pass on base rate increases (decreases) 
would be considered more favourable to consumers. Thus, we may look for an 
asymmetric response when policy rates are increasing compared to when they are 
decreasing and use this to more accurately model maverick behaviour. Indeed, Breunig 
and Menezes (2008) made a similar argument in their attempt at identification; in their 
responsiveness measure they distinguished between positive and negative changes in 
the RBA cash rate. Thus, there is a precedent in previous maverick identification work 
for the expectation of asymmetry. Moreover, this precedent was set in a finance/banking 
context. 
More generally, the “rockets and feathers” literature supports the likely presence of 
asymmetry (Bacon, 1991; Tappata, 2009). “Rockets and feathers” refers to the 
observation that firms often exhibit asymmetric price transmission; in other words, they 
are broadly quicker to increase their prices following cost rises and slower to decrease 
their prices following cost reductions. The phenomenon has often been examined in the 
context of the relationship between gasoline and oil prices (Bacon, 1991; Borenstein and 
Cameron, 1992), but the economic intuition holds for firms in a variety of contexts (for 
example, in agriculture - Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Indeed, asymmetric price 
transmission has been found in an array of contexts. If our market were one such 
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context, then a linear ECM would inadequately capture the behaviour of our firms; 
“rockets and feathers” contradicts the notion of a single rate of adjustment. However, 
even if our particular market did not exhibit aymmetry, we ultimately wish to generalise 
our method of maverick identification to other markets. Thus, we should allow for the 
possibility of asymmetry158. 
As an aside, it is notable that ECMs have been commonly used in the “rockets and 
feathers” literature. Early asymmetric price transmission papers used simple regressions 
of downstream and upstream prices (Karrenbrock, 1991; Shin, 1992) but later papers 
adopted ECMs (Borenstein et al, 1997; Balke et al, 1998). Indeed, we could align the 
earlier papers with the Breunig and Menezes (2008) approach, whilst the latter studies 
are more aligned with our own attempts at identification. Moreover, it is also notable that 
whilst earlier papers typically found symmetric price transmission, the later papers are 
the ones that found evidence of asymmetry. Thus, we could argue that as our methods 
are more sophisticated than those of Breunig and Menezes, we are more likely to be 
able to identify maverick behaviours. 
The linear ECMs of the preceding chapter allowed us to gauge the speed with which 
banks’ rates adjusted to changes in the common conditions, but this was a single 
measure irrespective of the direction of change. Contrary to this, what we expect to 
observe is a more complex form of cointegration with contrasting adjustments to different 
directional changes in the common conditions. In particular, we follow the precedent set 
in Breunig and Menezes (2008) in that we primarily expect contrasting changes with 
respect to positive and negative changes in the policy rate. 
In order to capture asymmetry we turn to the class of asymmetric error correction models 
(AECMs). Whilst linear ECMs can indicate firms that may be acting unusually in an 
unspecified way, the use of AECMs can narrow this down and shed light on the nature 
of their unusual behaviour. Several different asymmetric error correction approaches 
have been proposed in the literature. Each augments conventional error correction by 
incorporating some form of asymmetry or nonlinearity, though they differ in their 
approach to doing so.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 briefly describes the most prominent 
AECM variants. The AECM we ultimately adopt in this chapter is the nonlinear 
autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL), because of its treatment of asymmetry and its 
                                                          
158 Allowing for asymmetry is not the same as imposing asymmetry. We will be careful to retain the possibility of 
symmetry; we will ensure that if the relationship between the variables were ultimately symmetric our methods would not 
distort this. 
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wide applicability159. Section 7.2 explains in more detail why the NARDL is most 
appropriate for the purposes of maverick identification. Section 7.3 outlines our 
methodology. We place particular emphasis on positive and negative changes in the 
policy rate, but we also allow for asymmetric responses to changes in prices and output. 
Section 7.4 presents the results of fitting a NARDL to each firm in our sample, as well 
as the associated diagnostic tests. Section 7.5 provides a discussion, comparing the 
results to those of the previous chapters. Finally, Section 7.6 concludes. 
 
7.2 Asymmetric ECMs 
A number of techniques have been proposed to incorporate asymmetry into 
cointegration analysis. These include the asymmetric ECM of Granger and Lee (1989), 
the threshold autoregressive ECM (Hansen 1996, 1997, 2000), the ECM with threshold 
cointegration (Balke and Fomby, 1997; Enders and Granger, 1998), Markov-switching 
ECMs (Psaradakis et al, 2004), smooth transition ECMs (Michael et al, 1997; Kapetanios 
et al, 2006) and the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model of Shin, Yu 
and Greenwood-Nimmo (2009, 2014). 
These methods typically capture asymmetry via some form of ‘regime shift’. In other 
words, it is assumed that the relationship between variables is contingent on one or more 
of the variables being in a particular ‘state’ (or ‘regime’), and that asymmetry stems from 
contrasting effects to the dependent variable under these different states. One example 
could be where an independent variable is increasing under Regime A and decreasing 
under Regime B, with the two regimes provoking different reactions in the dependent 
variable. Another example could be where variables are cointegrated under Regime A 
but there is no cointegrating relationship under Regime B. In these examples there would 
not be a single rate of adjustment, but rather a different rate under the two regimes. 
Asymmetric error correction approaches differ with regard to the way in which regimes 
are defined and determined, but this is the broad sentiment underlying AECM 
techniques. 
Granger and Lee (1989) developed an AECM approach that is based on the idea of 
“multicointegration”. Multicointegration is a deeper form of cointegration that has two 
levels; in addition to conventional cointegration, in certain contexts one might also expect 
series to be cointegrated with the accumulated ECTs from their long-run relationship. 
                                                          
159 The NARDL would more appropriately be regarded as the “asymmetric ARDL”, but we conform to the “nonlinear 
ARDL” naming convention. 
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Granger and Lee motivated this with an example of inventories. Sales and production 
are cointegrated with one another, but one could also expect them to be cointegrated 
with inventories (stock) since the level of stock would influence the amount of production 
needed to satisfy demand. Inventories are defined as production minus sales, and the 
difference between production and sales is effectively the accumulated residuals from 
their long-run relationship – in other words, the ECTs. Thus, multicointegration implies 
an inherent endogeneity in the cointegrating relationship, which necessitates an 
asymmetric ECM since the rate of adjustment depends on the state of the deeper form 
of cointegration. For instance, in the inventories example, when firms hold a low level of 
stock and sales suddenly increase, production needs to increase suddenly too. 
However, when firms hold a high level of stock, production would not follow the change 
in sales so rapidly. This is because inventories can be reduced to account for the 
additional sales. Thus, in the given example, the rate of adjustment depends upon the 
state of inventories.  
The implication of Granger and Lee’s assertions is that in the presence of 
multicointegration there is a need to allow for different speeds of adjustment based on 
the position of the variable of interest with respect to its long-run equilibrium relationship 
with the independent variable(s). The initial application of this was effectively to set a 
threshold (or ‘attractor’) at zero, allowing the speed of adjustment to be different where 
the long-run residuals were positive or negative. In general terms, by Granger and Lee’s 
AECM the strength of attraction could be different on both sides of the attractor. The goal 
of their paper was then to test whether estimated coefficients were statistically different 
in order to establish, broadly, whether there was evidence of asymmetry (Manera and 
Grasso, 2005). 
Were we to apply the method to our data, we would decompose our cointegration 
residuals into positive and negative values, allowing two coefficients to be estimated. 
We could then compare these values for different banks. Such an approach would have 
some merit in the context of maverick identification, but the Granger-Lee AECM fails to 
capture the exact form of asymmetry we have outlined above. One could make an 
argument for measuring maverickness in terms of the difference in convergence when 
a bank’s rates were above and below their long-run relationship; in deposits, one would 
expect a maverick to adjust more quickly (slowly) when below (above) the long-run 
steady state, since this would be favourable to consumers. However, what we would 
ideally like to gauge is the difference in the adjustment of banks’ rates when the 
independent variables themselves are increasing or decreasing (something which is 
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actually simpler than the form of asymmetry captured by Granger and Lee). Thus, the 
Granger-Lee approach does not perfectly satisfy our requirements. 
An alternative approach, the threshold autoregressive ECM (TAR-ECM) of Hansen 
(1997, 2000) incorporates asymmetry by adding a threshold autoregressive mechanism 
to the standard ECM. In Granger and Lee (1989) there was effectively a threshold set at 
zero; they had two regimes defined by positive and negative deviations from the long-
run relationship. By contrast, with the TAR-ECM the threshold need not be zero nor 
predetermined; the appropriate threshold can be consistently estimated (Manera and 
Grasso, 2005). This is an econometrically desirable and appropriate feature in many 
situations. For example, suppose a series is constantly increasing but doing so at varying 
rates. In such a case a model with a threshold of zero would be inappropriate since there 
would never be negative changes. A suitable choice of threshold would instead be some 
positive value to allow for asymmetric responses dependent on whether increases were 
above or below a certain level. However, in the context of mavericks, our rationale for 
exploring asymmetry is centred on an expectation that firms will behave differently when 
the policy rate is increasing or decreasing, implying a zero threshold. A model that 
imposes a nonzero threshold would be difficult to interpret and we therefore rule out the 
TAR-ECM. 
Both Granger and Lee’s AECM and the TAR-ECM are based upon the Engle-Granger 
two-step procedure, in which the presence of cointegration is established by performing 
an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on long-run residuals. However, Balke and 
Fomby (1997) showed that where the long-run equilibrium relationship is nonlinear this 
test for cointegration is misspecified. This observation led to the “ECM with threshold 
cointegration”, in which the ADF regression is replaced by a TAR process with an 
indicator function based on the sign of the long-run residuals. However, treatment of the 
threshold in the model is similar to the TAR-ECM in that it is estimated and thus need 
not be zero. Again, this does not align with our rationale for exploring asymmetry and so 
we discount the approach as a possibility for maverick identification in this instance. 
Psaradakis et al (2004) propose a two-regime ‘Markov-switching’ ECM, which they term 
the Markov error correction (MEC) model. They based their approach to asymmetry on 
observations of the dynamics of stock prices and dividends, which at times follow a 
similar path but also exhibit periods of persistent deviation, producing two distinct 
regimes. The MEC model is designed to allow for a different speed of adjustment in each 
state; the system is allowed to switch from one state to the other. This has some appeal 
for our purposes, since, for example, positive/negative changes in policy rate could be 
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treated as the two regimes. However, the typical application of the MEC is in cases 
where cointegration breaks down during parts of a sample. In such cases traditional 
ECM techniques would simply find no cointegrating relationship in the sample overall, 
when in fact the true relationship would be one where there are periods of cointegration 
and periods of no cointegration. This is not the case in our context. We do not expect 
cointegration to break down; we expect it throughout, but with a different rate of 
adjustment under our alternative regimes. Thus the MEC is not ideal for our purposes160. 
Another approach is that of Kapetanios et al (2006). They proposed a procedure that 
detects the presence of a cointegrating relationship that follows a globally stationary 
smooth transition process. In other words, they modelled the process of error correction 
as adjusting more slowly when the cointegrating residual was close to zero, thereby 
depicting a gradual adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium. This and other 
smoothing approaches are somewhat different from the aforementioned AECMs in that 
asymmetry stems from the closeness of a series to its long-run equilibrium, rather than 
due to some threshold or state of the world. As a result, smooth transition ECMs model 
a more gradual form of adjustment, in contrast to the sharper adjustment of TAR models. 
In many contexts smooth adjustment may offer a more realistic depiction of reality. 
However, such models are deficient where adjustment is in response to a sudden shock 
(Psaradakis et al, 2004). This presents a problem for our analysis since shocks are 
common in banking; for instance, in our data we see the sudden and dramatic decrease 
in the base rate following the onset of the financial crisis. Therefore smooth-transition 
methods are inappropriate given our choice of market and the desire to ultimately 
generalise our methods. 
Finally, the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) approach of Shin, Yu and 
Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) builds upon the ARDL method of Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(1999, 2001). The method incorporates asymmetry through positive and negative ‘partial 
sum decompositions’ of explanatory variables. In other words, variables are separated 
into two subsets representing their positive and negative changes, and the subsets are 
modelled as having separate effects on the variable of interest. Moreover, the positive 
and negative decompositions appear separately in the long-run equilibrium relationship. 
As a result it is possible to assess both short- and long-run asymmetry161. The approach 
                                                          
160 In the previous chapter there were a small sample of banks for which we did not find a cointegrating relationship using 
standard ECM techniques. Visual inspection of the plots for those banks seems to suggest that this was due to the 
breakdown of cointegration part way through the sample, and so the MEC approach may be of some value for analysing 
the rate-setting behaviour of those particular banks. However, there were only six such firms in our dataset, and so this 
avenue will not be explored in this thesis. 
161 However, the model can be easily constrained to impose either short- or long-run symmetry (see for instance Yu, 
Chun and Kim, 2013, or Atil, Lahiani and Nguyen, 2014). 
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also has the benefit that it can be consistently estimated by standard OLS (Shin, Yu and 
Greenwood-Nimmo, 2014) and that it is well-suited to deal with sudden shocks to the 
system (Hammoudeh et al, 2014). This latter point is appealing given our rationale for 
discounting the smooth-transition approaches. 
The NARDL method has two further advantages which make it appealing from the 
perspective of maverick identification. Firstly, since both short- and long-run 
asymmetries are simultaneously modelled, the approach is appropriate where the nature 
of asymmetry is uncertain. In our context we have drawn upon economic reasoning to 
explain our expectation of asymmetry, yet in other contexts the source of asymmetry 
may be less clear. For instance, suppose we had a trivariate model and specifically 
expected a long-run asymmetric effect in only one of the explanatory variables. If, on the 
contrary, the true source of asymmetry were in the short-run or via the other or both 
explanatory variable(s), the NARDL would pick this up. Thus, prior understanding of the 
nature of asymmetry is not necessary, which makes the approach attractive from the 
perspective of generalisability.  
Secondly, the method has been shown to be appropriate for the analysis of variables of 
different orders of integration (Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo, 2014). All the other 
AECMs we have surveyed rely on the fundamental principle of cointegration, i.e. that in 
order for methods to be valid all variables must be non-stationary I(1) whilst some 
combination of them is stationary I(0). By contrast, the NARDL approach is valid for a 
combination of I(1) and I(0) variables. This gives the method much wider applicability. 
Bank rates, the policy rate, prices and output were all found to be I(1) in the preceding 
chapter. However, in other markets this may not be the case, which would impact our 
ability to apply the method to other contexts. By adopting the NARDL as our AECM we 
ensure greater generalisability and fulfil one of the core criteria of this work – ensuring 
that the methods of identification we develop can be applied to other industries. 
Though it is a relatively new technique, NARDL models have already been applied in a 
variety of contexts. These include exchange rate pass-through (Delatte and Lopez-
Villavicencio, 2012), the analysis of house prices (Katrakilidis and Trachanas, 2012), 
crop production (Mitra, 2014), and the relation between gasoline and oil prices (Atil, 
Lahiani and Nguyen, 2014). Moreover the technique has been applied to interest rate 
pass-through, albeit at an aggregate level (Yu, Chun and Kim, 2013). Indeed, previous 
studies that have adopted the NARDL approach have typically modelled only a handful 
of series, using aggregated data. Our undertaking is on a much larger scale; we will fit a 
107 
 
NARDL to each of our 88 banks162. Moreover, previous studies set out with the objective 
of establishing asymmetry. In our case, asymmetry is expected (though not imposed) 
and it is the interpretation of individual banks’ coefficients that is of interest. Thus our 
application of the method is novel and distinct from existing NARDL papers. 
 
7.3 Methodology 
In the first piece of analysis our approach was to fit a standard (linear and symmetric) 
ECM for each bank, interpreting a positive coefficient on the ECT as indicative of 
potential maverickness. This was based on the fact that we expected banks’ rates to 
have a long-run relationship with the common factors (the base rate, prices and output): 
Ratet = α1Baset + α2Pricest + α3Outputt + εt   (6.7) 
Where εt quantifies the deviation from the long-run relationship in period t. Our ECMs 
were of the form: 
ΔRatet = β1∑ΔRatet-k + β2∑ΔBaset-k + β3∑ΔPricest-k + β4∑ΔOutputt-k + ρ(Ratet-1 – 
α1Baset-1 – α2Pricest-1 – α3Outputt-1) + γt   (6.8) 
Where ρ represents the ECT. Since we postulated a long-run relationship between the 
variables (Equation (6.7)), we expected a bank’s rate to converge toward this long-run 
equilibrium over time. Thus we expected a negative coefficient on the ECT; we expected 
any deviation from the long-run relationship in time t-1 to be corrected (reduced) to some 
extent in period t. Behaviour consistent with this hypothesis was regarded as “normal”. 
On the other hand, a positive value of ρ implied that when out of equilibrium in t-1 a 
bank’s rate deviated further from that equilibrium in t. Such behaviour was not regarded 
as normal. Therefore in our first piece of analysis we took a positive coefficient (evidence 
of divergence) to be indicative of relative maverickness. 
However, as we have discussed, we have reason to believe that there is a more 
sophisticated relationship between banks’ rates, the policy rate, prices and output. 
Consequently, we have outlined a rationale for identifying the maverick on the basis of 
banks’ reactions to positive and negative changes in the policy rate163. To incorporate 
this into our model, consider the following alternative long-run relationship: 
                                                          
162 As in the preceding chapter, there are a number of firms whose samples are too short to conduct time series analysis. 
163 Rate changes in response to increases/decreases in the other common conditions may also be important, and so we 
also include these in our model. It is easy to impose symmetry under the NARDL methodology, and so where prices and 
output do not produce asymmetric responses we have the ability to constrain these terms. 
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Ratet = α+1Base+t + α-1Base-t + α+2Prices+t + α-2Prices-t + α+3Output+t + α-3Output-t + εt 
          (7.1) 
Where Base+t and Base-t are partial sum processes of positive and negative changes in 
Base, such that Base+t = ∑j=1ΔBase+j = ∑j=1max(ΔBasej,0) and Base-t = ∑j=1ΔBase-j = 
∑j=1min(ΔBasej,0). In other words, Base+t and Base-t represent sums of the positive and 
negative changes in the variable up to time t. Partial sum processes for prices/output are 
defined analogously as the sums of their positive/negative changes when they are 
increasing/decreasing. Whereas in the previous chapter each of the common conditions 
appeared in the long-run relationship as a single term, here positives and negatives 
appear separately, implying a more complex form of cointegration. The relationship 
between the variables is essentially allowed to differ according to the nature of change 
in each of the independent variables. Following Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) 
we are then able to formulate a NARDL(p,q) of the form: 
ΔRatet = λRatet-1 + θ+1Base+t-1 + θ-1Base-t-1 + θ+2Prices+t-1 + θ-2Prices-t-1 + θ+3Output+t-1 + 
θ-3Output-t-1 + ∑p-1j=1φjΔRatet-j + ∑qj=0(ω1+jΔBase+t-j + ω1-jΔBase-t-j + ω2+jΔPrices+t-j + ω2-
jΔPrices-t-j + ω3+jΔOutput+t-j + ω3-jΔOutput-t-j) + ut  (7.2) 
Where p and q denote ARDL-style lag lengths for the respective dependent and 
independent variables (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). Base+t, Base-t and the analogous price 
and output variables are defined above. Short-run adjustments to positive and negative 
changes in the common conditions are captured by the various ω+j and ω-j terms. Positive 
and negative long-run coefficients can be computed by LBase+ = - θ1+/λ and LBase- = - θ1-/λ, 
analogously for LPrices and LOutput. Note that LBase+ = α+1 and LBase- = α-1. In other words, the 
long-run coefficients correspond to the parameters of the long-run relationship depicted 
in Equation (7.1). 
We can rewrite our NARDL as a conditional AECM to facilitate ease of comparison to 
the standard ECM. Doing so yields: 
ΔRatet = ρ(Ratet-1 - α+1Base+t-1 - α-1Base-t-1 - α+2Prices+t-1 - α-2Prices-t-1 - α+3Output+t-1 - α-
3Output-t-1) + ∑p-1j=1φjΔRatet-j + ∑qj=0(ω1+jΔBase+t-j + ω1-jΔBase-t-j + ω2+jΔPrices+t-j + ω2-
jΔPrices-t-j + ω3+jΔOutput+t-j + ω3-jΔOutput-t-j) + ut  (7.3) 
Comparing Equation (7.3) to Equation (6.8), we can clearly see the how the NARDL 
augments the conventional ECM. First, the error in this AECM representation, (Ratet-1 - 
α+1Base+t-1 - α-1Base-t-1 - α+2Prices+t-1 - α-2Prices-t-1 - α+3Output+t-1 - α-3Output-t-1), reflects 
the individual importance of positive and negative changes in the independent variables. 
Second, we allow for different lag lengths on the dependent and independent variables 
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(p and q, per an ARDL model). Overall, adopting the NARDL approach should allow us 
to capture more precisely the relationship between the variables, allowing us to 
characterise the response of banks’ rates to the common conditions more accurately. 
Our ultimate goal is maverick identification. In addressing this objective, there are 
several elements of the NARDL output that we could examine. One is ρ, which is 
effectively the “ECT”. This would be consistent with our analysis of the preceding chapter 
as it is the value that corresponds to speed of adjustment. However, as in the standard 
ECM we again produce only a single value for adjustment under the NARDL method 
(albeit adjustment is toward a hypothetically more accurate long-run relationship that 
allows for different effects from positive and negative decompositions of the variables). 
Thus the value does not bestow upon us any additional information about a bank’s 
responses to positive or negative changes in the common factors; it does not make it 
any clearer whether banks were diverging favourably or unfavourably. At best, this value 
would give us a more precise rate of adjustment, i.e. a more accurate picture of which 
banks’ rates diverged from the long-run relation. However, shedding light on the nature 
of the divergence was our primary goal in exploring asymmetry. 
Our other options are the short-run coefficients (the various ω+j and ω-j terms), and the 
long-run coefficients (the L+j and L-j terms). With regard to the former, these are many in 
number (depending on the number of lags in a relevant model) and typically exhibit 
varying signs and significances across lags as a consequence of the method. It would 
therefore be difficult to compare these coefficients across banks and direct comparisons 
would not be possible in many cases. By contrast, the long-run coefficients produce a 
single value for each variable that appears on the right hand side of Equation (7.1) and 
these can therefore be more easily compared. These coefficients define the parameters 
of the long-run relationship; the interpretation of LBase+ and LBase- is as the respective long-
run effects of positive and negative changes in the base rate, and analogously for prices 
and output. As a result, these coefficients convey information about the nature of 
asymmetry evident within the behaviour of a given bank. 
We will therefore focus our attention on the long-run coefficients, and specifically LBase+ 
and LBase- given the widely-acknowledged influence of the policy rate in bank rate-setting. 
Broadly, we expect LBase+ to be positive and LBase- to be negative; that is, we expect a 
positive (negative) change in base rate to have a positive (negative) long-run effect on 
a bank’s rates164. However, of greater interest is the magnitude of coefficients. 
                                                          
164 With regard to LPrices
+, LPrices
-, LOutput
+ and LOutput
-, when inflation is higher individuals are more inclined to save rather 
than spend and so banks need not offer such a high interest rate on deposits (Gambacorta, 2008). Thus in a “normal” 
bank we expect LPrices
+ to be negative and LPrices
- to be positive. With regard to real output, higher incomes naturally lead 
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Specifically, we are interested in observing the size of LBase+ and LBase- for the “divergers”; 
the banks that were implicated as “abnormal” and potentially maverick in the preceding 
chapter because they exhibited positive ECTs. Divergence, as we have discussed, could 
be favourable or unfavourable from a consumer point of view, and could be caused by 
several things. By examining the long-run coefficients from the NARDL output for the 
divergent banks we should be able to clarify which of them diverged from the long-run 
relationship in a favourable way and which diverged in an unfavourable way. This in turn 
should allow us to produce a more convincing case for candidate mavericks. 
We adopt a “general-to-specific” approach to lag length choice (Hendry 1995, 2000). In 
the context of the NARDL(p,q) this amounts to starting with the longest feasible lags of 
p and q before reducing these (where applicable) according to a sequential rule. Our 
chosen starting point is a NARDL(8,8); that is, a lag of 8 months on both the dependent 
and independent variables165. Starting with this maximum lag length, we apply the 
method to each bank and inspect the t-statistic for each of the final lags. We adopt a 
10% sequential rule with regard to eliminating lags; if, for a given bank, the final lags are 
significant at the 10% level then we accept the NARDL(8,8)166. If they are not significant 
we repeat the process, iteratively reducing the respective lag lengths in a sequential 
manner until such point as the final lag demonstrates a significant effect on the 
dependent variable. This process is then repeated for our population of banks. 
The adoption of a general-to-specific approach is borne out of the desire to include the 
maximum amount of relevant information, in order to accurately portray the behaviour of 
banks’ rates. Such an approach is becoming reasonably standard in the NARDL 
literature (see for instance Yu, Chun and Kim, 2013). Alternative approaches to NARDL 
model selection include the comparison of information criteria (for example used in Mitra, 
2014) or the adjusted R-squared, although there are issues with each167. A general-to-
specific approach is preferred. 
 
 
                                                          
to greater savings and so as output rises banks need not offer such a high rate of interest to attract deposits (Gambacorta, 
2008). Thus, again, we expect LOutput
+ to be negative and LOutput
- to be positive. However, we focus our assessment of 
maverickness on the base rate. 
165 Our reason for starting at this length is twofold. Firstly, in the preceding chapter we allowed for a lag of up to 12 
months but no individual bank warranted an ECM with a lag greater than 8. Secondly, in general longer lags are difficult 
to justify in economic terms; it is difficult to argue that the base rate from more than 8 months in the past has a bearing 
on a bank’s rates today. For these reasons, a NARDL(8,8) is a reasonable starting point. 
166 In terms of the ‘q’ lag, we focus our attention on significance of the base rate variable. 
167 It is not strictly appropriate to compare information criteria across models with different lags because a change in the 
lag impacts the sample size which in turn affects the criteria. With regard to R-squared, by construction this will always 
decrease as the lag length decreases. Thus the sequential general-to-specific approach is favoured. 
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7.4 Results 
Following the process of model selection, initial results are given in Appendix S. The 
table shows the chosen lag lengths as well as the corresponding long-run coefficients 
LBase+ and LBase- for each bank168. In addition, we fit a NARDL to the aggregated sample 
to act as a benchmark. Note that direct comparisons of the coefficients of different banks 
are not entirely appropriate by virtue of the varying lag lengths (and in some cases slight 
differences in sample lengths) across banks. Overall, Appendix S can be regarded as 
the “fully asymmetric ARDL” in that the dependent and independent variables are 
unconstrained and allowed to be asymmetric in both the short run and the long run. 
It is important to test whether the fully asymmetric model is appropriate for each 
individual bank. Although we have a rationale for identifying maverick behaviour based 
on asymmetric responses to changes in the policy rate, it would be inappropriate to 
impose an asymmetric model if the data suggested symmetry. Moreover, there are two 
possible sources of asymmetry: in the long-run relationship between the variables and 
in the short-run responses of a banks’ rates to changes in the common factors. Under 
the NARDL approach, testing for symmetry is achieved through the use of long-run (LR) 
and short-run (SR) Wald tests. In essence we test the equality of the coefficients (on the 
positive and negative decompositions of each variable) in order to assess whether we 
can rule out the possibility that they are the same. Where we are unable to reject 
symmetry with regard to a particular variable we are then able to impose symmetry, 
producing a partially constrained model for that bank169. Thus we are able to produce a 
more accurate depiction of the relationship between each banks’ rates and the common 
factors. 
The LR Wald test tests the equality LBase+ = LBase- in the case of base rate, and 
analogously for prices and output. In other words, it tests whether positive and negative 
decompositions of the independent variables have the same long-run effect on the 
dependent variable. The null hypothesis is symmetry. If we are unable to reject the null 
then we are unable to say with certainty that a given bank’s rates exhibit long-run 
asymmetry with respect to that particular variable. We would therefore conclude that a 
constrained model with symmetry imposed on the relevant parameters would be more 
                                                          
168 Recall that these values quantify the parameters of a given bank’s long-run relationship with positive and negative 
changes in the base rate. For example, a larger value of LBase
+ indicates that positive changes in the base rate had a 
greater impact on that bank in the long-run. 
169 Though the focus of our attention is on the base rate, it is important that symmetry tests are conducted on each of the 
independent variables. This is because we wish to fit the most accurate model to each bank. If Wald tests suggest it is 
appropriate to impose symmetry on prices or output then we wish to do so in our model. 
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appropriate. We could refer to the resultant model as a “constrained NARDL” or “partly 
asymmetric ARDL with long run symmetry imposed”. 
The SR Wald test has two variants, “pairwise” and “additive” (Shin, Yu and Greenwood-
Nimmo, 2009). In our context, the pairwise SR Wald would amount to testing ω1+j=ω1-j, 
ω2+j=ω2-j and ω3+j=ω3-j for each lag j (up to q). In other words, testing whether positive 
changes in each of the independent variables have the same effect as negative changes 
with the same lag. By contrast, the additive SR Wald tests whether ∑ω+j=∑ω-j, i.e. 
whether the sum of the short-run coefficients for positive changes is equal to the sum of 
the coefficients for their negative counterparts. Both forms of the test essentially strive 
to establish whether changes in the independent variables have the same effect on the 
dependent variable regardless of their direction of change. Again, the null hypothesis is 
symmetry. If we are unable to reject the null then we are unable to reject a symmetric 
effect and would conclude that a partly asymmetric ARDL (with short run symmetry 
imposed) would be appropriate for that bank. Greenwood-Nimmo et al (2012) note that 
the pairwise test involves a very strong restriction which is unlikely to be satisfied given 
a general-to-specific approach to lag selection. Accordingly, following their work and 
others (e.g. Atil, Lahiani and Nguyen, 2014), our SR Walds are of the additive variety. 
The results of symmetry tests are given in Appendix T. The first value reported is the 
test statistic. The value in parentheses reflects our confidence in rejecting the null 
hypothesis – we reject only where we have 95% confidence. Where the value in 
parentheses is greater than 0.05 we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of symmetry. 
In response to the results of the Wald tests, we then impose symmetry on the 
independent variables (where appropriate) in order to fit a more accurate model to our 
data. As an example, take the case of Yorkshire Building Society (“YORK”), which can 
be seen at the very bottom of Appendix T. For YORK, we cannot reject symmetry in the 
long-run coefficients for prices and output and we cannot reject symmetry in the short-
run coefficients for the base rate and output. Thus a more appropriate model for YORK 
would be a partly asymmetric ARDL which allows only LBase+ and LBase- to differ amongst 
the long-run coefficients and ω2+j and ω2-j to differ amongst the short-run coefficients. 
Given the previously-determined lag lengths of p=3 and q=2 for YORK, its constrained 
NARDL(3,2) therefore takes the form: 
ΔRatet = λRatet-1 + θ+1Base+t-1 + θ-1Base-t-1 + θ2Pricest-1 + θ3Outputt-1 + ∑3-1j=1φjΔRatet-j + 
∑2j=0(ω1jΔBaset-j + ω2+jΔPrices+t-j + ω2-jΔPrices-t-j + ω3jΔOutputt-j) + ut  (7.4) 
This should be compared with Equation (7.2) to appreciate the constraints that are 
imposed in response to the Wald tests.  
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In addition, roughly analogous with the Johansen tests in the previous chapter, we need 
to test for a long run relationship between the variables170. In the context of the NARDL, 
the appropriate test is the FPSS “bounds test” of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). The 
FPSS test essentially tests the null hypothesis that all of the long-run coefficients are zero, 
by means of a straightforward F test. If they are zero then clearly there is no relationship 
between the variables. However, if we can reject the null then we are contented that 
there is some form of underlying relationship. 
The FPSS test is termed a bounds test because we compare the calculated statistic 
against two critical values representing upper and lower bounds. Asymptotic critical 
values for various situations (defined by trend, intercept, and number of parameters) 
were computed and tabulated by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). The upper and lower 
bounds correspond to the two extreme cases where all regressors are I(0) and where all 
regressors are I(1). For calculated values above the upper bound, we reject the null of 
no long-run relationship. For values below the lower bound, we accept the null. For 
values between the bounds, we have an inconclusive result. Of course, if we are 
confident that all variables are either I(0) or I(1), then we can simply use the single 
relevant critical value and compare it against our calculated FPSS value. This is true in 
our case; recall that in the preceding chapter we confirmed that all variables are I(1). 
However, Pesaran, Shin and Smith’s bounds are valuable given that we hope to 
generalise the method to identify mavericks in other situations. 
“Constrained” NARDL results (with appropriate forms of symmetry) and FPSS test values 
are shown in Appendix U. With regard to the latter, our NARDLs have unrestricted 
intercepts and no trend, so with 4 variables the relevant critical values at the 95% 
confidence level are 2.86 and 4.01 (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001). We can see from 
Appendix U that for the majority of our banks we can comfortably reject the null and 
conclude that there is a long-run levels relationship between the variables. However, we 
have a number that fall within the inconclusive range and a handful for which we reject 
a long-run relationship171. 
If we consider our NARDL results in isolation, we regard larger positive values for LBase+ 
as indicative of relatively maverick behaviour. A larger value for this coefficient would 
imply that a bank’s rates increased by a larger amount (in the long-run) in response to 
                                                          
170 We are testing for a long run “levels” relationship, as opposed to the “cointegrating” relationship of the preceding 
chapter. Cointegration is the special case wherein all variables are I(1). 
171 A note on the FPSS test for constrained models. As more symmetry constraints are imposed, the test becomes more 
stringent and difficult to pass. Therefore, note that we are unable to accept a long-run relationship for the banks for which 
we have had to impose greater constraints. For the purposes of maverick identification, firms exhibiting a symmetric 
response to the base rate would not be regarded as maverick anyway, and so this quirk is perceived to pose no great 
problems. However, it is important to acknowledge the issue. 
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central bank increases. In terms of LBase- we regard negative values that are closer to 
zero as more maverick, and positive values as especially maverick. A small negative 
value would imply that a bank only decreased its rates by a small amount (in the long-
run) in response to central bank decreases. A positive value for this coefficient would 
imply that a bank actually increased its rates (in the long-run) in response to policy rate 
decreases. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 display the top ten banks when each of these coefficients 
are ranked. 
Table 7.1: Banks with the largest positive coefficients for LBase+ 
BANK p lag q lag  LBase+ 
YBNK 6 5 8.656 
CHSM 4 5 5.997 
NATS 6 7 5.928 
NBNK 5 3 5.926 
CLYD 3 3 5.533 
FIRD 4 2 5.502 
LAIK 6 2 5.417 
NATW 6 5 5.104 
PRIN 4 2 4.727 
EARS 5 2 4.512 
 
Table 7.2: Banks with the largest positive coefficients for LBase- 
BANK p lag q lag LBase- 
AAL 2 8 2.581 
NBNK 5 3 2.071 
TAC 5 6 0.83 
NRCK 8 4 0.801 
HLFX 5 5 0.785 
MARH 2 6 0.461 
CHGL 4 8 0.403 
HOLM 5 5 0.39 
SCAR 2 2 0.194 
NATS 6 7 0.095 
 
National Savings (“NATS”), which appears in both of these tables, might be considered 
a candidate maverick. However, it may be more insightful to consider the LBase+ and LBase- 
coefficients for the firms that were identified as “divergers” when straightforward linear 
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methods were applied in the previous chapter172. In Chapter 6, we found that 21 firms 
had a positive ECT and therefore displayed unusual behaviour (divergence from the 
postulated long-run relationship with the common factors). These were our candidate 
mavericks, yet we were unable to state whether their divergence was favourable or 
unfavourable from a consumer point of view. Indeed, our whole rationale for exploring 
asymmetric methods was based around shedding light on the nature of these firms’ 
apparent abnormal behaviour. Thus, Table 7.3 below presents the LBase+ and LBase- 
values from the constrained NARDLs of the 21 firms that had a positive ECT in Chapter 
6. Also displayed is their ECT value, by which the firms are sorted. Interesting results 
are discussed below. 
Table 7.3: Constrained NARDL results for the “divergent” banks 
Bank Period ECT LBase+ LBase- 
NBNK 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.977 5.926 2.071 
ECO 2000m1 to 2009m4 0.254 2.086 -0.829 
CHGL 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.110 4.239 0.403 
PRIN 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.050 4.727 -0.763 
MANS 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.045 3.061 -0.919 
CUMB 2000m5 to 2009m12 0.038 3.696 0.092 
FURN 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.031 3.001 -0.571 
YBNK 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.029 8.656 -0.764 
CLYD 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.028 5.533 -0.433 
LBRO 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.026 4.089 -0.484 
LTSB 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.021 3.226 -0.440 
JHB 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.017 2.254 -1.068 
HLFX 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.010 3.443 0.785 
CHOR 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.009 3.424 -0.916 
ULSB 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.008 4.060 -1.089 
RBS 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.005 1.041 -1.041 
SAS 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.003 2.726 -0.606 
NOTT 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.003 2.593 -0.027 
HANL 2002m7 to 2009m12 0.002 3.034 -0.584 
MONM 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.001 2.645 -0.865 
CHSM 2000m1 to 2009m12 0.001 5.997 -0.230 
 
The “benchmark” values of LBase+ and LBase- were 2.821 and -0.903 respectively; these 
were the coefficients when a single NARDL model was fitted to the entire sample. 
Though these values provide a broad indication of banks’ long-run responses to base 
                                                          
172 It is interesting to note that NATS was one of the few firms for which we did not find a cointegrating relationship in the 
previous chapter. This may be evidence that the bank exhibits a more complex form of cointegration.  
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rate changes, it is not entirely appropriate to compare individual banks to this benchmark 
since lag lengths vary considerably from bank to bank. 
As we have stated, hypothetically we would expect a maverick bank to have a relatively 
larger value for LBase+, implying a greater long-run effect of positive changes in the policy 
rate on their own rates. To this end, four of the “divergers” from Table 7.3 (YBNK, CHSM, 
NBNK and CLYD) are in the top five banks by the LBase+ coefficient. This can be seen in 
Table 7.1. This implies that in the long-run these banks increased their rates by the 
greatest amount in response to policy rate increases. Such behaviour is favourable from 
a consumer point of view, and supports the case for YBNK, CHSM, NBNK and CLYD as 
candidate mavericks. At the other end of the spectrum, two of the banks from the table 
(RBS and ECO) appear in the thirty lowest when LBase+ is sorted, making them unlikely 
mavericks. 
With regard to LBase-, as we have stated, relatively higher values would be regarded as 
favourable, with positive values considered especially favourable. A positive coefficient 
implies that the long-run response of that bank to decreases in the policy rate was to 
increase its own rates. We consider this to be very unusual given the interest rate 
channel of monetary policy. We can see from Table 7.3 that four of the divergers have 
a positive value for LBase- (NBNK, HLFX, CHGL and CUMB), and the first three of these 
appear in the top ten in Table 7.2. This is evidence in support of these firms as candidate 
mavericks. A positive value for LBase- is not exclusive to the firms in Table 7.3; overall, 
eleven firms had such a positive value. However, of these, four were the result of 
imposing long-run symmetry on Base following the Wald tests. Thus, only seven firms 
exhibited a positive value for LBase- when the effect of the policy rate was asymmetric in 
the long run, and nearly two-thirds of these appear amongst our candidate mavericks 
from the preceding chapter. Two of the divergers (JHB and ULSB) from Table 7.3 appear 
in the thirty lowest banks by the LBase- coefficient. This is evidence against the notion that 
JHB or ULSB might be maverick. 
The most promising candidate mavericks from the preceding two chapters were ECO 
and TSCO. We have already stated that ECO was in the bottom thirty banks for LBase+; 
suggesting a modest long-run response to increases in the policy rate. Moreover, it is 
the median bank when LBase- is ranked, indicating a relatively normal response to 
decreases in the policy rate. Both of these coefficients are close to our benchmark for 
the sample as a whole. Overall, this counts strongly against the notion that ECO was the 
maverick in our market. These facts are also consistent with our observation in 
conclusion of the previous chapter that ECO performed poorly by the Breunig and 
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Menezes (2008) responsiveness measure, indicating that whilst ECO may have 
behaved unusually this unusual behaviour was not favourable to consumers. It seems 
that the source of ECO’s divergence was primarily in its reactions to prices and output, 
on which we place less emphasis when it comes to identifying maverick behaviour.  
Moreover, TSCO, which seemed to be a strong candidate maverick by the BM measures 
in Chapter 5, had a coefficient of 1.482 for LBase+ and -0.604 for LBase-. These coefficients 
place it in the bottom thirty when LBase+ is ranked and a modest 29th overall when LBase- 
is ranked. Again, these findings count against the notion that TSCO might be the 
maverick in the market for instant access deposit accounts. The firm’s long-run response 
to positive changes in the base rate, in particular, strongly suggests behaviour that is 
unfavourable from a consumer point of view. This serves to highlight deficiencies in the 
simple BM measures of maverickness. 
In general, applying the NARDL approach to our sample has allowed deeper exploration 
of the nature of the “divergence” we established in the previous chapter. By looking at 
the long-run coefficients on Base we are able to get an indication of which of the 
“divergers” from Chapter 6 behaved favourably with regard to changes in the policy rate. 
Specifically, we have evidence supporting the cases of CHGL, CHSM, CLYD, CUMB, 
HLFX, NBNK and YBNK as candidate mavericks173. Of these, it is notable that CUMB 
also appeared in the top-scoring banks by BM Measure 2. This suggests that as well as 
having positive long-run responses to changes in the policy rate, the timing of their rate 
changes was also favourable to consumers. Thus, in the case of CUMB, we have a firm 
that appears to be favourable by the simple BM measure, diverges per our ECM 
approach, and diverges in a favourable way by the NARDL approach. Therefore, of the 
firms in our data during the period under consideration, we conclude that CUMB shows 
the greatest propensity to behave in a maverick way. TSCO and ECO, which were 
identified as candidate mavericks by the simpler measures, are revealed to have 
distinctly un-maverick tendencies when we modelled their specific responses to 
increases and decreases in the policy rate. 
We cannot state that CUMB was the maverick at each and every point in the sample. It 
may even be the case that CUMB was not the maverick at any point in the sample; 
Tables 5.3-5.5 in Chapter 5 demonstrated that CUMB never offered the highest rates at 
either the low, medium or high deposit levels in any of the ten calendar years. However, 
                                                          
173 As we have discussed, CLYD, NBNK and YBNK were all part of the same banking group, and so we repeat the point 
that it is intuitively pleasing that they are identified as having similar levels of relative maverickness. 
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we can state that during the entirety of the period 2000-2009 CUMB appeared to display 
the greatest level of relative maverickness174. 
 
7.5 Discussion 
A point of discussion is whether the NARDL approach is appropriate for the purposes of 
maverick identification. As we mentioned in Section 7.2 of this chapter there are a couple 
of items counting in its favour. First, it successfully separates out the effects of positive 
and negative changes in the common factors. By using the approach we are able to 
model the rate-setting behaviours of firms when each of the common factors was in a 
different state (i.e. increasing or decreasing). Whilst we did not compare the short run 
effects of changes in the independent variables due to the different lag lengths from 
model to model, we were able to compare the long run effects. In doing so, we were able 
to capture firm behaviour in a more specific way than we could using the standard (linear 
and symmetric) time series methods deployed in Chapter 6. Assuming that price is 
indeed the medium through which maverick behaviour manifests itself in our market, the 
NARDL approach allows us to distinguish between favourable and unfavourable 
behaviours, whereas linear ECMs could only highlight “abnormal” behaviour. 
Second, a key advantage is the fact that the NARDL approach can be applied in cases 
where variables are not all I(1). This is particularly appealing when it comes to applying 
it to other markets. Our ultimate objective was to develop a means of maverick 
identification that could be applied to any case. Whereas the error correction approach 
of the preceding chapter would only be applicable in markets where key variables 
happen to be I(1), the methods we deploy here are much more widely generalisable 
(Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo, 2014). 
These points are positive and the asymmetric methods deployed in this chapter are 
certainly an improvement over those used the preceding one. However, there are some 
issues with the approach. One is that we are still analysing an arbitrary time period. 
Unfortunately, in order to apply a method such as the NARDL, this is unavoidable. As 
we discussed in the previous chapter, in order for time series methods to be applicable 
the sample needs to be sufficiently long175. Thus, in adopting a time series approach the 
                                                          
174 Recall that in Chapter 5 we discounted NBNK as a possible maverick because the bank operated solely in Northern 
Ireland. Along similar lines, CUMB is a regional building society whose physical branches are located in the north west of 
England. However, crucially, CUMB did serve the entire UK market (for example via online banking). Thus, the concerns 
we had with respect to NBNK are lesser when it comes to CUMB. 
175 Indeed, in this chapter and the one preceding it we were unable to fit models to banks whose samples were too short. 
The result of this was that some firms could not be analysed, and it is possible that the true maverick may have been 
amongst that group. 
119 
 
best we can hope to achieve is to produce estimates for the relative maverickness of 
firms during a pre-determined period. We are not able to state conclusively which firm 
was the maverick at each and every point in time. Moreover, the required sample length 
poses particular problems as merger analysis typically takes a short-term outlook. The 
conditions in markets regularly change, and so to consider such a long period is 
questionable for our purposes. 
From the point of view of merger analysis, being able to identify the maverick at each 
point in time would be more valuable than producing a broad overall measure of relative 
maverickness. We could theoretically capture the maverick at a given point in time using 
cross-sectional methods, at least in terms of the relative level of rates that firms offered; 
by taking an approach along the lines of BM Measure 1 we could state which firm offered 
the best rates at particular times. However, as we have seen, such simple measures do 
not appear to accurately identify the maverick. Moreover, we have emphasised that 
maverick behaviours are best identified via the reactions of firms (in our case to changes 
in the common factors). Indeed, the responses of firms are recognised as crucial to 
maverick identification in the existing literature (e.g. Baker, 2002). Such responses could 
not be picked up using simple cross-sectional methods. 
Recall that we chose to explore time series methods as a consequence of our chosen 
market. As we outlined in the previous chapter, error correction techniques have been 
widely used in the analysis of banking. However, we may speculate that panel time 
series methods may prove more fruitful in the identification of mavericks (Deaton, 1985; 
Coakley, Fuertes and Smith, 2004). By using panel time series methods, we could still 
analyse the responses of banks to common factors but we could potentially investigate 
shorter time periods. If we were able to establish breaks in the data in order to subdivide 
the period into shorter segments, then this would theoretically give a more accurate 
account of the maverick(s) in the market. More generally, there are a number of other 
variables we could have included had we adopted panel methods. For instance, we 
could have considered characteristics of the firms and how these influence the prices 
they set; of relevance since mavericks are supposedly smaller players. We take up this 
discussion further in the overall conclusion to the thesis. 
Another issue is that the analysis of maverickness using the NARDL approach makes 
no explicit allowance for strategic effects; we do not allow for the fact that firms’ interest 
rates are likely to be influenced by one another. This is particularly pertinent given that 
mavericks supposedly constrain the behaviours of their rivals. Our attempt at maverick 
identification constitutes what Baker (2002) termed a “revealed preferences” 
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approach176. Recall that this is where a maverick is identified on the basis of its 
observable behaviour, and we have argued that such an approach is preferable to the 
qualitative “a priori factors” approach that authorities currently typically employ. 
However, Baker also suggested a third approach to identification which he termed 
“natural experiments”. This is where a firm is shown to have a significant influence over 
the prices of its rivals or the prevailing industry price. Arguably, maverick identification 
could be enhanced by incorporating strategic effects and attempting to identify firms 
whose actions constrained the actions of others177. For instance, what if the majority of 
firms in our sample chose to follow policy rates because a specific competitor had a 
history and reputation for doing so? By conducting individual time series analysis, we 
are unable to pick up any such effect. Again, we will return to this discussion in the 
conclusion to the thesis. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Using the NARDL approach was an improvement over the ECM approach of Chapter 6 
since it incorporated asymmetries. Allowing for asymmetric reactions to the common 
factors is crucial in order to distinguish between favourable and unfavourable 
behaviours, and thus crucial in order to establish maverick behaviour as it is depicted in 
theory. Without some allowance for asymmetry, the best we can hope to achieve is the 
identification of “abnormal” behaviour, which in itself is not enough to establish 
maverickness. “Abnormal” behaviour could be good or bad for consumers. Mavericks 
must not only behave in an unusual way, but must behave in a manner that is positive 
for consumers; this notion underlies the entire rationale for giving such firms special 
treatment under merger policy.  
More generally, the time series methods we adopted in this chapter and the one that 
preceded it are preferable to the methods of Breunig and Menezes (2008) because they 
encompass firm behaviour in a single measure. One of the key issues with the BM 
approach was that the relative rate and responsiveness measures captured two distinct 
behaviours and that there was no way to know which was the appropriate dimension to 
capture maverick behaviour. In the error correction approaches we have employed, 
                                                          
176 This is also true of the methods used in the preceding two chapters. 
177 This would be consistent with the few pieces of econometric analysis that competition authorities have conducted, for 
example the econometric analysis of the presence of JET fuel stations in the StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips case we 
discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, Sabbatini (2014) argued that a maverick could only be identified where there was 
evidence that collusion had been constrained by a maverick in the past. 
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these two dimensions are combined into one measure. Crucially, the magnitude of rate 
adjustments is incorporated. 
Our aim in exploring strategies for maverick identification was to develop an objective 
empirical test of maverickness, which we argued would be preferable to the subjective, 
qualitative approach that we have observed in past merger cases. This led us to explore 
asymmetric error correction, with the NARDL emerging as our chosen approach for the 
reasons we have documented: in addition to incorporating asymmetries, the fact that it 
is applicable to variables of different orders of integration is particularly advantageous 
from the perspective of generalisation. We have discussed at some length the need to 
allow for asymmetry, since the theoretical literature emphasises that maverick behaviour 
is favourable rather than just simply different. Therefore as an empirical exercise to test 
the theory the NARDL method is much more appropriate than those that have come 
before it. 
However, it is clear that the approach does not represent a perfect method of maverick 
identification. In particular, it is difficult to reconcile the conflicting facts that time series 
methods require a long sample whilst merger analysis tends to be focused on the short-
term178. Thus, this empirical approach is not completely perfect; it may be useful in some 
merger analyses, but in others where the relevant period under consideration is relatively 
short it may not be appropriate. In this regard, we have not been wholly successful in 
devising a generalisable empirical test of maverickness (but rather a test that provides 
a strong indicator of potential maverick behaviour). We have suggested that panel time 
series methods may be the solution to this problem, but this idea is in its infancy. Much 
like our survey of AECM variants earlier in this chapter, further work would require careful 
consideration regarding what would be the best approach. If alternative methods are 
pursued it is imperative that the asymmetric dimension is maintained. 
  
                                                          
178 Time series methods are good at capturing dynamics; in our case, the reactions of firms to the policy rate and so on. 
However, as an empirical exercise to test the maverick theory such methods are not ideal since merger analyses tend to 
be conducted on relatively short time periods for which such dynamics might not be observable. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This thesis sought to address perceived gaps in the literature on maverick firms. 
Specifically, the three core objectives of the thesis were to contribute toward the 
development of a formal theory of mavericks, to analyse and understand the way the 
European Commission has applied the maverick concept in merger cases, and to try to 
develop an empirical method of maverick identification. In terms of the latter, crucially, 
we sought to develop an approach that was objective in nature and did not rely on 
preconceptions regarding the likely identity of the maverick party. Prior to this thesis, no 
formal theory existed, no study had considered in detail the use of the concept across a 
population of cases, and there had been only one (relatively unsuccessful) attempt at 
objective empirical identification. This concluding chapter will summarise how the thesis 
contributes to the literature, discuss policy implications, and outline areas for possible 
further study. 
In Chapter 2 we began to formulate a formal theory of mavericks. Building upon Ivaldi et 
al (2003), we constructed a repeated games model in the style of Compte, Jenny and 
Rey (2002). In other words, we produced a model in which the maverick had a lower 
discount factor than the level required in order for it to favour collusion over deviation, 
and where firms had different production capacities. By adopting this framework we were 
able to portray the maverick in a manner that was consistent with the way such firms are 
depicted in merger guidelines (i.e. as a smaller player that is averse to collusion). 
Moreover, we were able to use the model to explore the effect that such firms have on 
markets. 
The repeated games model contributes to the maverick literature in several ways. First, 
we were able to formally demonstrate how and under what circumstances the maverick 
would genuinely constrain coordination. We have shown that the patience of non-
mavericks is crucial in this regard. Where non-mavericks are sufficiently patient to offset 
the impatience of the maverick, we outlined scenarios where collusion could theoretically 
occur in spite of the presence of a maverick. This has significant policy implications since 
it implies that the presence of a maverick may not be enough to prevent collusion on its 
own. Rather, we have demonstrated that collusion would only be restricted where a 
maverick was present and other firms in the market were not patient enough to 
accommodate it (or alternatively where the redistribution of market share proved 
impossible). These findings suggest that the application of the maverick concept is not 
clear-cut. Our model implies that identifying a particular firm as maverick is not the same 
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as identifying a constraint to collusion; it seemingly also depends on the status of non-
mavericks and the nature of firm interaction in a given market. 
In addition to this, our model also formally demonstrates that the presence of a maverick 
has a detrimental effect on the payoffs of non-mavericks. Where a maverick is 
insurmountably averse to collusion and rivals can only achieve partial collusion, we have 
shown that the collective payoff of the latter would be lower. To reiterate the findings of 
Chapter 2, depending on the makeup of firms within a market, it is possible for some 
non-mavericks to receive a greater payoff from partial collusion but it is not possible for 
all firms to do so. Thus, non-mavericks would generally favour full collusion; being 
restricted to partial collusion has an adverse effect on their collective profits. This is an 
important finding because it provides a motive for firms to instigate the removal of a 
maverick from a market, which is a key concern of competition authorities. Since we 
have shown that non-mavericks’ payoffs are impacted by the presence of a maverick, 
we have formally provided an explanation for why non-mavericks might wish to actively 
acquire and remove mavericks. However, we also noted an incentive problem: why 
would a non-maverick incur a cost to acquire a maverick, when other non-mavericks 
could enjoy the benefits of this without incurring the cost?179 
In Chapter 3 we analysed the use of the maverick concept in EC merger cases during 
the period 2000 to 2013. Having searched for the term in the population of merger case 
reports, we conducted an in-depth analysis of the nature and context of the concept’s 
application. The work presented in Chapter 3 gave invaluable insights into the way the 
EC competition authority regards maverick firms. We noted that application of the 
concept was inconsistent with merger guidelines. In particular, the term was regularly 
used in conjunction with unilateral effects, whereas guidelines relate the concept only to 
coordination. Moreover, it was applied to outsider mavericks when EC guidelines only 
discuss the party as an insider to a merger. These observations highlight the need for 
authorities to clarify their position with regard to maverick firms. It is possible that this 
apparent misapplication of the concept is a consequence of the lack of a formal theory 
and a fundamental misunderstanding of the subject. Alternatively, we have speculated 
that the shift in thinking following the 2004 review of merger regulation may have caused 
a change in attitude with respect to mavericks, or that the term has been consciously 
used to add weight to unilateral arguments. In any case, our findings emphasise the fact 
                                                          
179 The findings of Chapter 3 may help answer this question and so we provide an explanation in the discussion of further 
areas of study below. 
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that this issue requires clarification. Moreover, our findings align with similar criticisms of 
US authorities’ application of the concept (Owings, 2013). 
The analysis of EC merger cases also provided useful insights that informed our 
subsequent maverick identification work. From studying individual cases in detail it 
seemed to be apparent that those mergers in which the authority was able to conduct 
some form of econometric analysis were more likely to result in the maverick being 
ultimately established (recall, for example, the case of StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips). 
This added emphasis to the third objective of this thesis, the desire to develop an 
objective empirical method of maverick identification. It is clear that the EC authority 
places emphasis on the value of quantitative analysis. Therefore, this reaffirmed our 
initial perception that an empirical test of maverickness would be preferable to the 
current approach, which typically involves identification based on qualitative reasoning 
and the perceptions of market participants. Furthermore, from our analysis in Chapter 3 
we noted that in order for the authority to identify a firm as maverick they typically 
required evidence that the firm’s prices were lower than those of its rivals. This focus on 
prices reinforced the notion that our attempts at empirical identification should be based 
around the prices of firms, as opposed to, for example, quality considerations. 
Chapters 5-7 documented our attempts at empirical maverick identification. Having first 
replicated the methods involved in the only previous attempt by Breunig and Menezes 
(2008), we went on to explore alternative approaches based on cointegration and 
asymmetric cointegration, respectively. We were drawn to explore such methods as a 
consequence of investigating the techniques commonly used to analyse our market of 
interest, UK bank and building society deposit accounts. Our methods followed Breunig 
and Menezes in that they placed particular emphasis on the responses of firms to 
changes in the policy rate. Ultimately, in Chapter 7 we applied the nonlinear 
autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) approach, which allowed us to distinguish 
between the effects of positive and negative changes in the “common factors” we had 
established (with emphasis on the policy rate). We then argued that we were able to 
identify favourable and unfavourable behaviours from the long-run coefficients in the 
NARDL output. This allowed us to judge relative maverickness. 
Breunig and Menezes’ (2008) attempt at empirical identification was not particularly 
successful. Moreover, as we have discussed, their methods were relatively simplistic 
and there were several problems with their approach. Our subsequent attempts, and 
particularly the NARDL approach, contribute to the literature since they provide more 
sophisticated and more accurate depictions of firm behaviour. Based on similar 
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principles to that of Breunig and Menezes, our attempts overcome many of the issues 
with their study. For example, BM Measure 2 (the responsiveness measure) 
incorporated rate adjustments but did not allow for their magnitude. Our attempts, using 
both ECMs and the NARDL, implicitly incorporate the size of rate adjustment. Moreover, 
the sample we chose to analyse had an advantage over Breunig and Menezes’ since it 
included both policy rate increases and decreases, whereas theirs included only 
increases. Therefore we were better able to accurately capture favourable, and 
potentially maverick, behaviours – thus, the NARDL approach developed in this thesis 
represents a more accurate test of maverick behaviour as it is defined in the literature180. 
However, as we outlined in the previous chapter, an issue that persists through all three 
attempts at identification is the fact that we were analysing an arbitrary time period. This 
was necessary given that we used time series methods; in order for these to be valid the 
sample needed to be sufficiently long. As we have discussed, a consequence of this is 
that our methods are only able to produce estimates of relative maverickness for the 
entirety of the period; we cannot state which firm was the maverick at each and every 
point in time. From a policy perspective this is not ideal. Nonetheless, our approach can 
provide useful indicators regarding firms’ relative maverickness, which can inform and 
guide authorities with respect to the likely role of particular firms within a market. As a 
minimum our methods would allow authorities to rule out firms that were clearly not 
maverick, which is a significant contribution to the subject. 
The empirical analysis of Chapters 5-7 was conducted on the market for UK instant 
access deposit accounts that paid interest on an annual basis. Whilst most of our 
discussion and conclusions here have been related to maverick firms in a more general 
sense, it is appropriate to consider the implications of this work for the market itself. Can 
we draw any insights into the functioning of the market on the basis of our analysis? 
Amongst other findings, Chapter 5 demonstrated that there are clear periods where one 
particular bank offered the most favourable rates, Chapter 6 identified a firm with a 
different business model (ECO) that was exhibiting very different pricing behaviour, and 
Chapter 7 showed that firms within the same branch network do indeed appear to follow 
similar rate-setting strategies. These are, in the most part, observations one would 
expect, but our analysis confirms them. 
Moreover, our various empirical approaches have suggested different candidate 
mavericks in the instant access deposit market. One reason for this may be because, as 
                                                          
180 From a methodological standpoint, our use of the NARDL method was in a context and on a scale that has never 
been done before. Typically, NARDL models have been fitted to single series, but never to a sample as large as 88 banks. 
Thus, this is another contribution, albeit to a different literature. 
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we have discussed at length, our methods were based around prices (interest rates) and 
rate-setting behaviour yet consumers may choose their account on the basis of non-
price characteristics such as those we outlined in Chapter 4. Consumers have been 
found to be prone to inertia when it comes to switching between bank accounts (Kiser, 
2002) and the age of a product has been found to be negatively correlated with the 
interest rate paid (Anderson, Ashton and Hudson, 2014). In terms of mavericks in the 
deposit market, these facts contribute to the difficulty in stating who the maverick might 
be. Is a maverick in this market a firm that offers the most favourable introductory rates, 
or a firm that continues to offer favourable rates to its long-standing customers? These 
are considerations that we are unable to allow for with the data at hand, but they allude 
to the fact that identifying the maverick firm in this particular market may not be as 
straightforward as it initially seemed. These would be important considerations for any 
merger analysis conducted on this market, or similar markets, in the future. 
Let us now consider areas for further study. In terms of the repeated games model, there 
are several directions in which the work could go. An obvious natural step would be to 
model hypothetical mergers within our framework. Such an idea has tentatively been 
explored by Baker (2010). “In order for the market participants to coordinate more 
effectively… the maverick’s incentives must change so that the constraint it imposes is 
relaxed. One way that could happen is through merger.” (Baker, 2010, p.243). Assuming 
that market shares and capacities were simply added together upon merger, Baker 
presented a simple example showing how the constraint on coordination was relaxed 
following a merger involving the maverick. In the context of our model, mergers could be 
imposed and the resultant firms’ payoffs could be calculated. We could then explore 
whether non-mavericks of different sizes and discount factors would find it profitable to 
merge with the maverick, from the perspective of facilitating collusion. 
Alternatively, given our observation that the EC has increasingly applied the concept to 
unilateral effects, we have reason to believe that our theoretical model of mavericks 
should allow for this type of anti-competitive effect. It is not clear how unilateral effects 
could be explored within our existing model. However, alternative models could be 
produced that attempt to incorporate product repositioning and post-merger closures into 
models of unilateral effects. Doing so would help to reconcile our maverick theory with 
the current approach of competition authorities. Moreover, recall the incentive problem 
we highlighted with regard to maverick acquisitions. We have taken the detrimental 
impact on non-mavericks’ payoffs as evidence supporting the notion that firms may wish 
to acquire and remove mavericks, yet we have questioned why a firm would do so when 
it also confers a “free-riding” benefit to its rivals. A solution to this may come in the form 
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of unilateral effects. If the merged firm can unilaterally increase its prices following the 
acquisition of a maverick, then there would no longer be an incentive problem; it would 
be quite clear as to why a firm may wish to engage in such a merger. 
With respect to the merger analysis of Chapter 3, areas for further work could involve 
analysing cases from other regions. We stated in the introduction that whilst individual 
cases are often studied, aggregate-level analysis had not been done. It would be 
interesting to consider the population of US cases to see if attitudes to mavericks follow 
similar patterns to those in Europe. This would then allow us to test the significance of 
the 2004 European merger review; if US authorities demonstrated similar trends to that 
of the EC, then we would place less emphasis on the effect of the review. In general, the 
greater prominence of unilateral effects requires further consideration. An area of 
possible further work could be to interview competition authorities and gather first-hand 
information regarding their attitudes to maverick merger enforcement. In this thesis we 
have inferred their attitudes based on the wording of case reports, but we could gain a 
better understanding by communicating with the authorities directly. 
Along similar lines, note that our analysis was conducted on cases considered by the 
EC; i.e. those that had international dimensions and impacted the European Community. 
Thus, the sample of cases that we analysed did not include every single maverick case 
in Europe during 2000-2013, simply those that warranted the EC’s attention. In addition 
to those analysed by the EC, national competition authorities also made reference to the 
maverick term in their own merger analysis. This was evidenced by, for example, 
Massey (2010) in the context of Irish merger cases and Billard, Ivaldi and Mitraille (2011) 
in the context of a French case. Thus, a possible extension could be to consider 
populations of merger cases on a national level. This would allow us to fully appreciate 
the extent to which the concept is used, and to assess the consistency of its application. 
It would be interesting to observe whether individual countries’ approaches to the 
concept mirrored those of the EC and whether trends in the use of the concept (for 
example, the increasing emphasis on unilateral effects) also emerged at a national level. 
Finally, as we mentioned in the concluding remarks to the preceding chapter, there are 
potential areas of further work with regard to maverick identification. First, it would be 
interesting incorporate strategic effects into identification attempts. The approaches 
used in Chapters 5-7 are all based on “revealed preferences”. On the contrary, an 
avenue that could be explored is the alternative “natural experiments” approach 
suggested by Baker (2002). In other words, rather than attempting to identify mavericks 
based on some notion of overall favourable behaviour, we could attempt to identify them 
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via the constraints they have over rivals. If we were able to establish links between the 
prices of a single firm and overall trends in industry prices, then this could be construed 
as maverick behaviour. This would be particularly true if the firm in question was a 
smaller party that would not be expected to influence overall market prices. 
More generally, applying the NARDL approach to other markets would be a valuable 
contribution. This would serve to reinforce our arguments regarding the appropriateness 
of the method; we have suggested that it is applicable to other markets and contexts, 
but this is something that should be tested. Specifically, it would be interesting to apply 
the method in markets that are dissimilar to bank and building society deposit accounts. 
A traditional manufacturing context would provide a good example, whereby the 
“common factors” that firms’ prices respond to would be the key inputs to the 
manufacture of that product. Alternatively, it would be insightful to apply the methods to 
industries in which the EC has applied the concept in cases. For instance, the concept 
has twice been applied to mergers in the mobile communications industry, so this would 
be a strong candidate market. In general, the method could be applied to any industry in 
which the EC established a maverick, and we could test whether the firm implicated by 
the method was consistent with the party identified by the authority via qualitative means. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 we suggested that the approach developed in this thesis may 
exhaust the usefulness of time series methods with regard to maverick identification, 
and that panel time series methods could be explored next. In particular, such methods 
are appealing since they could still be based around the responses of firms to common 
factors but shorter periods of time could be analysed. This would be better-aligned with 
the short-term outlook of merger enforcement. Panel methods could also allow the 
inclusion of a wider range of variables. It would be interesting, for example, to incorporate 
firm characteristics into the econometric analysis of mavericks. This may facilitate the 
identification of particular characteristics that make firms more or less likely to be 
maverick. 
To conclude, we have unearthed evidence that the maverick concept will continue to 
grow in importance within the sphere of merger policy; this was particularly evidenced 
by our findings in Chapter 3. Moreover, the literature suggests that this trend is 
appropriate; several studies have advocated a wider role for the maverick concept in 
merger analysis (for example Baker, 2002, and Owings, 2013). Therefore, we are 
hopeful that contributions like the formal theory (depicted in Chapter 2) and attempts at 
objective identification (chronicled in Chapters 5-7) prove valuable to authorities. 
However, it is also clear that there is plenty of scope for both the theory and identification 
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techniques to be developed further. Moreover, these should be developed in conjunction 
with the use of the concept in merger case decisions in order to ensure consistency. 
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Appendix A – Derivation of the critical discount factor (Chapter 2) 
 
Here we derive the ‘critical discount factor’ - the level of discount factor that a firm must 
have in order to sustain collusion. 
In Equation 2.6 we have stated that Firm i favours collusion over deviation if: 
 
In other words, if the payoff to collusion is greater than the one-shot payoff to deviation 
followed by Nash punishment forever more. If we set these things equal and solve for δi, 
this gives the level of discount factor above which collusion is strictly preferred.  
Multiplying the equation by (1 – δi) gives: 
 
Multiplying out the parentheses and dividing by ki gives: 
 
Multiplying by kl gives: 
 
We can then exploit the fact that kl + K-l = K. Substituting this into the expression 
simplifies the right hand side: 
 
Rearranging the terms and multiplying by K gives: 
 
Simplifying and dividing by (K – M) gives: 
 
Then dividing by K gives us the critical discount factor: 
 
Above this level a firm prefers collusion. At this discount level, a firm is indifferent 
between collusion and deviation.  
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Appendix B – Derivation of the critical discount factor for partial collusion 
(Chapter 2) 
 
Here we derive the level of discount factor that would be needed in order to sustain 
partial collusion.  
Non-maverick i prefers partial collusion to deviation if: 
 
In other words, if the payoff to collusion when the maverick firm m is ignored is greater 
than the one-shot payoff to deviation followed by Nash punishment forever. If we set 
these things equal and solve for δi, this gives the level of discount factor above which 
partial collusion is sustainable. 
Multiplying the equation by (1 – δi) gives: 
 
Dividing by ki and multiplying out the parentheses gives: 
 
Multiplying by kl gives: 
 
As in Appendix A, we can again exploit the fact that kl + K-l = K. Substituting this into the 
expression simplifies the right hand side: 
 
Multiplying by (K – km) gives: 
 
Multiplying out the first set of parentheses on the right hand side leaves us with a 
negative klkm term on either side of the inequality, which cancels out: 
 
This rearranges to: 
 
Dividing by (K – M): 
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Thus the critical discount factor for partial collusion is given by: 
 
Above this level partial collusion is sustainable. Exactly at this discount level, a firm is 
indifferent between partial collusion and deviation.  
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Appendix C – Derivation of the transfer, T (Chapter 2) 
 
Here we derive the size of the total transfer of market share needed in order to 
encourage the maverick to participate in full collusion. 
Equation 2.12 states that the maverick receives a higher payoff from collusion when: 
 
In other words, where the maverick’s payoff to collusion when it is afforded some 
additional amount of market share (T) is greater than its payoff to deviation. 
Multiplying this by (1 – δm): 
 
Multiplying out the parentheses, dividing by M, and subtracting km/K can give us an 
expression for T: 
 
However, this can be simplified much further. Multiplying by M, klM and K gives: 
 
Simplifying gives: 
 
Once again, we can again exploit the fact that kl + K-l = K in order to simplify the right 
hand side: 
 
Dividing by KMkl: 
 
This is as far as we are able to simplify the expression. 
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Appendix D – Proof that partial collusion is never preferable when βi = 0 (Chapter 
2) 
 
Here we are proving that, for a given non-maverick firm, the payoff to partial collusion is 
never greater than the payoff to full collusion, provided that firm is not required to give 
up market share to the maverick. 
If firm i is not required to make a transfer then βi = 0 and Equation 2.15 simplifies to: 
 
We can show that it is not possible for the left hand side of this inequality to be larger 
than the right hand side. 
Multiplying by (1 – δi): 
 
Subsequently multiplying by (K – km) and K: 
 
Multiplying out the parentheses: 
 
Cancelling out like terms: 
 
Yet, recall that by construction we imposed that K > M. Therefore, the inequality is never 
satisfied when βi = 0. 
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Appendix E – Proof that when δm̂ → 0 and βi = 1, the payoff to partial collusion is 
strictly greater than that of full so long as kj > 0 where j ≠ i ≠ m (Chapter 2) 
 
For a given firm i, partial collusion is preferred to full collusion if Equation 2.15 is satisfied: 
 
Multiplying this by (1 – δi): 
 
When δ̂m → 0, the maverick is extremely averse to collusion and the maximal transfer is 
required in order to incentivise its cooperation. The maximal transfer is given in Equation 
2.14. Substituting in this value of T gives: 
 
Multiplying out the outer parentheses on the right hand side: 
 
Subsequently multiplying by (K – km) and K: 
 
Multiplying out the first two sets of parentheses: 
 
Cancelling out like terms: 
 
Rearranging and simplifying: 
 
Dividing by (K – M)km and inverting the sign: 
 
Where βi = 1, this becomes: 
 
This is true so long as there are more than two firms in the market. Non-maverick i 
prefers partial collusion to full collusion so long as there is some other non-maverick j.  
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Appendix F - When δm̂ → 0 and 0 < βi < 1, under what circumstances is partial 
collusion preferred? (Chapter 2) 
 
Our proof is the same as in Appendix E - from Equation 2.15 we arrive at the point: 
 
However, this time, rather than imposing βi = 1, we can solve for βi to ascertain the levels 
of transfer for which a maverick would still favour partial collusion. Dividing by (K – km) 
yields: 
 
Therefore partial collusion is (strictly) preferred by non-maverick i where: 
 
In other words, it is preferred where their share of the ‘transfer’ to the maverick in order 
to achieve full collusion exceeds their collusive market share under partial collusion.  
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Appendix G – When δm̂ > 0 and βi > 0, under what circumstances is partial 
collusion preferred? 
 
Here we are deriving an expression for the proportion of transfer (βi) that would result in 
non-maverick i preferring partial collusion to full collusion, in cases where the maverick 
is not completely averse to collusion; in other words, where the maverick has some 
positive discount factor (δ̂m > 0).  
When δ̂m > 0, the level of transfer required in order to facilitate full collusion with the 
maverick is given by the expression we derived in Appendix C: 
 
Substituting this value into Equation 2.15 and multiplying by (1 – δi) gives: 
 
We aim to simplify this as much as possible and to ultimately produce an expression for 
βi. Multiplying out the outer parenthesis on the right hand side and then multiplying by 
(K – km) gives: 
 
Multiplying by Kkl gives: 
 
Multiplying out the first two sets of parentheses and cancelling out like terms gives: 
 
Adding kmMkikl gives: 
 
Simplifying the left hand side gives: 
 
Dividing by (K – M) and inverting the sign gives: 
 
Dividing by (K – km)(kl - δ̂mK) gives: 
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Appendix H – Proof that partial collusion is never strictly preferred by all non-
mavericks (Chapter 2) 
 
This is a straightforward proof to show that partial collusion can never be strictly preferred 
by all non-mavericks. 
In Appendix G we showed that in order for a non-maverick to prefer partial collusion their 
transfer under full collusion would have to satisfy: 
 
In order for the maverick to be incentivised to collude, we know that βs sum to one. In 
addition, the market shares of non-mavericks in the case of partial collusion also sum to 
one:  
 
Thus, in order for all non-mavericks to simultaneously favour partial collusion, it would 
have to be the case that: 
 
In other words, it would have to be the case that: 
 
Yet when δ̂m > 0 it is apparent that this will never be true. 
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Appendix I - Application of the maverick concept by industry sector (Chapter 3) 
 
Sector Number of total 
cases 
Number of 
maverick cases 
% of maverick 
cases 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
4 0 0 
Mining and Quarrying 6 1 17 
Manufacturing 169 9 5 
Electricity, Gas, 
Steam and Air 
Conditioning 
18 3 17 
Water Supply, 
Sewerage, Waste 
Management and 
Remediation Activities 
2 0 0 
Construction  3 1 33 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade; Repair of 
Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
10 4 40 
Transportation and 
Storage 
26 1 4 
Accommodation and 
Food Service 
Activities 
1 0 0 
Information  
and Communication 
31 5 16 
Financial and 
Insurance Activities 
7 0 0 
Real Estate Activities 
 
0 0 0 
Professional, 
Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
4 0 0 
Administrative and 
Support Service 
Activities 
6 1 17 
Public Administration 
and Defence; 
Compulsory Social 
Security 
0 0 0 
Education 0 0 0 
Human Health and 
Social Work Activities 
1 0 0 
Arts, Entertainment 
and Recreation 
5 1 20 
Other Service 
Activities 
1 0 0 
Activities of 
Households as 
Employers; 
Undifferentiated 
0 0 0 
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Goods- and Services - 
Producing Activities of 
Households for Own 
Use 
Activities of 
Extraterritorial 
Organisations and 
Bodies 
0 0 0 
Not specified 5 0 0 
Total  299 26 9 
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Appendix J – List of banks and their associated abbreviations 
Bank/Building Society Name Abbreviation 
AA AA 
ABBEY ABBE 
AIRDRIE SAVINGS BANK AIRD 
ALDERMORE ALDE 
ALLIANCE & LEICESTER AAL 
ALLIANCE & LEICESTER GIRO AALG 
ALLIED IRISH BANK AIB 
AMP BANKING AMP 
ANGLO IRISH BANK ANGL 
ASDA ASDA 
AVIVA AVIV 
BANK OF CHINA (UK) BOCH 
BANK OF CYPRUS BOCY 
BANK OF IRELAND (GB) BOIG 
BANK OF IRELAND (NI) BOIN 
BANK OF SCOTLAND BOS 
BANK OF WALES BOW 
BARCLAYS BARC 
BARNSLEY BS BARN 
BATH BS BATH 
BEVERLEY BS BEV 
BIRMINGHAM MIDSHIRES BMID 
BIRMINGHAM MIDSHIRES INTERMEDIARY BMII 
BMW SAVINGS BMW 
BRADFORD & BINGLEY BAB 
BRISTOL & WEST BAW 
BRITANNIA BS BRIT 
BRITISH GAS BGAS 
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE BS BUCK 
BUTTERFIELD PRIVATE BANK BPB 
CAHOOT CAH 
CAMBRIDGE BS CAMB 
CAPITAL ONE CAP 
CATER ALLEN PRIVATE BANK CATA 
CATHOLIC BS CATH 
CHELSEA BS CHEL 
CHELTENHAM & GLOUCESTER CHGL 
CHESHAM BS CHSM 
CHESHIRE BS CHSE 
CHORLEY & DIST BS CHOR 
CITIBANK CITI 
CITY OF DERRY BS COD 
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CLAY CROSS BS CLAY 
CLOSE BROTHERS CLOB 
CLYDESDALE BANK CLYD 
CO-OPERATIVE BANK COOP 
COUTTS & CO COUT 
COVENTRY BS COV 
CUMBERLAND BS CUMB 
DAO HENG BANK DAOH 
DARLINGTON BS DARL 
DERBYSHIRE BS DERB 
DIRECT LINE DIRL 
DUDLEY BS DUD 
DUNFERMLINE BS DUNF 
EARL SHILTON BS EARS 
ECOLOGY BS ECO 
EGG EGG 
FIRST ACTIVE FIRA 
FIRST DIRECT FIRD 
FIRST TRUST BANK (NI) FTB 
FIRST-E FIRE 
FIRSTSAVE FIRS 
FLEMING PREMIER BANK FLEM 
FRIZZELL BANK FRIZ 
FURNESS BS FURN 
GOLDFISH GOLD 
HALIFAX HLFX 
HANLEY ECONOMIC BS HANL 
HARPENDEN BS HARP 
HERITABLE BANK HERI 
HFC BANK HFC 
HINCKLEY & RUGBY BS HAR 
HOARE & CO HOAR 
HOLMESDALE BS HOLM 
HSBC HSBC 
ICESAVE ICE 
ICICI BANK UK ICIC 
ING DIRECT (UK) ING 
INTELLIGENT FINANCE IF 
INVESTEC BANK INVC 
IPSWICH BS IPS 
JULIAN HODGE BANK JHB 
KAUPTHING EDGE KAUE 
KAUPTHING SINGER & FRIEDLANDER KAUS 
KENT RELIANCE BS KENT 
LAIKI BANK LAIK 
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LAMBETH BS LAMB 
LEEDS BS LEED 
LEEK UNITED BS LEEK 
LEGAL & GENERAL LAG 
LEOPOLD JOSEPH LEOJ 
LIVERPOOL VICTORIA LV 
LIVERPOOL VICTORIA BANKING SERVICES LVBS 
LLOYDS TSB LTSB 
LOMBARD DIRECT LMBD 
LOMBARD NORTH CENTRAL LNC 
LOUGHBOROUGH BS LBRO 
MANCHESTER BS MANC 
MANSFIELD BS MANS 
MARFIN LAIKI BANK MLB 
MARKET HARBOROUGH BS MARH 
MARKS & SPENCER MAS 
MARSDEN BS MARS 
MBNA EUROPE BANK LTD MBNA 
MBNA INTERNATIONAL MBNI 
MELTON MOWBRAY BS MELM 
MERCANTILE BS MERC 
MONEYWAY MYWY 
MONMOUTHSHIRE BS MONM 
NATIONAL COUNTIES BS NATC 
NATIONAL SAVINGS NATS 
NATIONWIDE BS NWDE 
NATWEST NATW 
NEWBURY BS NEWB 
NEWCASTLE BS NEWC 
NORTHERN BANK (NI) NBNK 
NORTHERN ROCK NRCK 
NORWICH & PETERBOROUGH BS NAP 
NORWICH UNION NORU 
NOTTINGHAM BS NOTT 
NOTTINGHAM IMPERIAL BS NOTI 
OPEN + DIRECT OPEN 
OVERSEAS TRUST BANK OTB 
POPULAR BANK POP 
PORTMAN BS PORT 
POST OFFICE PO 
PRINCIPALITY BS PRIN 
PROGRESSIVE BS PROG 
PRUDENTIAL BANKING PRU 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND RBS 
RUFFLER BANK RUFF 
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SAFEWAY SFWY 
SAFFRON BS SAFF 
SAGA SAGA 
SAINSBURY'S SAIN 
SCARBOROUGH BS SCAR 
SCARBOROUGH INVESTMENTS DIRECT SCID 
SCOTTISH BS SCOT 
SCOTTISH WIDOWS BANK SWB 
SECURE TRUST BANK STB 
SHEPSHED BS SHEP 
SKIPTON BS SKIP 
SMILE SMLE 
STAFFORD RAILWAY BS STRY 
STAFFORDSHIRE BS STAF 
STANDARD LIFE BANK SLB 
STATE BANK OF INDIA SBI 
STROUD & SWINDON BS SAS 
SUN BANK SUN 
TEACHERS' BS TCHR 
TESCO TSCO 
TIPTON & COSELEY BS TAC 
TRIODOS BANK TRIO 
TURKISH BANK (UK) TURK 
ULSTER BANK ULSB 
UNITED NATIONAL BANK UNB 
UNITED TRUST BANK UTB 
UNIVERSAL BS UNIV 
VERNON BS VERN 
VIRGIN VIRG 
WEATHERBYS BANK LTD WBYS 
WESLEYAN SAVINGS BANK WESL 
WEST BROMWICH BS WEST 
WHITEAWAY LAIDLAW BANK WLB 
WOOLWICH WOOL 
YORKSHIRE BANK YBNK 
YORKSHIRE BS YORK 
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Appendix K – Full results of Breunig and Menezes measure 1 (Chapter 5) 
Rank Bank 
Low 
(£500) 
Medium 
(£5000) 
High 
(£50K) Average 
1 PO 2.28 2.00 1.66 1.98 
2 NATC 1.60 1.52 1.40 1.51 
3 TSCO 1.33 1.34 1.60 1.43 
4 SBI 1.49 1.40 1.31 1.40 
5 SUN 1.60 1.28 1.10 1.33 
6 SAIN 1.25 1.00 0.92 1.06 
7 TCHR 1.50 1.04 0.44 0.99 
8 ABBE 0.93 1.00 0.77 0.90 
9 OTB 1.42 0.87 0.25 0.85 
10 NEWB 1.55 0.84 0.11 0.83 
11 BRIT 0.68 0.98 0.73 0.80 
12 COV 1.10 0.76 0.40 0.75 
13 BOS 0.37 0.93 0.92 0.74 
14 SMLE 1.07 0.72 0.27 0.69 
15 NOTI 0.95 0.70 0.39 0.68 
16 WESL 0.24 1.05 0.68 0.66 
17 LEED 0.47 0.83 0.67 0.66 
18 WEST 0.61 0.81 0.52 0.65 
19 DAOH 1.14 0.67 0.05 0.62 
20 EGG 1.07 0.65 0.13 0.62 
21 CHEL 1.18 0.42 0.19 0.59 
22 WOOL 0.75 0.57 0.46 0.59 
23 BAW 0.85 0.61 0.13 0.53 
24 YORK 0.75 0.61 0.23 0.53 
25 LTSB 0.53 0.31 0.47 0.44 
26 CITI 0.70 0.10 0.50 0.43 
27 JHB n/a 0.23 0.64 0.43 
28 STRY 0.39 0.03 0.77 0.40 
29 PORT -0.04 0.69 0.53 0.40 
30 HARP 0.25 0.46 0.37 0.36 
31 BOIG 0.66 0.35 -0.01 0.33 
32 LAMB -0.05 0.79 0.23 0.32 
33 BARN 0.65 0.33 -0.07 0.30 
34 CHSE 0.19 0.30 0.28 0.25 
35 NWDE 0.40 0.07 0.19 0.22 
36 BUCK -0.16 -0.19 0.98 0.21 
37 MARS 0.28 0.23 0.08 0.20 
38 HOLM 0.01 0.14 0.34 0.16 
39 BARC 0.04 0.15 0.26 0.15 
40 SKIP -0.02 0.07 0.37 0.14 
41 ECO 0.30 0.16 -0.07 0.13 
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42 MANC -0.86 0.59 0.58 0.10 
43 MELM -0.04 0.09 0.12 0.06 
44 SCAR 0.51 -0.09 -0.25 0.06 
45 SAS 0.18 0.07 -0.16 0.03 
46 PROG -0.20 -0.01 0.25 0.01 
47 NATS -0.75 -0.24 0.96 -0.01 
48 HLFX 0.11 0.08 -0.25 -0.02 
49 DUNF -0.71 0.07 0.41 -0.07 
50 CUMB -0.15 -0.29 0.16 -0.09 
51 NAP -0.35 -0.12 0.07 -0.13 
52 TAC -0.75 0.09 0.22 -0.15 
53 COOP -0.30 -0.21 0.02 -0.16 
54 WLB n/a -0.26 -0.10 -0.18 
55 FIRD -0.16 0.06 -0.44 -0.18 
56 SCOT -0.13 -0.30 -0.18 -0.20 
57 MARH -0.71 0.31 -0.26 -0.22 
58 NBNK -0.39 -0.23 -0.06 -0.23 
59 COD -0.48 -0.37 0.15 -0.23 
60 BATH -1.05 0.06 0.10 -0.30 
61 SHEP -0.70 -0.10 -0.19 -0.33 
62 HFC n/a -0.28 -0.41 -0.35 
63 CHGL -0.21 -0.35 -0.51 -0.36 
64 CHOR -0.46 -0.43 -0.19 -0.36 
65 MONM -0.40 -0.49 -0.33 -0.40 
66 SAFF -0.35 -0.55 -0.43 -0.44 
67 FURN -0.49 -0.61 -0.27 -0.46 
68 LBRO -0.25 -0.47 -0.65 -0.46 
69 DERB -0.38 -0.51 -0.52 -0.47 
70 STAF -1.02 -0.51 0.12 -0.47 
71 IPS -0.53 -0.59 -0.31 -0.47 
72 TURK -0.44 -0.47 -0.51 -0.48 
73 HSBC -0.37 -0.69 -0.62 -0.56 
74 CAMB -0.51 -0.76 -0.41 -0.56 
75 BAB -1.30 -0.04 -0.40 -0.58 
76 DUD -1.06 -0.90 0.21 -0.59 
77 NOTT -0.69 -0.70 -0.40 -0.59 
78 MLB -0.51 -0.59 -0.69 -0.60 
79 AAL -0.43 -0.57 -0.79 -0.60 
80 MANS -0.92 -0.72 -0.25 -0.63 
81 RBS -0.63 -0.73 -0.54 -0.63 
82 COUT -0.65 -0.90 -0.36 -0.64 
83 HAR -0.96 -0.90 -0.23 -0.70 
84 BOCY -0.98 -0.94 -0.27 -0.73 
85 TRIO -1.84 0.00 -0.38 -0.74 
86 KENT -0.73 -0.95 -0.62 -0.77 
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87 BOIN -1.12 -0.92 -0.31 -0.78 
88 NATW -0.80 -0.79 -0.78 -0.79 
89 LEEK -0.71 -0.83 -0.85 -0.80 
90 CLYD -0.80 -0.99 -0.76 -0.85 
91 ULSB -1.37 -0.92 -0.28 -0.85 
92 YBNK -0.95 -0.84 -0.78 -0.86 
93 BEV -0.91 -0.93 -0.74 -0.86 
94 BMID -1.18 -0.93 -0.49 -0.87 
95 NEWC -1.05 -1.01 -0.58 -0.88 
96 EARS -0.71 -1.07 -0.92 -0.90 
97 PRIN -0.77 -1.01 -0.92 -0.90 
98 CLAY -0.90 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 
99 DARL -1.17 -0.89 -0.77 -0.94 
100 CATH -1.13 -1.11 -0.65 -0.96 
101 FTB -1.46 -1.19 -0.25 -0.97 
102 MERC -1.18 -1.05 -0.83 -1.02 
103 POP -0.45 -1.01 -1.65 -1.04 
104 HOAR -1.00 -1.37 -0.83 -1.07 
105 HANL -0.87 -1.13 -1.36 -1.12 
106 VERN -1.11 -1.06 -1.19 -1.12 
107 UNIV -1.32 -1.25 -0.80 -1.13 
108 NRCK -1.56 -1.15 -1.06 -1.25 
109 LAIK -0.97 -1.32 -1.76 -1.35 
110 AIRD -1.71 -2.03 -1.18 -1.64 
111 CHSM -1.67 -1.75 -1.97 -1.80 
112 AALG -2.18 -2.75 -3.38 -2.77 
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Appendix L – Full results of Breunig and Menezes measure 2 (Chapter 5) 
Rank Bank 
Low 
(£500) 
Medium 
(£5000) 
High 
(£50k) Average 
1 NWDE 11.71 13.08 13.09 12.63 
2 IPS 12.73 11.64 6.85 10.40 
3 TSCO 10.00 8.59 10.02 9.54 
4 CUMB 10.26 9.41 8.81 9.49 
5 EARS 9.29 9.24 8.49 9.01 
6 COD 8.08 8.96 8.90 8.64 
7 LEEK 8.09 9.05 8.39 8.51 
8 MANS 7.16 10.23 7.81 8.40 
9 SCOT 9.16 7.31 7.91 8.13 
10 TCHR 8.76 7.41 7.41 7.86 
11 NEWC 7.88 7.56 7.57 7.67 
12 STAF 6.86 8.18 7.79 7.61 
13 EGG 7.61 7.59 7.61 7.60 
14 BEV 7.39 7.00 8.41 7.60 
15 CHGL 7.83 5.77 7.42 7.01 
16 HOAR 6.75 6.82 6.85 6.81 
17 SHEP 3.43 8.45 8.42 6.77 
18 DAOH 6.39 6.41 6.39 6.40 
19 BOIG 6.64 5.99 5.98 6.20 
20 KENT 6.95 5.47 5.71 6.04 
21 MON 5.99 6.00 6.02 6.00 
22 VERN 5.01 6.41 6.44 5.95 
23 PO 5.75 5.82 5.83 5.80 
24 BOIN 5.72 5.65 5.81 5.73 
25 CLAY 5.61 5.59 5.61 5.60 
26 BOS 4.68 5.64 5.94 5.42 
27 HLFX 5.60 5.18 5.35 5.38 
28 CHSM 5.28 6.29 4.52 5.37 
29 LAIK 5.78 5.83 4.39 5.33 
30 MARS 6.33 5.66 3.42 5.13 
31 YBNK 5.55 6.50 3.31 5.12 
32 ABBE 4.46 5.27 5.49 5.07 
33 BRIT 6.14 4.07 4.81 5.00 
34 HAR 3.77 5.30 5.94 5.00 
35 PRIN 4.58 5.06 4.53 4.73 
36 WLB 2.78 5.41 5.00 4.40 
37 COV 3.14 4.87 5.16 4.39 
38 HOLM 3.54 4.16 4.57 4.09 
39 DUD 1.85 4.07 5.67 3.86 
40 PROG 4.04 3.96 3.57 3.86 
41 DERB 3.89 3.77 3.91 3.86 
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42 DUNF 4.04 3.46 3.92 3.81 
43 RBS 2.35 4.04 5.02 3.80 
44 FURN 2.59 4.39 4.38 3.79 
45 MONM 2.93 2.55 5.29 3.59 
46 NEWB 2.81 5.77 2.18 3.59 
47 SKIP 3.77 4.34 2.34 3.48 
48 TAC 0.06 4.45 5.68 3.39 
49 COUT 2.92 3.87 3.28 3.36 
50 JHB 9.73 1.00 -0.78 3.31 
51 MELM 6.47 1.87 1.56 3.30 
52 BAW 3.49 3.34 2.99 3.27 
53 CAMB 3.40 3.00 2.98 3.13 
54 WOOL 1.87 2.56 4.33 2.92 
55 NATS 4.16 3.37 1.09 2.87 
56 NATW 4.92 2.67 0.69 2.76 
57 LBRO 2.17 2.67 3.23 2.69 
58 SAIN 2.60 2.58 2.63 2.60 
59 CHOR 2.00 1.63 4.06 2.57 
60 BATH 3.29 2.11 2.22 2.54 
61 CHEL 1.31 2.95 3.27 2.51 
62 MERC 4.30 1.53 1.53 2.45 
63 BARN 2.24 2.09 2.54 2.29 
64 FTB 1.78 2.00 3.00 2.26 
65 SAS 2.58 1.98 2.16 2.24 
66 CLYD 2.63 1.86 2.15 2.21 
67 HARP 3.99 1.70 0.69 2.13 
68 LAMB 2.99 2.34 1.05 2.13 
69 BAB 3.46 1.52 1.38 2.12 
70 DARL 1.14 2.29 2.77 2.07 
71 MARH 1.08 3.59 1.21 1.96 
72 HANL 1.21 2.74 1.69 1.88 
73 AAL 1.17 0.26 3.36 1.59 
74 WEST 1.58 1.64 1.44 1.55 
75 LTSB 1.62 1.59 1.41 1.54 
76 BOCY 1.78 2.45 0.03 1.42 
77 WESL 1.79 1.00 0.98 1.26 
78 ULSB 4.45 -0.94 -0.09 1.14 
79 STRY 2.19 1.07 -0.07 1.06 
80 CHSE 0.66 1.40 1.10 1.05 
81 NBNK 1.04 1.05 0.95 1.01 
82 TRIO 0.00 1.41 1.41 0.94 
83 AIRD 0.69 1.41 0.21 0.77 
84 BARC 0.41 0.43 1.12 0.65 
85 FIRD -0.12 1.21 0.53 0.54 
86 NAP 0.99 0.29 0.22 0.50 
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87 CITI 1.38 -0.37 0.13 0.38 
88 SAFF -0.67 0.54 1.20 0.36 
89 LEED -0.46 0.37 0.46 0.12 
90 BUCK 0.65 0.21 -0.84 0.01 
91 AALG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
92 HFC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
93 MLB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
94 NATC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
95 NOTI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
96 OTB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
97 POP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
98 SBI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
99 TURK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100 ECO 3.00 -1.41 -1.83 -0.08 
101 BMID -0.54 0.30 -0.39 -0.21 
102 YORK -0.94 -0.29 0.03 -0.40 
103 NOTT -3.54 2.16 0.02 -0.46 
104 NRCK 0.25 -0.72 -1.11 -0.52 
105 MANC 2.47 -0.85 -3.24 -0.54 
106 SCAR 1.23 -2.31 -1.81 -0.96 
107 HSBC -1.60 -0.81 -0.87 -1.09 
108 COOP -0.99 -1.82 -0.77 -1.20 
109 SMLE -3.67 -3.74 -3.75 -3.72 
110 UNIV -3.75 -4.90 -4.32 -4.32 
111 PORT -4.78 -4.83 -4.37 -4.66 
112 CATH -5.41 -6.21 -6.20 -5.94 
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Appendix M – BM measure 1 applied to the full dataset (Chapter 5) 
Rank Bank 
Low 
(£500) 
Medium 
(£5000) 
High 
(£50K) Average 
1 KAUE 2.71 2.40 2.00 2.37 
2 UNB 2.47 2.36 2.19 2.34 
3 ICE 2.20 1.93 1.51 1.88 
4 HERI 2.72 1.67 1.23 1.87 
5 FIRE 2.32 1.87 1.21 1.80 
6 OPEN 2.58 1.72 1.03 1.78 
7 SCID n/a 1.83 1.66 1.74 
8 ICIC 1.93 1.73 1.42 1.69 
9 ANGL 1.99 1.73 1.31 1.68 
10 SWB 2.03 1.63 1.31 1.66 
11 AA 1.85 1.58 1.19 1.54 
12 BMW 2.15 1.40 1.01 1.52 
13 INVC n/a 1.96 1.07 1.52 
14 FIRS 1.74 1.52 1.24 1.50 
15 RUFF n/a n/a 1.47 1.47 
16 BGAS 1.78 1.48 1.03 1.43 
17 MBNA n/a 1.65 1.12 1.39 
18 CAP 1.50 1.50 1.09 1.37 
19 PO 1.64 1.40 1.04 1.36 
20 GOLD 1.59 1.27 1.19 1.35 
21 SUN 1.83 1.23 0.83 1.30 
22 ASDA 1.52 1.32 1.00 1.28 
23 ING 1.62 1.32 0.89 1.28 
24 LMBD 1.60 1.16 0.97 1.24 
25 IF 1.62 1.26 0.83 1.24 
26 CAH 1.56 1.25 0.87 1.23 
27 LAG 1.67 1.19 0.70 1.19 
28 FRIZ 1.71 1.13 0.57 1.14 
29 MBNI n/a 1.42 0.78 1.10 
30 SLB 1.29 1.05 0.76 1.04 
31 FIRA 1.10 1.14 0.83 1.02 
32 KAUS n/a n/a 1.01 1.01 
33 SBI 1.14 1.02 0.86 1.01 
34 LV 1.41 1.04 0.55 1.00 
35 UTB 1.18 1.03 0.78 1.00 
36 EGG 1.43 1.02 0.51 0.99 
37 ALDE n/a 1.05 0.88 0.97 
38 BMII n/a 0.92 0.98 0.95 
39 WLB n/a 1.00 0.86 0.93 
40 NATC 0.83 0.99 0.96 0.92 
41 SFWY 1.12 0.98 0.67 0.92 
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42 LEOJ n/a n/a 0.89 0.89 
43 TSCO 0.85 0.77 0.95 0.86 
44 TCHR 0.74 0.82 0.86 0.81 
45 CHEL 1.41 0.64 0.28 0.78 
46 BOW 0.05 1.46 0.77 0.76 
47 DIRL 1.00 0.68 0.55 0.74 
48 BPB n/a n/a 0.74 0.74 
49 VIRG 1.13 0.69 0.22 0.68 
50 SAIN 0.85 0.68 0.52 0.68 
51 WESL 0.73 0.87 0.42 0.67 
52 NWDE 0.99 0.57 0.23 0.60 
53 MAS 0.72 0.62 0.45 0.60 
54 NORU n/a 0.76 0.35 0.55 
55 SAGA -0.34 1.21 0.74 0.54 
56 STB -0.58 1.24 0.94 0.53 
57 FLEM n/a 0.54 0.49 0.52 
58 CLOB 0.54 0.71 0.27 0.51 
59 NEWB 0.95 0.29 0.25 0.49 
60 AMP 0.25 0.62 0.55 0.47 
61 LVBS 0.73 0.47 0.09 0.43 
62 BOS -0.06 0.76 0.49 0.40 
63 SKIP 0.02 0.37 0.68 0.36 
64 BUCK 0.28 0.24 0.42 0.32 
65 BMID 0.04 0.46 0.39 0.29 
66 PORT -0.15 0.54 0.45 0.28 
67 JHB n/a 0.08 0.47 0.27 
68 MYWY -0.59 0.64 0.70 0.25 
69 NRCK 0.57 0.25 -0.09 0.24 
70 CATA n/a 0.03 0.42 0.23 
71 YORK 0.52 0.26 -0.14 0.21 
72 SCAR 0.72 0.13 -0.23 0.21 
73 NATS 0.11 0.01 0.48 0.20 
74 WEST 0.27 0.29 0.04 0.20 
75 ABBE 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 
76 LNC n/a n/a 0.13 0.13 
77 COV 0.38 0.18 -0.18 0.12 
78 HARP -0.57 0.60 0.25 0.09 
79 BAW 0.31 0.19 -0.25 0.08 
80 LEED -0.17 0.31 0.07 0.07 
81 SMLE 0.50 0.08 -0.40 0.06 
82 AAL 0.18 0.16 -0.17 0.05 
83 BAB -0.76 0.62 0.28 0.05 
84 BRIT 0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.03 
85 CITI 0.15 -0.16 0.07 0.02 
86 NAP 0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.00 
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87 SAFF 0.21 -0.06 -0.16 0.00 
88 OTB 0.74 -0.06 -0.75 -0.02 
89 STAF -1.24 0.52 0.65 -0.03 
90 LAMB -0.31 -0.01 0.23 -0.03 
91 WOOL 0.11 -0.06 -0.20 -0.05 
92 HOLM -0.08 -0.41 0.29 -0.07 
93 STRY 0.16 -0.25 -0.15 -0.08 
94 LBRO 0.00 -0.14 -0.19 -0.11 
95 PROG -0.41 -0.08 0.14 -0.12 
96 LEEK -1.32 0.57 0.39 -0.12 
97 MLB -0.07 -0.11 -0.18 -0.12 
98 MANS -0.69 0.01 0.31 -0.12 
99 LTSB 0.00 -0.22 -0.18 -0.13 
100 DAOH 0.53 -0.14 -0.80 -0.14 
101 HAR -0.55 -0.06 0.12 -0.16 
102 TAC -0.85 0.07 0.27 -0.17 
103 MARH -0.65 -0.04 0.14 -0.18 
104 IPS -0.67 0.07 0.05 -0.18 
105 CHGL -0.35 -0.05 -0.16 -0.19 
106 SAS -0.34 -0.13 -0.12 -0.19 
107 CHSE -0.37 -0.03 -0.19 -0.20 
108 BARN 0.06 -0.32 -0.34 -0.20 
109 PRIN -0.23 -0.30 -0.10 -0.21 
110 HLFX 0.09 -0.25 -0.49 -0.22 
111 FIRD -0.17 -0.04 -0.46 -0.22 
112 TURK -0.79 0.11 -0.02 -0.23 
113 ECO -0.15 -0.23 -0.38 -0.25 
114 CHOR -0.77 -0.04 0.05 -0.26 
115 DUNF -0.71 -0.21 0.15 -0.26 
116 NEWC -0.16 -0.54 -0.07 -0.26 
117 CUMB -0.57 -0.25 0.02 -0.27 
118 MELM -0.45 -0.40 0.03 -0.27 
119 BARC -0.26 -0.31 -0.25 -0.27 
120 COD -1.07 -0.22 0.47 -0.27 
121 NOTI 0.28 -0.37 -0.77 -0.29 
122 UNIV -1.16 0.17 0.12 -0.29 
123 MARS -0.31 -0.34 -0.24 -0.30 
124 DERB -0.40 -0.26 -0.23 -0.30 
125 MANC -1.63 0.41 0.32 -0.30 
126 BOIG -0.01 -0.32 -0.68 -0.33 
127 SCOT -0.62 -0.27 -0.19 -0.36 
128 EARS -0.43 -0.61 -0.09 -0.38 
129 TRIO -0.37 -0.26 -0.51 -0.38 
130 POP 0.25 -0.57 -0.84 -0.38 
131 CLYD -0.60 -0.36 -0.38 -0.44 
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132 NATW 0.01 -0.78 -0.62 -0.46 
133 RBS -0.51 -0.68 -0.39 -0.53 
134 NOTT -1.20 -0.25 -0.13 -0.53 
135 MONM -1.04 -0.42 -0.14 -0.54 
136 SHEP -0.62 -0.56 -0.43 -0.54 
137 BEV -1.24 -0.24 -0.14 -0.54 
138 DUD -1.03 -0.85 0.03 -0.62 
139 CAMB -1.10 -0.41 -0.38 -0.63 
140 BATH -1.89 -0.16 0.10 -0.65 
141 FURN -0.98 -0.64 -0.34 -0.65 
142 COOP -0.71 -0.71 -0.57 -0.66 
143 YBNK -0.73 -0.67 -0.60 -0.67 
144 KENT -0.63 -0.97 -0.49 -0.70 
145 CLAY -1.45 -0.54 -0.18 -0.72 
146 NBNK -0.90 -0.67 -0.61 -0.73 
147 HSBC -0.49 -0.85 -0.86 -0.73 
148 BOCY -1.23 -0.69 -0.35 -0.75 
149 LAIK -0.45 -0.80 -1.04 -0.76 
150 AVIV n/a -0.68 -0.85 -0.77 
151 HANL -1.09 -0.81 -0.42 -0.77 
152 PRU -0.44 -1.14 -0.85 -0.81 
153 CATH -1.19 -0.89 -0.47 -0.85 
154 WBYS -0.79 -0.89 -0.89 -0.86 
155 VERN -1.71 -0.58 -0.29 -0.86 
156 BOCH -0.82 -0.92 -1.09 -0.94 
157 DARL -1.38 -1.15 -0.41 -0.98 
158 MERC -1.74 -0.90 -0.54 -1.06 
159 ULSB -1.82 -0.96 -0.51 -1.10 
160 BOIN -1.72 -1.08 -0.52 -1.11 
161 CHSM -2.12 -1.01 -0.22 -1.12 
162 COUT -1.30 -1.58 -0.90 -1.26 
163 HFC n/a -1.25 -1.44 -1.35 
164 FTB -2.06 -1.84 -0.94 -1.61 
165 HOAR -1.60 -2.02 -1.23 -1.62 
166 AIRD -2.40 -2.00 -1.54 -1.98 
167 AIB n/a -2.73 -1.37 -2.05 
168 AALG -2.86 -3.75 -4.43 -3.68 
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Appendix N – BM measure 2 applied to the full dataset (Chapter 5) 
 
Rank Bank 
Low 
(£500) 
Medium 
(£5000) 
High 
(£50K) Average 
1 ASDA 10.63 11.02 10.38 10.67 
2 ICIC 9.44 9.14 10.05 9.54 
3 NWDE 9.90 9.15 8.00 9.02 
4 CUMB 6.63 10.37 9.90 8.97 
5 ING 9.14 8.00 8.33 8.49 
6 NATC 6.09 7.52 8.04 7.22 
7 TSCO 7.24 6.43 7.92 7.20 
8 LMBD 6.66 6.73 7.07 6.82 
9 BEV 3.00 8.09 9.33 6.81 
10 NATS 7.60 7.37 5.32 6.76 
11 BOS 5.57 6.64 7.50 6.57 
12 BMW 10.23 4.74 4.73 6.57 
13 VIRG 5.00 7.23 6.00 6.08 
14 LNC 5.63 4.03 8.34 6.00 
15 BOIN 7.45 5.65 4.81 5.97 
16 PRU 1.78 7.96 8.13 5.96 
17 SUN 5.88 5.94 5.96 5.93 
18 CLAY 4.02 6.66 6.88 5.86 
19 LAIK 6.36 5.49 5.50 5.78 
20 KENT 6.28 5.18 5.45 5.64 
21 FLEM 1.25 7.63 7.72 5.53 
22 EGG 4.73 6.06 5.58 5.46 
23 PO 5.01 5.57 5.68 5.42 
24 DAOH 6.13 5.00 5.00 5.38 
25 FTB 6.88 4.63 4.34 5.28 
26 SHEP 3.90 5.43 6.47 5.27 
27 PRIN 4.78 4.83 6.14 5.25 
28 IF 5.92 5.09 4.69 5.23 
29 TCHR 2.12 6.57 6.94 5.21 
30 BOIG 5.45 5.06 5.11 5.20 
31 HAR 3.05 6.27 6.10 5.14 
32 UTB 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
33 DUD 4.43 4.91 5.58 4.97 
34 RBS 5.12 4.72 4.75 4.86 
35 HOLM 3.94 5.33 5.27 4.84 
36 LEEK 3.64 5.32 5.55 4.84 
37 MBNA 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.83 
38 FRIZ 4.92 5.17 4.16 4.75 
39 STRY 4.79 4.37 4.21 4.46 
40 HLFX 3.47 4.92 4.85 4.41 
41 NATW 4.21 5.34 3.40 4.31 
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42 STAF 3.00 3.97 5.58 4.18 
43 WESL 2.19 4.98 5.32 4.16 
44 LAMB 4.04 4.32 3.89 4.08 
45 CLOB 2.50 4.03 5.60 4.05 
46 NEWB 2.07 5.84 4.22 4.04 
47 CHSM 2.85 3.73 5.50 4.02 
48 NEWC 3.52 3.82 4.46 3.93 
49 BRIT 3.50 3.89 4.29 3.89 
50 WLB 2.21 4.50 4.82 3.84 
51 TAC 1.82 4.44 5.10 3.79 
52 LVBS 2.91 4.42 4.02 3.78 
53 COD 1.94 4.53 4.76 3.74 
54 SCOT 3.55 3.75 3.59 3.63 
55 CAH 2.95 3.26 4.49 3.57 
56 FURN 2.92 3.90 3.82 3.55 
57 EARS 4.08 3.21 3.19 3.49 
58 BARC 2.20 4.19 4.04 3.48 
59 DIRL 2.95 3.85 3.37 3.39 
60 FIRS 2.50 3.95 3.65 3.37 
61 ANGL 5.79 2.10 2.15 3.35 
62 COV 2.77 3.45 3.70 3.30 
63 SKIP 3.46 2.51 3.65 3.21 
64 CHGL 3.48 2.89 3.22 3.20 
65 FIRA 3.28 3.28 3.02 3.20 
66 HOAR 3.52 3.03 2.63 3.06 
67 MARS 2.35 3.96 2.85 3.05 
68 MARH 1.95 4.05 3.11 3.04 
69 FIRE 2.88 2.94 2.96 2.93 
70 ECO 3.70 2.39 2.64 2.91 
71 MANS 2.00 3.72 2.98 2.90 
72 MELM 2.71 2.42 3.28 2.81 
73 AA 2.77 2.53 2.54 2.61 
74 ABBE 2.81 2.18 2.80 2.60 
75 IPS 1.40 2.94 3.14 2.49 
76 CAMB 2.95 1.03 3.18 2.39 
77 YBNK 2.74 2.40 1.75 2.30 
78 COUT 1.69 1.98 2.99 2.22 
79 CLYD 1.66 2.49 2.48 2.21 
80 PROG 1.60 2.02 2.96 2.19 
81 BARN 1.90 1.77 2.81 2.16 
82 RUFF 1.13 0.00 5.33 2.15 
83 FIRD 3.76 1.09 1.18 2.01 
84 MONM 2.18 1.49 2.22 1.97 
85 LEED 1.57 1.65 2.62 1.95 
86 BAW 1.59 2.00 2.17 1.92 
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87 SWB 0.93 1.41 3.28 1.88 
88 LAG 0.93 2.24 2.35 1.84 
89 WOOL 1.21 1.25 2.75 1.74 
90 ULSB 2.50 1.09 1.50 1.70 
91 INVC 0.50 -0.04 4.63 1.70 
92 DARL 0.61 1.10 3.26 1.66 
93 HARP 1.58 1.75 1.44 1.59 
94 GOLD 1.45 1.51 1.52 1.49 
95 DERB 1.46 1.68 1.31 1.48 
96 WEST 1.54 1.45 1.22 1.40 
97 NBNK 1.21 1.32 1.66 1.39 
98 LBRO 1.27 1.15 1.75 1.39 
99 SAGA 1.90 1.12 0.99 1.34 
100 SAFF 1.99 0.88 1.03 1.30 
101 SAS 1.14 1.84 0.89 1.29 
102 NAP 1.73 1.21 0.86 1.27 
103 KAUE 1.00 1.29 1.34 1.21 
104 AAL 0.81 1.17 1.62 1.20 
105 BOCY 0.25 1.92 0.83 1.00 
106 SAIN 1.12 0.39 1.36 0.96 
107 BAB 0.26 1.42 1.17 0.95 
108 CAP 1.05 0.66 1.10 0.94 
109 HANL 1.72 0.54 0.51 0.92 
110 CHSE 0.44 1.30 0.95 0.90 
111 MERC 1.69 0.32 0.63 0.88 
112 CHEL 0.56 1.09 0.93 0.86 
113 LTSB 1.07 0.75 0.68 0.83 
114 LEOJ 0.81 0.55 1.06 0.81 
115 NORU 0.47 1.12 0.74 0.77 
116 DUNF 1.17 0.02 1.05 0.75 
117 BMID 0.07 0.85 1.24 0.72 
118 AIRD 0.00 1.29 0.67 0.65 
119 SFWY 0.80 -0.66 1.75 0.63 
120 BATH 0.44 0.57 0.20 0.40 
121 CITI 0.55 -0.19 0.79 0.38 
122 BOW 0.00 0.29 0.34 0.21 
123 OPEN 0.00 0.29 0.34 0.21 
124 TURK 0.00 0.26 0.27 0.18 
125 MBNI 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.07 
126 VERN 1.20 -0.34 -0.66 0.07 
127 BPB 0.31 -0.27 0.14 0.06 
128 ALDE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
129 AALG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
130 AMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
131 AVIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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132 BOCH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
133 BMII 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
134 MLB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
135 MAS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
136 MYWY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
137 NOTI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
138 OTB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
139 POP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
140 SCID 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
141 SBI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
142 WBYS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
143 HERI -0.70 0.51 0.16 -0.01 
144 MANC 0.62 -0.25 -0.61 -0.08 
145 AIB -0.50 -0.36 0.34 -0.17 
146 HFC -1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.33 
147 YORK -0.58 -0.40 -0.16 -0.38 
148 COOP 0.12 -1.09 -0.22 -0.40 
149 CHOR 1.17 -1.47 -1.24 -0.51 
150 TRIO -1.06 -0.11 -0.42 -0.53 
151 SCAR -0.15 -1.12 -0.88 -0.71 
152 NRCK -0.25 -0.88 -1.03 -0.72 
153 CATA -0.64 -3.69 1.96 -0.79 
154 HSBC -0.69 -0.92 -1.15 -0.92 
155 JHB 4.11 -3.41 -3.53 -0.95 
156 CATH 0.70 -1.67 -2.25 -1.07 
157 SMLE -2.82 -0.97 0.35 -1.15 
158 ICE -1.43 -1.04 -0.97 -1.15 
159 UNB -1.13 -1.34 -1.38 -1.28 
160 BUCK -0.19 -2.05 -2.10 -1.45 
161 STB -1.61 -2.53 -1.14 -1.76 
162 SLB -3.04 -1.85 -2.91 -2.60 
163 UNIV 0.05 -4.39 -4.16 -2.83 
164 KAUS -3.78 -1.14 -4.11 -3.01 
165 NOTT -0.20 -4.93 -5.42 -3.52 
166 BGAS -6.13 -3.71 -3.66 -4.50 
167 PORT -0.95 -7.10 -5.81 -4.62 
168 LV -7.13 -7.34 -7.38 -7.28 
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Appendix O – BM Measure 1, individual calendar years (£500 deposit level) 
Bank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AAL -0.29 -0.43 -0.26 0.44 0.34 -0.50 -0.79 -1.12 -1.39 -0.46 
AALG -2.18 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
ABBE -1.95 0.26 1.15 1.08 1.79 1.71 1.65 1.42 1.68 0.57 
AIRD -1.70 -1.87 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BAB -0.68 -1.14 -1.22 -1.06 -1.19 -1.30 -1.34 -1.69 -1.96 -0.50 
BARC -0.38 -0.72 -0.87 -0.55 -0.16 -0.20 0.83 0.92 1.22 0.48 
BARN 1.18 1.35 0.96 0.82 0.74 0.63 0.21 -0.24 -0.18 -0.04 
BATH -0.83 n/a n/a n/a -1.31 -1.40 -1.55 -1.81 -1.91 0.26 
BAW 0.76 0.88 0.81 0.96 0.92 0.80 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BEV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -1.28 -1.28 -0.48 
BMID -0.96 -1.16 -1.27 -1.11 -1.19 -1.42 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BOCY -1.19 -0.92 -0.77 -0.93 -1.09 -1.15 -1.13 -1.13 -1.18 -0.33 
BOIG -1.55 0.58 0.98 0.80 0.91 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.74 -0.49 
BOIN -1.33 -0.98 -1.27 -1.16 -1.11 -1.21 -1.23 -1.23 -1.30 -0.48 
BOS 0.15 -0.19 -0.08 -0.16 -0.34 -0.40 0.01 2.27 2.40 0.51 
BRIT 0.48 1.01 1.17 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.54 0.82 0.68 0.49 
BUCK -1.26 -1.48 -1.02 -0.86 -0.69 -0.53 0.41 1.73 1.70 0.45 
CAMB 0.26 0.02 -0.52 -0.62 -0.58 -0.60 -0.80 -0.85 -0.88 -0.51 
CATH 0.06 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -1.05 -1.16 -1.18 n/a 
CHEL n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.89 1.50 1.19 0.77 
CHGL -1.48 -1.57 -1.02 -0.86 -0.64 -0.78 -0.10 0.62 0.46 0.08 
CHOR 0.09 -0.35 -0.67 -0.79 -0.78 -0.80 -0.48 -0.47 -0.27 -0.39 
CHSE -0.24 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.42 0.11 -0.03 -0.36 -0.53 -0.42 
CHSM -2.09 -2.15 -1.42 -1.26 -1.47 -1.54 -1.62 -2.00 -2.10 -0.54 
CITI -2.40 n/a n/a 2.62 1.01 0.38 0.30 0.14 1.50 2.15 
CLAY -0.45 -1.04 -1.12 -1.03 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
CLYD 0.06 -0.65 -0.84 -1.00 -0.80 -1.05 -1.19 -1.38 -1.47 -0.45 
COD 0.25 -0.05 -0.52 -0.63 -0.63 -0.70 -0.68 -0.72 -0.66 -0.44 
COOP -0.34 -0.34 -0.52 -0.86 -1.24 -0.51 -0.01 0.97 1.41 0.28 
COUT -1.65 n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.40 -0.38 -0.46 -0.96 -0.19 
COV 0.94 0.55 0.59 0.87 1.22 1.79 1.65 1.46 1.34 0.15 
CUMB 0.16 0.02 -0.69 -0.63 -0.45 -0.13 -0.01 -0.07 0.07 -0.10 
DAOH n/a 1.14 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
DARL -1.06 -1.15 -1.02 -0.93 -1.02 -1.20 -1.26 -1.55 -1.74 -0.52 
DERB -1.29 -1.41 -0.57 -0.46 -0.34 -0.38 -0.16 0.06 0.04 -0.32 
DUD -0.54 -0.90 -1.12 -1.02 -1.03 -1.16 -1.34 -1.49 -1.52 -0.50 
DUNF -0.29 -0.66 -1.02 -0.97 -0.85 -0.93 -1.02 -1.06 -0.43 -0.48 
EARS 0.38 -0.22 -0.66 -0.85 -0.84 -0.86 -0.90 -1.12 -1.34 -0.47 
ECO 0.95 0.66 0.33 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.12 -0.08 0.18 0.23 
EGG 2.81 2.18 0.90 0.57 -0.15 -0.62 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
FIRD 0.69 0.26 -0.15 -0.51 -0.67 -0.70 -0.77 -0.82 -1.00 -0.77 
FTB -1.68 -1.86 -1.42 -1.27 -1.34 -1.46 -1.43 -1.73 -1.91 -0.53 
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FURN -0.02 -0.59 -0.52 -0.47 -0.58 -0.70 -0.70 -0.68 -0.86 -0.13 
HANL -2.19 -1.99 -0.54 -0.46 -0.56 -0.70 -0.70 -0.73 -0.78 -0.45 
HAR -0.80 -1.08 -0.83 -0.80 -0.94 -1.09 -1.15 -1.18 -1.33 -0.48 
HARP -0.02 -0.46 -0.52 -0.36 -0.83 -0.84 0.89 0.70 0.83 0.83 
HLFX 0.95 1.07 0.46 0.38 0.30 0.18 -0.09 -0.43 -0.58 -0.37 
HOAR -0.52 -0.86 -1.22 -1.13 -1.09 -1.15 -1.13 -1.13 -1.33 -0.49 
HOLM 0.14 0.30 0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 
HSBC 0.01 -0.57 -0.49 -0.29 -0.20 -0.34 -0.47 -0.33 -0.55 -0.49 
IPS 0.27 0.32 -0.52 -0.59 -0.72 -0.86 -0.94 -1.33 -0.96 -0.21 
KENT 0.52 0.18 -0.26 -0.77 -1.04 -1.20 -1.17 -1.38 -0.76 -0.39 
LAIK -0.60 -0.42 -0.77 -0.93 -1.16 -1.25 -1.23 -1.23 -1.26 -0.55 
LAMB n/a 1.70 0.94 0.26 -0.91 -1.19 -1.27 n/a n/a n/a 
LBRO 0.55 0.17 -0.23 -0.56 -0.64 -0.79 -0.49 -0.25 -0.34 0.05 
LEED 0.57 0.07 0.83 0.71 0.60 0.50 0.35 0.29 0.43 0.27 
LEEK -0.16 -0.50 -0.77 -0.80 -0.84 -0.90 -0.88 -0.88 -1.10 -0.44 
LTSB 0.11 0.34 0.58 0.41 0.37 0.53 0.48 0.48 0.78 0.82 
MANC -1.52 -0.32 -1.27 -1.11 -1.29 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
MANS -0.36 -0.48 -1.23 -1.11 -0.88 -0.91 -0.99 -1.38 -1.51 -0.36 
MARH 0.03 -0.44 -0.94 -0.86 -0.90 -1.05 -1.09 -1.25 -1.31 -0.21 
MARS 0.83 0.43 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.37 0.02 0.02 0.46 0.12 
MELM 0.41 -0.03 -0.32 -0.18 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.12 -0.01 -0.43 
MERC -0.51 -1.05 -1.27 -1.19 -1.32 -1.48 -1.54 n/a n/a n/a 
MLB n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.51 
MONM 0.22 -0.19 -0.52 -0.58 -0.48 -0.71 -0.74 -0.70 -0.65 -0.13 
NAP -0.29 -0.32 -0.52 -0.31 -0.41 -0.68 -0.71 -0.55 0.07 -0.04 
NATC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.60 
NATS -1.00 -1.23 -1.02 -1.07 -0.40 -0.40 -0.48 -0.78 -0.92 -0.17 
NATW -0.29 -0.89 -0.87 -0.87 -0.91 -0.95 -0.88 -0.93 -1.10 -0.41 
NBNK -0.61 -1.28 -1.42 -1.26 -1.25 -0.41 0.76 1.33 -0.25 -0.48 
NEWB 1.66 1.38 1.83 1.63 1.56 1.54 1.70 1.67 1.56 0.86 
NEWC -1.07 -1.35 -1.26 -1.13 -1.20 -0.23 -1.24 -1.68 -1.83 -0.55 
NOTI 0.95 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NOTT -1.54 -1.47 -0.67 -0.58 -0.72 -0.87 -0.60 -0.80 -0.89 0.68 
NRCK -1.05 -2.17 -1.37 -1.21 -1.54 -1.90 -1.90 -2.15 -2.18 0.58 
NWDE 1.49 1.13 0.63 0.56 0.54 0.43 0.37 0.11 -0.10 -0.38 
OTB 1.43 1.38 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PO n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.61 2.62 2.74 1.23 
POP -0.45 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PORT 1.43 1.37 1.31 0.34 -0.99 -1.16 -1.43 -1.70 n/a n/a 
PRIN -0.30 -0.76 -1.02 -0.95 -0.77 -0.81 -0.70 -0.81 -1.12 -0.47 
PROG 0.32 0.48 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.04 -0.64 -0.93 -1.14 -0.54 
RBS -1.22 -1.40 -1.04 -0.63 -0.26 -0.41 -0.49 -0.57 -0.49 -0.30 
SAFF 0.39 0.02 -0.47 -0.35 -0.39 -0.50 -0.61 -0.85 -1.10 -0.52 
SAIN 2.12 1.76 1.33 1.24 1.36 1.21 1.16 1.02 0.66 -0.33 
SAS 0.65 0.34 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.33 0.18 0.03 0.24 
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SBI n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.49 
SCAR -1.69 -2.03 -0.95 0.44 0.62 1.13 1.54 1.51 1.27 1.56 
SCOT 0.23 0.27 -0.17 -0.28 -0.21 0.14 -0.39 -0.73 -0.73 -0.41 
SHEP 0.25 0.01 -0.57 -0.77 -0.73 -0.73 -0.80 -1.16 -1.20 -0.47 
SKIP n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.69 0.22 -0.63 -0.09 -0.08 0.16 
SMLE 2.25 1.89 1.48 1.12 1.12 1.10 1.05 0.71 0.64 -0.40 
STAF -0.92 -1.14 -1.02 -0.96 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
STRY 0.75 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.46 0.40 0.41 0.37 0.49 -0.17 
SUN 2.05 1.56 1.05 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TAC -2.19 -1.86 -1.27 -1.09 -0.84 -0.93 -0.37 -0.30 -0.50 -0.48 
TCHR 1.91 1.48 1.04 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TRIO -1.84 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TSCO 2.10 1.82 1.33 1.19 1.26 1.20 1.22 1.37 1.15 0.70 
TURK n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.44 
ULSB -2.19 -2.05 -1.42 -1.26 -1.56 -1.39 -1.34 -1.16 -1.39 -0.53 
UNIV -1.27 -1.55 -1.08 -1.11 -1.14 -1.42 -1.57 n/a n/a n/a 
VERN -0.80 -0.97 -1.02 -0.86 -1.27 -1.46 -1.38 -1.49 -1.54 -0.38 
WESL n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.67 0.62 0.51 0.13 -0.01 -0.37 
WEST 1.21 0.85 0.57 0.67 0.39 0.18 0.81 0.97 0.79 0.00 
WOOL 0.75 0.59 1.07 0.56 0.87 0.83 0.67 0.44 n/a n/a 
YBNK -0.51 -0.95 -0.96 -1.08 -1.19 -0.95 -1.09 -1.28 -1.29 -0.45 
YORK 0.92 0.66 0.91 0.80 0.98 0.99 0.81 0.74 0.73 0.01 
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Appendix P - BM Measure 1, individual calendar years (£5000 deposit level) 
Bank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AAL -0.45 -0.50 -0.48 0.19 0.05 -0.74 -1.00 -1.30 -1.63 -0.08 
AALG -2.75 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
ABBE -0.23 0.81 0.81 0.75 1.46 1.35 1.34 1.12 1.61 1.01 
AIRD -2.02 -2.13 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BAB -0.94 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.20 -0.43 -0.30 0.01 1.34 -0.31 
BARC -0.83 -0.87 -0.29 0.03 0.41 0.34 0.09 0.47 0.83 0.36 
BARN 0.83 0.98 0.70 0.54 0.38 0.24 -0.14 -0.55 -0.52 -0.13 
BATH 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.06 -0.12 -0.14 -0.24 -0.40 0.10 0.39 
BAW 0.29 0.67 0.66 0.80 0.72 0.57 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BEV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -1.23 -1.25 -0.57 
BMID -1.30 -1.32 -0.62 -0.64 -0.76 -1.03 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BOCY -0.34 -0.57 -0.86 -1.00 -1.21 -1.29 -1.24 -1.21 -1.29 -0.43 
BOIG -1.36 0.30 0.64 0.52 0.54 0.46 0.51 0.54 0.38 -0.60 
BOIN -1.15 -0.79 -1.11 -1.20 -1.21 -1.29 -1.24 -1.21 -1.15 0.33 
BOS 0.09 -0.22 0.52 0.44 1.79 1.71 1.81 2.06 2.30 0.83 
BRIT 0.94 1.15 1.49 1.09 1.09 1.02 0.90 0.93 0.73 0.42 
BUCK -1.17 -1.46 -1.36 -1.19 -0.56 0.09 0.05 1.40 1.34 0.35 
CAMB -0.10 -0.28 -0.76 -0.84 -0.85 -0.90 -1.06 -1.08 -1.14 -0.60 
CATH 0.14 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -1.06 -1.14 -1.26 n/a 
CHEL -1.94 -0.43 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.41 0.39 0.30 0.55 0.82 
CHGL -2.04 -2.04 -1.36 -1.19 -1.01 -1.17 -0.46 0.35 0.78 0.20 
CHOR 0.13 -0.22 -0.71 -0.81 -0.85 -0.89 -0.40 -0.35 -0.18 -0.40 
CHSE 0.07 0.69 0.80 0.67 0.45 0.16 0.07 -0.21 -0.42 -0.49 
CHSM -1.79 -2.05 -1.61 -1.44 -1.70 -1.78 -1.83 -2.19 -2.33 -0.64 
CITI -0.57 -1.30 -1.36 -1.28 -0.93 -0.58 0.10 0.10 1.33 2.05 
CLAY -0.52 -0.97 -1.11 -1.05 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
CLYD -0.31 -0.78 -0.99 -1.23 -0.97 -1.24 -1.35 -1.51 -1.64 -0.56 
COD 0.18 -0.02 -0.36 -0.46 -0.50 -0.54 -0.49 -0.50 -0.52 -0.46 
COOP 0.50 -0.05 -0.39 -0.80 -1.10 -0.37 -0.27 0.65 1.06 0.17 
COUT -1.04 -1.35 n/a n/a n/a -0.80 -0.74 -0.80 -1.32 -0.30 
COV -0.04 0.44 0.59 0.74 1.00 1.28 1.21 1.04 0.91 -0.06 
CUMB -0.20 -0.31 -0.85 -0.74 -0.60 -0.35 -0.20 -0.17 -0.08 -0.04 
DAOH n/a 0.67 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
DARL -0.64 -0.76 -0.96 -0.68 -0.73 -0.91 -0.93 -1.18 -1.40 -0.63 
DERB -1.15 -1.36 -0.90 -0.80 -0.61 -0.68 -0.40 0.05 0.02 -0.28 
DUD -0.30 -0.34 -0.86 -0.85 -0.85 -0.95 -1.46 -1.63 -1.49 -0.47 
DUNF 1.08 0.68 0.38 0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.14 -0.05 -0.50 
EARS -0.18 -0.69 -1.00 -1.17 -1.21 -1.28 -1.26 -1.46 -1.70 -0.57 
ECO 0.64 0.45 0.24 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.07 0.09 
EGG 2.25 1.72 0.56 0.25 -0.52 -1.01 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
FIRD 1.12 1.08 0.18 -0.69 -0.89 -0.95 -0.98 -1.01 -1.22 -0.92 
FTB -0.63 -0.80 -1.11 -1.25 -1.39 -1.54 -1.49 -1.46 -1.62 -0.63 
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FURN -0.29 -0.42 -0.76 -0.78 -0.71 -0.79 -0.76 -0.71 -0.89 -0.24 
HANL -2.75 -2.48 -0.54 -0.69 -0.93 -1.09 -1.06 -1.06 -1.14 -0.29 
HAR -0.73 -1.08 -0.64 -0.71 -0.86 -1.04 -1.06 -1.06 -1.22 -0.56 
HARP 0.41 0.03 -0.41 -0.33 -0.39 -0.32 1.03 0.87 1.00 0.76 
HFC -0.28 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
HLFX 0.42 0.66 0.16 0.10 -0.04 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 0.05 
HOAR -1.09 -1.33 -1.56 -1.45 -1.46 -1.54 -1.49 -1.46 -1.68 -0.60 
HOLM 1.08 0.22 -0.04 0.08 0.22 0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.13 
HSBC -0.50 -0.97 -0.75 -0.53 -0.51 -0.71 -0.83 -0.66 -0.90 -0.59 
IPS -0.10 -0.14 -0.65 -0.70 -0.84 -0.99 -0.99 -1.36 -0.82 0.01 
JHB 1.64 1.05 0.29 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.24 -0.54 
KENT 0.46 0.14 -0.39 -0.88 -1.18 -1.42 -1.48 -1.72 -1.11 -0.50 
LAIK -1.15 -0.89 -1.11 -1.25 -1.53 -1.64 -1.59 -1.56 -1.62 -0.66 
LAMB n/a 1.52 1.65 0.99 -0.40 -0.77 0.51 n/a n/a n/a 
LBRO 0.21 -0.08 -0.40 -0.72 -0.82 -0.99 -0.64 -0.48 -0.69 -0.05 
LEED 1.39 1.11 1.20 1.00 0.88 0.78 0.70 0.54 0.38 0.41 
LEEK -0.42 -0.72 -0.86 -0.88 -0.96 -1.04 -0.99 -0.96 -1.20 -0.51 
LTSB 0.47 0.12 0.21 0.01 -0.05 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.53 0.72 
MANC -1.10 0.96 0.47 0.75 0.81 0.51 0.27 0.33 -0.21 -0.31 
MANS 0.08 0.05 -0.58 -0.79 -0.90 -0.96 -0.99 -1.20 -1.45 -0.42 
MARH 1.31 1.06 0.66 0.56 0.42 0.26 -1.19 -1.44 -1.49 -0.07 
MARS 0.57 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.32 0.16 0.14 0.41 0.03 
MELM 0.15 -0.22 -0.56 -0.36 0.48 0.38 0.44 0.49 0.38 -0.59 
MERC -0.57 -1.09 -1.11 -1.01 -1.18 -1.38 -1.17 n/a n/a n/a 
MLB n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.59 
MONM 0.01 -0.31 -0.66 -0.69 -0.55 -0.76 -0.75 -0.68 -0.71 -0.23 
NAP -0.23 -0.24 -0.39 0.03 0.12 -0.17 -0.20 -0.10 0.03 -0.24 
NATC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.52 
NATS -1.57 -1.70 -1.36 -1.40 0.88 1.01 0.97 0.69 0.37 -0.27 
NATW -0.84 -1.46 -1.34 -1.28 -0.78 -0.70 -0.66 -0.65 -0.84 -0.20 
NBNK -0.05 -0.44 -0.89 -0.80 -0.89 -0.46 0.46 0.99 -0.63 -0.58 
NEWB 1.12 0.91 0.56 0.51 0.65 0.60 1.06 1.34 1.21 0.76 
NEWC -0.63 -0.82 -0.97 -1.13 -1.32 -0.45 -1.30 -1.70 -1.94 -0.64 
NOTI 0.70 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NOTT -1.23 -0.81 -0.60 -0.65 -0.95 -1.18 -0.80 -1.05 -0.89 0.72 
NRCK -0.98 -2.49 -1.71 -1.54 -1.91 -2.29 -2.26 -1.04 -0.07 0.81 
NWDE 1.02 0.73 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.03 0.02 -0.22 -0.46 -0.48 
OTB 0.87 0.86 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PO n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.27 2.29 2.38 1.12 
POP -1.01 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PORT 1.34 1.07 0.96 0.76 0.62 0.36 0.20 0.03 n/a n/a 
PRIN -0.56 -0.95 -1.16 -1.19 -1.05 -1.13 -1.06 -1.14 -1.47 -0.57 
PROG 0.78 0.39 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.04 -0.38 -0.53 -0.54 -0.46 
RBS -1.39 -1.54 -1.36 -0.85 -0.46 -0.62 -0.66 -0.73 -0.47 -0.11 
SAFF 0.12 -0.21 -0.61 -0.54 -0.76 -0.89 -0.96 -1.18 -1.45 -0.43 
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SAIN 1.81 1.55 1.24 1.09 1.00 0.83 0.85 0.74 0.46 -0.37 
SAS 0.21 -0.03 -0.21 -0.26 -0.32 -0.23 0.02 0.13 0.45 0.15 
SBI n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.40 
SCAR -1.48 -2.05 -1.41 -0.34 -0.20 0.05 0.23 1.17 1.02 1.46 
SCOT 0.08 0.06 -0.34 -0.43 -0.41 -0.11 -0.50 -0.71 -0.74 -0.51 
SHEP 0.13 -0.01 -0.46 -0.60 -0.31 0.15 0.16 -0.01 -0.06 -0.42 
SKIP 0.43 0.01 -0.36 -0.42 -0.06 0.49 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.06 
SMLE 1.68 1.43 1.14 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.38 0.28 -0.50 
STAF 0.06 -0.30 -0.87 -0.84 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
STRY 0.18 -0.12 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.13 -0.27 
SUN 1.69 1.23 0.81 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TAC -0.29 -0.51 -0.86 -0.17 0.37 0.27 0.38 0.42 0.19 -0.26 
TCHR 1.34 1.02 0.70 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TRIO 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TSCO 1.93 1.76 1.39 1.27 1.29 1.21 1.26 1.44 1.19 0.66 
TURK n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.47 
ULSB -1.35 -1.41 -0.79 -0.78 -0.93 -0.67 -0.61 -0.92 -1.38 -0.59 
UNIV -1.58 -1.81 -1.23 -1.31 -1.43 -0.60 -1.74 n/a n/a n/a 
VERN -0.58 -0.77 -0.91 -1.08 -1.22 -1.29 -1.33 -1.43 -1.56 -0.42 
WESL n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.54 1.48 1.41 1.04 0.91 0.07 
WEST 0.97 0.90 0.90 1.24 0.85 0.63 0.76 0.92 0.78 0.05 
WLB n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.34 -0.56 
WOOL 0.29 0.45 0.94 0.40 0.69 0.73 0.70 0.43 n/a n/a 
YBNK -0.75 -1.05 -1.11 -1.08 -0.99 -0.09 -0.15 -0.31 -0.64 -0.56 
YORK 0.84 0.63 0.94 0.83 0.85 0.67 0.54 0.50 0.45 -0.05 
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Appendix Q – BM Measure 1, individual calendar years (£50k deposit level) 
Bank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AAL -0.87 -0.82 -0.72 -0.06 -0.14 -0.72 -1.07 -1.36 -1.78 -0.18 
AALG -3.38 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
ABBE -0.56 0.48 0.52 0.47 1.18 1.10 1.08 0.93 1.48 1.00 
AIRD -1.17 -1.26 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BAB -1.07 -0.41 -0.39 -0.45 -0.57 -0.81 -0.70 -0.38 0.96 -0.43 
BARC -1.35 -0.89 0.01 0.42 0.76 0.65 -0.10 0.34 0.57 0.45 
BARN 0.34 0.43 0.23 0.16 -0.02 -0.15 -0.51 -0.88 -0.81 -0.20 
BATH -0.13 -0.35 -0.22 -0.19 -0.09 0.62 0.58 0.46 0.73 0.47 
BAW -0.14 0.46 0.23 0.21 0.10 -0.05 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BEV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.81 -0.89 -0.58 
BMID -0.49 -0.75 -0.35 -0.33 -0.38 -0.65 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
BOCY 0.29 0.06 -0.13 -0.19 -0.46 -0.48 -0.43 -0.39 -0.43 -0.54 
BOIG -0.23 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.11 -0.01 -0.70 
BOIN -0.63 0.05 -0.27 -0.50 -0.43 -0.53 -0.48 -0.44 -0.39 0.26 
BOS 0.96 0.54 0.41 0.31 1.34 1.27 1.37 1.68 1.99 0.72 
BRIT 0.65 0.68 0.97 0.79 0.82 0.76 0.65 0.84 0.71 0.40 
BUCK 1.75 1.17 0.80 0.63 0.73 0.85 0.81 1.36 1.35 0.64 
CAMB 0.17 -0.03 -0.43 -0.44 -0.45 -0.48 -0.65 -0.67 -0.68 -0.43 
CATH 0.95 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.57 -0.68 -0.86 n/a 
CHEL -1.61 -0.38 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.10 0.07 -0.04 0.19 0.75 
CHGL -1.58 -1.66 -1.66 -1.48 -1.31 -1.46 -0.79 -0.01 0.51 0.21 
CHOR 0.10 -0.24 -0.73 -0.66 -0.70 -0.73 -0.02 0.04 0.28 -0.20 
CHSE -0.24 0.54 0.72 0.68 0.47 0.21 0.08 -0.21 -0.38 -0.53 
CHSM -1.76 -2.07 -2.03 -1.78 -2.06 -2.12 -2.17 -2.52 -2.64 -0.75 
CITI 0.76 0.49 -0.13 -0.26 -0.22 -0.26 0.15 0.34 1.31 1.94 
CLAY -0.39 -0.95 -1.23 -1.13 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
CLYD -0.05 -0.67 -0.96 -1.17 -0.52 -0.78 -0.88 -1.05 -1.09 -0.66 
COD 0.56 0.36 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09 
COOP 0.87 0.47 0.24 -0.31 -0.54 -0.22 -0.35 0.35 0.62 0.06 
COUT -0.32 -0.53 n/a n/a n/a -0.23 -0.18 -0.17 -0.72 -0.36 
COV -0.23 0.10 0.10 0.32 0.60 0.89 0.80 0.61 0.52 -0.16 
CUMB 0.28 0.03 -0.37 -0.18 -0.04 0.18 0.31 0.34 0.23 0.31 
DAOH n/a 0.05 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
DARL -0.52 -0.60 -0.73 -0.52 -0.73 -0.90 -0.89 -0.94 -1.11 -0.63 
DERB -1.00 -1.24 -0.79 -0.64 -0.48 -0.58 -0.44 -0.18 -0.16 -0.39 
DUD 0.58 0.50 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 0.15 0.39 0.41 0.37 -0.19 
DUNF 1.43 1.08 0.89 0.67 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.36 0.07 -0.60 
EARS -0.21 -0.58 -0.77 -0.87 -0.91 -1.31 -0.99 -1.14 -1.37 -0.62 
ECO 0.26 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.16 -0.18 -0.18 -0.30 -0.07 0.05 
EGG 1.62 1.10 0.03 -0.19 -0.97 -1.46 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
FIRD 0.52 0.48 -0.30 -1.13 -1.33 -1.39 -1.42 -1.44 -1.61 -1.08 
FTB 0.24 0.08 -0.13 -0.22 -0.28 -0.33 -0.28 -0.24 -0.59 -0.73 
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FURN -0.01 -0.14 -0.38 -0.36 -0.31 -0.38 -0.35 -0.29 -0.45 -0.29 
HANL -3.38 -3.10 -0.89 -0.91 -1.13 -1.28 -1.25 -1.24 -1.28 -0.25 
HAR 0.26 -0.16 -0.15 -0.17 -0.29 -0.42 -0.45 -0.44 -0.62 -0.43 
HARP 0.29 -0.09 -0.43 -0.27 -0.34 -0.30 0.84 0.68 0.86 0.77 
HFC -0.41 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
HLFX -0.17 0.07 -0.26 -0.24 -0.32 -0.44 -0.42 -0.43 -0.34 -0.04 
HOAR -0.44 -0.64 -0.88 -0.92 -0.91 -0.98 -0.93 -0.94 -1.12 -0.53 
HOLM 0.93 -0.15 -0.31 0.45 0.77 0.62 0.65 0.56 0.58 0.58 
HSBC -0.63 -1.12 -0.69 -0.43 -0.49 -0.67 -0.77 -0.32 -0.52 -0.69 
IPS 0.54 0.49 -0.08 -0.37 -0.64 -0.75 -0.75 -1.04 -0.67 -0.03 
JHB 1.64 1.10 0.66 0.61 0.54 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.36 -0.25 
KENT 0.34 -0.09 0.94 0.46 0.10 -0.23 -1.07 -1.52 -1.08 -0.57 
LAIK -1.77 -1.51 -1.63 -1.69 -1.98 -2.08 -2.03 -1.99 -2.01 -0.77 
LAMB n/a 0.90 0.49 0.24 -0.47 -0.52 0.43 n/a n/a n/a 
LBRO -0.11 -0.38 -0.65 -0.92 -0.99 -1.17 -0.82 -0.66 -0.84 0.00 
LEED 1.08 0.92 1.02 0.82 0.74 0.66 0.58 0.38 0.14 0.49 
LEEK -0.60 -0.90 -1.13 -1.07 -0.91 -0.98 -0.93 -0.89 -1.09 -0.39 
LTSB 0.52 0.21 0.42 0.30 0.19 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.50 0.72 
MANC -1.45 0.84 1.03 0.97 0.90 0.64 0.38 0.35 -0.02 -0.34 
MANS 0.45 0.43 -0.18 -0.23 -0.35 -0.41 -0.49 -0.59 -0.79 -0.39 
MARH 0.36 -0.06 -0.41 -0.43 -0.44 -0.68 -0.67 -0.77 -0.72 0.35 
MARS 0.44 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.15 -0.24 
MELM 0.42 0.06 -0.18 -0.11 0.79 n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.71 
MERC -0.45 -1.00 -1.13 -0.96 -0.71 -0.85 -0.77 n/a n/a n/a 
MLB n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.69 
MONM 0.04 -0.23 -0.53 -0.53 -0.42 -0.55 -0.54 -0.42 -0.35 -0.19 
NAP -0.13 -0.36 -0.13 0.32 0.45 0.15 0.11 0.21 0.22 -0.30 
NATC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.40 
NATS n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.40 1.32 1.27 1.01 0.73 0.08 
NATW -0.91 -1.16 -1.18 -1.19 -0.74 -0.62 -0.70 -0.83 -1.01 -0.14 
NBNK 0.16 -0.09 -0.49 -0.51 -0.52 -0.28 0.41 0.83 -0.29 -0.69 
NEWB 0.49 0.29 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.16 -0.01 -0.04 -0.15 0.07 
NEWC -0.26 -0.44 -0.49 -0.57 -0.77 -0.18 -0.77 -1.03 -1.28 -0.64 
NOTI 0.39 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NOTT -0.08 -0.44 -0.53 -0.47 -0.73 -0.95 -0.46 -0.73 -0.76 0.93 
NRCK -0.89 -2.01 -1.20 -1.24 -1.76 -2.13 -2.15 -1.18 -0.27 0.70 
NWDE 1.02 0.73 0.43 0.42 0.28 0.15 0.13 -0.01 -0.15 -0.53 
OTB 0.25 0.24 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PO n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.82 1.86 1.99 1.02 
POP -1.65 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PORT 0.71 0.45 0.44 0.52 0.79 0.57 0.41 0.24 n/a n/a 
PRIN -0.72 -1.03 -1.13 -1.13 -0.68 -0.72 -0.80 -0.88 -1.17 -0.65 
PROG 0.81 0.51 0.37 0.39 0.44 0.28 -0.05 -0.19 -0.16 0.10 
RBS -1.24 -1.41 -1.28 -0.67 -0.20 -0.37 -0.41 -0.54 -0.27 0.08 
SAFF 0.14 -0.18 -0.48 -0.33 -0.56 -0.68 -0.76 -0.97 -1.19 -0.47 
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SAIN 1.68 1.43 1.22 1.15 1.00 0.76 0.66 0.57 0.36 -0.37 
SAS 0.09 -0.16 -0.40 -0.34 -0.45 -0.48 -0.33 -0.21 0.15 0.14 
SBI n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.31 
SCAR -0.76 -1.53 -1.72 -0.67 -0.55 -0.30 -0.09 0.85 0.78 1.43 
SCOT -0.05 0.14 -0.13 -0.17 -0.16 0.01 -0.39 -0.74 -0.73 -0.53 
SHEP 0.01 -0.10 -0.43 -0.49 -0.32 -0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.18 -0.43 
SKIP 1.66 1.29 1.02 1.04 0.99 0.92 0.95 -0.10 -0.43 -0.55 
SMLE 1.06 0.81 0.62 0.35 0.30 0.27 0.25 -0.06 -0.11 -0.61 
STAF 0.49 0.25 -0.14 -0.04 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
STRY -0.44 -0.45 1.27 1.12 1.14 1.07 1.11 1.08 1.19 0.63 
SUN 1.51 1.02 0.67 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TAC 0.08 -0.13 -0.38 0.18 0.59 0.49 0.39 0.42 0.22 -0.25 
TCHR 0.71 0.40 0.17 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TRIO -0.38 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
TSCO 1.83 1.89 1.62 1.58 1.59 1.52 1.57 1.75 1.55 1.12 
TURK n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -0.51 
ULSB -0.57 -0.33 -0.12 -0.26 -0.49 0.06 -0.01 -0.36 -0.63 -0.12 
UNIV -0.71 -0.93 -0.57 -0.86 -1.08 -0.50 -1.55 n/a n/a n/a 
VERN -0.81 -0.99 -1.09 -1.14 -1.25 -1.38 -1.49 -1.61 -1.64 -0.51 
WESL n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.09 1.04 0.96 0.60 0.51 -0.04 
WEST 0.39 0.76 0.97 0.82 0.40 0.19 0.44 0.66 0.56 -0.04 
WLB n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.72 -0.50 
WOOL 0.14 0.29 0.74 0.33 0.67 0.72 0.61 0.36 n/a n/a 
YBNK -0.82 -1.20 -1.22 -1.29 -0.88 0.77 0.53 0.35 0.04 -0.66 
YORK 0.31 0.04 0.47 0.42 0.44 0.28 0.13 0.09 0.09 -0.06 
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Appendix R – ECM results (Chapter 6) 
Rank Bank ECT Lag 
1 NBNK 0.977 4 
2 ECO 0.254 6 
3 CHGL (***) 0.110 10 
4 PRIN 0.050 4 
5 MANS (*) 0.045 2 
6 CUMB 0.038 3 
7 FURN (*) 0.031 2 
8 YBNK 0.029 4 
9 CLYD 0.028 4 
10 LBRO 0.026 3 
11 LTSB 0.022 4 
12 JHB 0.017 4 
13 HLFX 0.010 4 
14 CHOR 0.009 4 
15 ULSB 0.008 9 
16 RBS 0.005 4 
17 SAS (**) 0.003 6 
18 NOTT 0.003 2 
19 HANL 0.002 4 
20 MONM 0.001 2 
21 CHSM 0.001 4 
22 HOAR 0.000 4 
23 PROG -0.001 5 
24 COD -0.005 4 
25 IPS -0.010 5 
26 KENT -0.015 4 
27 LEEK -0.017 4 
28 TAC -0.017 2 
29 HARP -0.017 4 
30 VERN -0.017 6 
31 SCAR -0.020 1 
32 LEED -0.021 4 
33 DUD -0.022 4 
34 ABBE -0.026 2 
35 BOIN -0.027 2 
36 CITI -0.028 2 
37 BOS (*) -0.030 2 
38 BOCY -0.031 4 
39 TSCO (**) -0.032 6 
40 EARS (**) -0.034 2 
41 HOLM -0.045 8 
42 COOP -0.077 7 
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43 NATW (***) -0.084 6 
44 AAL -0.093 6 
45 LAMB -0.094 1 
46 SAIN -0.107 6 
47 BUCK (**) -0.115 6 
48 NAP -0.122 3 
49 FIRD (**) -0.170 2 
50 STRY -0.171 5 
51 BARC -0.172 6 
52 HAR -0.190 4 
53 MARS -0.206 6 
54 BATH (**) -0.220 6 
55 FTB -0.228 4 
56 CHEL -0.232 9 
57 UNIV (**) -0.235 9 
58 YORK -0.241 6 
59 MARH (**) -0.248 9 
60 NEWB (*) (**) -0.266 2 
61 NEWC -0.267 3 
62 BARN -0.272 7 
63 LAIK (**) -0.295 2 
64 BRIT -0.298 8 
65 BOIG -0.304 9 
66 CAMB (**) -0.318 2 
67 NRCK (**) -0.323 9 
68 DARL (**) -0.350 2 
69 WEST -0.384 9 
70 COV (**) -0.409 2 
71 HSBC (**) -0.412 2 
72 SCOT (*) (**) -0.420 2 
73 NWDE -0.464 4 
74 SAFF -0.612 10 
75 MANC -0.620 7 
76 MELM (**) -0.758 2 
77 CHSE (*)(**) -0.796 2 
78 MERC -0.808 1 
79 WESL (*) (**) -0.932 1 
80 BAB (**) -1.043 3 
81 SMLE -1.200 4 
82 DUNF -1.311 4 
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Appendix S – Asymmetric ARDL results (Chapter 7) 
BANK p q BASE + BASE - 
AAL 2 8 -0.434 2.34 
ABBE 8 8 2.539 -1.557 
BAB 6 6 2.426 -2.21 
BARC 3 6 1.554 -0.039 
BARN 3 4 2.564 -0.869 
BATH 3 8 1.355 -0.437 
BOCY 4 5 4.093 -0.841 
BOIG 5 6 1.312 -4.295 
BOIN 8 6 4.066 -0.649 
BOS 6 7 2.564 -0.429 
BRIT 7 7 1.391 -1.019 
BUCK 5 5 3.85 -0.283 
CAMB 5 3 3.629 -1.21 
CHEL 7 8 1.639 -1.303 
CHGL 4 8 4.599 0.238 
CHOR 2 5 3.475 -0.904 
CHSE 2 3 1.227 -1.533 
CHSM 4 5 6.055 -0.679 
CITI 6 4 3.863 -0.478 
CLYD 3 3 6.044 -1.127 
COD 5 3 3.054 -0.92 
COOP 3 6 4.672 -1.624 
COV 2 2 1.958 -1.002 
CUMB 5 3 3.617 0.244 
DARL 5 4 3.337 -0.535 
DERB 7 6 3.078 -0.131 
DUD 7 7 2.525 -0.218 
DUNF 3 4 2.149 -1.576 
EARS 5 2 4.37 -0.933 
ECO 4 3 2.228 -0.642 
FIRD 4 2 5.677 -1.991 
FTB 4 2 3.292 -1.513 
FURN 2 2 2.871 -0.49 
HANL 2 2 2.974 -0.453 
HAR 3 4 2.394 -0.996 
HARP 2 2 1.221 -0.825 
HLFX 5 5 3.408 1.334 
HOAR 7 5 4.63 -1.101 
HOLM 5 5 -0.231 0.885 
HSBC 4 2 2.906 -0.959 
IPS 3 4 3.046 -0.839 
JHB 4 3 2.261 -1.163 
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KENT 2 3 2.298 -1.529 
LAIK 6 2 5.871 -1.541 
LBRO 5 3 3.951 -0.83 
LEED 4 2 1.564 -0.535 
LEEK 3 4 4.13 -0.723 
LTSB 4 2 3.221 -0.513 
MANC 7 3 2.455 -2.407 
MANS 8 6 2.888 -0.919 
MARH 2 6 2.766 0.464 
MARS 6 7 2.023 -0.665 
MELM 5 4 -2.996 3.276 
MERC 7 8 2.996 -3.561 
MONM 8 4 2.688 -0.665 
NAP 6 7 1.132 -0.516 
NATS 6 7 9.32 -0.837 
NATW 6 5 5.255 -0.517 
NBNK 5 3 4.819 0.315 
NEWB 4 6 1.43 -0.594 
NEWC 3 2 2.971 -2.873 
NOTT 2 2 2.646 -0.053 
NRCK 8 4 4.078 1.224 
NWDE 5 6 2.017 -1.131 
PORT 3 4 2.018 -1.317 
PRIN 4 2 4.797 -1.143 
PROG 5 6 1.453 -0.504 
RBS 2 2 1.961 0.149 
SAFF 2 5 2.433 0.062 
SAIN 2 8 1.106 -1.483 
SAS 7 6 2.496 -0.531 
SCAR 2 2 1.943 0.463 
SCOT 5 5 3.244 -1.081 
SHEP 8 4 3.987 -1.414 
SKIP 3 2 2.403 -1.068 
SMLE 5 7 1.712 -1.703 
STRY 8 5 1.314 -0.6 
TAC 5 6 -0.605 1.893 
TSCO 6 4 1.474 -0.664 
ULSB 7 6 3.83 -1.064 
UNIV 6 6 4.015 -2.806 
VERN 4 5 3.839 -0.481 
WESL 2 2 0.647 -1.173 
WEST 6 5 1.104 -1.288 
WOOL 6 6 1.928 -2.175 
YBNK 6 5 8.542 -0.85 
YORK 3 2 1.83 -1.04 
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Appendix T – Symmetry tests for the NARDL (Chapter 7) 
Bank Fpss 
LR Wald 
(Base) 
SR Wald 
(Base) 
LR Wald 
(Price) 
SR Wald 
(Price) 
LR Wald 
(Output) 
SR Wald 
(Output) 
AAL 3.11 
2.006 
[0.162] 
1.145 
[0.289] 
18.65 
[0.000] 
1.837 
[0.181] 
8.774 
[0.005] 
6.213 
[0.016] 
ABBE 5.06 
5.255 
[0.026] 
0.04471 
[0.833] 
10.5 
[0.002] 
0.3688 
[0.546] 
14.72 
[0.000] 
1.025 
[0.316] 
BAB 5.57 
0.1221 
[0.728] 
0.6119 
[0.437] 
9.36 
[0.003] 
0.7706 
[0.384] 
1.497 
[0.226] 
22.35 
[0.000] 
BARC 2.64 
5.41 
[0.023] 
0.01776 
[0.894] 
0.1309 
[0.719] 
9.237 
[0.003] 
1.173 
[0.283] 
0.9194 
[0.341] 
BARN 3.84 
32.6 
[0.000] 
1.044 
[0.310] 
0.987 
[0.323] 
0.1064 
[0.745] 
0.07398 
[0.786] 
0.4645 
[0.497] 
BATH 6.63 
30.86 
[0.000] 
4.286 
[0.043] 
21.24 
[0.000] 
6.091 
[0.017] 
2.791 
[0.101] 
2.783 
[0.101] 
BOCY 2.49 
20.39 
[0.000] 
1.312 
[0.256] 
1.951 
[0.167] 
0.3142 
[0.577] 
0.01487 
[0.903] 
0.3459 
[0.558] 
BOIG 10.24 
29.91 
[0.000] 
0.03822 
[0.846] 
17.18 
[0.000] 
2.602 
[0.112] 
0.001774 
[0.967] 
7.782 
[0.007] 
BOIN 33.64 
83.26 
[0.000] 
0.2972 
[0.588] 
6.859 
[0.011] 
3.477 
[0.067] 
0.3407 
[0.562] 
1.118 
[0.294] 
BOS 2.61 
65.5 
[0.000] 
0.3194 
[0.574] 
15.18 
[0.000] 
2.899 
[0.094] 
0.0282 
[0.867] 
2.349 
[0.131] 
BRIT 5.59 
1.448 
[0.234] 
1.647 
[0.205] 
0.7321 
[0.396] 
1.667 
[0.202] 
0.3729 
[0.544] 
1.417 
[0.239] 
BUCK 4.83 
343.3 
[0.000] 
1.075 
[0.303] 
59.02 
[0.000] 
8.637 
[0.004] 
0.4479 
[0.505] 
4.504 
[0.037] 
CAMB 5.31 
71.4 
[0.000] 
0.6993 
[0.405] 
3.528 
[0.064] 
1.484 
[0.227] 
0.3101 
[0.579] 
0.007145 
[0.933] 
CHEL 1.89 
0.5355 
[0.468] 
1.751 
[0.192] 
24.54 
[0.000] 
0.04029 
[0.842] 
4.886 
[0.032] 
2.058 
[0.158] 
CHGL 7.07 
70.83 
[0.000] 
0.1024 
[0.750] 
19.48 
[0.000] 
10.49 
[0.002] 
0.3686 
[0.546] 
1.506 
[0.225] 
CHOR 7.04 
61.21 
[0.000] 
0.2558 
[0.614] 
23.53 
[0.000] 
3.49 
[0.066] 
0.2546 
[0.615] 
1.931 
[0.169] 
CHSE 19.87 
9.68 
[0.002] 
7.721 
[0.007] 
70.88 
[0.000] 
0.8781 
[0.351] 
0.429 
[0.514] 
0.1138 
[0.737 
CHSM 5.63 
88.08 
[0.000] 
3.163 
[0.079] 
36.06 
[0.000] 
18.58 
[0.000] 
2.309 
[0.133] 
0.4672 
[0.496] 
CITI 4.78 
40.94 
[0.000] 
0.1353 
[0.714] 
2.84 
[0.096] 
6.734 
[0.011] 
8.61 
[0.004] 
0.355 
[0.553] 
CLYD 2.46 
34.23 
[0.000] 
4.306 
[0.041] 
4.061 
[0.047] 
0.1836 
[0.669] 
3.217 
[0.076] 
0.568 
[0.453] 
COD 4.07 
50.34 
[0.000] 
0.003315 
[0.954] 
7.153 
[0.009] 
1.116 
[0.294] 
0.2359 
[0.628] 
0.3871 
[0.536] 
COOP 3.95 
14.49 
[0.000] 
3.911 
[0.052] 
0.522 
[0.472] 
3.702 
[0.059] 
0.9063 
[0.344] 
0.04692 
[0.829] 
COV 9.42 
24.49 
[0.000] 
5.15 
[0.025] 
8.577 
[0.004] 
0.9461 
[0.333] 
9.231 
[0.003] 
1.352 
[0.248] 
CUMB 2.71 
19.38 
[0.000] 
0.4927 
[0.485] 
7.384 
[0.008] 
0.7047 
[0.404] 
0.0004426 
[0.983] 
0.02595 
[0.872] 
DARL 4.6 
23.87 
[0.000] 
0.1028 
[0.749] 
6.88 
[0.010] 
1.339 
[0.251] 
1.636 
[0.205] 
2.991 
[0.088] 
DERB 2.22 27 [0.000] 
0.3501 
[0.556] 
19.55 
[0.000] 
2.028 
[0.159] 
0.128 
[0.722] 
1.561 
[0.216] 
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DUD 4.25 
10.73 
[0.002] 
0.7044 
[0.405] 
7.673 
[0.008] 
1.872 
[0.177] 
0.00716 
[0.933] 
3.46 
[0.068] 
DUNF 24.22 
51.51 
[0.000] 
5.193 
[0.025] 
3.114 
[0.081] 
0.04657 
[0.830] 
4.62 
[0.035] 
1.191 
[0.278] 
EARS 5.56 
54.72 
[0.000] 
0.7208 
[0.398] 
12.68 
[0.001] 
0.861 
[0.356] 
0.4905 
[0.485] 
2.786 
[0.099] 
ECO 9.12 
33.64 
[0.000] 
1.961 
[0.165] 
17.96 
[0.000] 
2.676 
[0.106] 
0.06004 
[0.807] 
0.02148 
[0.884] 
FIRD 4.23 
4.771 
[0.032] 
0.002569 
[0.960] 
0.07516 
[0.785] 
2.489 
[0.118] 
0.7678 
[0.782] 
1.062 
[0.306] 
FTB 6.83 
45.41 
[0.000] 
1.825 
[0.180] 
4.354 
[0.040] 
0.7968 
[0.374] 
0.176 
[0.676] 
0.9514 
[0.332] 
FURN 6.11 
79.02 
[0.000] 
0.1585 
[0.691] 
18.65 
[0.000] 
0.8956 
[0.346] 
0.1438 
[0.705] 
2.65 
[0.107] 
HANL 3.93 
67.03 
[0.000] 
2.117 
[0.150] 
14.89 
[0.000] 
2.296 
[0.134] 
3.965 
[0.051] 
4.538 
[0.037] 
HAR 8.7 
101.7 
[0.000] 
2.638 
[0.108] 
21.93 
[0.000] 
6.304 
[0.014] 
6.266 
[0.014] 
0.1361 
[0.713] 
HARP 3.69 
0.3314 
[0.566] 
0.2291 
[0.633] 
9.896 
[0.002] 
0.01203 
[0.913] 
4.105 
[0.046] 
0.002561 
[0.960] 
HLFX 9.11 
23.23 
[0.000] 
1.27 
[0.263] 
6.495 
[0.013] 
5.981 
[0.017] 
0.6137 
[0.436] 
0.2194 
[0.641] 
HOAR 7.95 
124.7 
[0.000] 
0.04411 
[0.834] 
26.43 
[0.000] 
19.38 
[0.000] 
10.06 
[0.002] 
0.002373 
[0.961] 
HOLM 2.79 
0.3069 
[0.581] 
0.6969 
[0.407] 
4.772 
[0.032] 
0.005958 
[0.939] 
1.533 
[0.220] 
1.167 
[0.284] 
HSBC 4.68 
26.81 
[0.000] 
5.151 
[0.026] 
2.576 
[0.112] 
4.933 
[0.029] 
10.91 
[0.001] 
0.02527 
[0.874] 
IPS 4.67 
56.76 
[0.000] 
0.565 
[0.454] 
5.91 
[0.017] 
4.743 
[0.032] 
1.973 
[0.164] 
1.383 
[0.243] 
JHB 6.4 
36.2 
[0.000] 
1.18 
[0.280] 
4.125 
[0.045] 
1.33 
[0.252] 
0.7292 
[0.395] 
0.5094 
[0.477] 
KENT 8.47 
9.265 
[0.003] 
10.62 
[0.002] 
13.32 
[0.000] 
0.9056 
[0.344] 
7.628 
[0.007] 
1.85 
[0.177] 
LAIK 2.45 
5.39 
[0.023] 
2.321 
[0.132] 
2.439 
[0.123] 
0.01448 
[0.905] 0.1 [0.753] 
1.461 
[0.231] 
LBRO 2.88 
24.05 
[0.000] 
13.9 
[0.000] 
5.055 
[0.027] 
1.576 
[0.213] 
1.314 
[0.255] 
4.711 
[0.033] 
LEED 6.2 
46.87 
[0.000] 
0.281 
[0.597] 
2.738 
[0.101] 
2.146 
[0.146] 
0.3395 
[0.562] 
5.018 
[0.027] 
LEEK 7.08 
119.4 
[0.000] 
4.121 
[0.046] 
24.51 
[0.000] 
24.86 
[0.000] 
3.072 
[0.083] 
1.481 
[0.227] 
LTSB 8.5 
103.9 
[0.000] 
3.543 
[0.063] 
29.6 
[0.000] 
0.1438 
[0.705] 
18.46 
[0.000] 
2.819 
[0.097] 
MANC 6.85 
0.006445 
[0.936] 
0.1176 
[0.733] 
7.338 
[0.008] 
1.044 
[0.310] 
7.273 
[0.009] 
1.46 
[0.230] 
MANS 4.6 
20.33 
[0.000] 
0.03068 
[0.862] 
5.987 
[0.017] 
6.82 
[0.011] 
10.21 
[0.002] 
6.303 
[0.015] 
MARH 7.25 
79.93 
[0.000] 
3.192 
[0.078] 
7.137 
[0.009] 
2.401 
[0.126] 
19.44 
[0.000] 
11.65 
[0.001] 
MARS 9.46 
41.73 
[0.000] 
0.3039 
[0.584] 
23.49 
[0.000] 
0.1899 
[0.665] 
3.127 
[0.082] 
15.13 
[0.000] 
MELM 1.61 
0.002678 
[0.959] 
0.2199 
[0.640] 
0.07713 
[0.782] 
0.1888 
[0.665] 
0.07251 
[0.788] 
0.5955 
[0.443] 
MERC 5.11 
0.2263 
[0.646] 
0.9534 
[0.354] 
0.2393 
[0.636] 
0.08959 
[0.771] 
0.07922 
[0.785] 
0.2134 
[0.655] 
MONM 6.49 
42.74 
[0.000] 
7.541 
[0.008] 
17.22 
[0.000] 
2.656 
[0.107] 
0.5294 
[0.469] 
4.232 
[0.043] 
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NAP 2.04 
1.919 
[0.171] 
0.4745 
[0.494] 
4.671 
[0.035] 
0.5422 
[0.464] 
5.471 
[0.023] 
2.558 
[0.115] 
NATS 3.16 
97.13 
[0.000] 
0.3648 
[0.548] 
11.16 
[0.001] 
0.3004 
[0.586] 
24.52 
[0.000] 
0.001446 
[0.970] 
NATW 5.86 
305 
[0.000] 
1.27 
[0.264] 
70.32 
[0.000] 
4.155 
[0.045] 
21.06 
[0.000] 
0.809 
[0.371] 
NBNK 4.32 
5.184 
[0.025] 
0.3889 
[0.535] 
5.048 
[0.027] 
0.493 
[0.485] 
1.675 
[0.199] 
0.9928 
[0.322] 
NEWB 2.35 
4.395 
[0.040] 
0.006332 
[0.937] 
0.2111 
[0.647] 
3.084 
[0.084] 
0.6301 
[0.430] 
2.588 
[0.112] 
NEWC 6.42 
0.02764 
[0.868] 
10.42 
[0.002] 
0.02254 
[0.881] 
3.21e-08 
[1.000] 
12.13 
[0.001] 
0.2312 
[0.632] 
NOTT 3.85 
43.67 
[0.000] 
0.5281 
[0.469] 
10.71 
[0.001] 
0.1252 
[0.724] 
0.2808 
[0.597] 
0.05929 
[0.808] 
NRCK 6.74 
56.58 
[0.000] 
2.583 
[0.112] 
8.454 
[0.005] 
0.4781 
[0.491] 
38.14 
[0.000] 
2.094 
[0.152] 
NWDE 2.86 
10.99 
[0.001] 
0.0449 
[0.833] 
2.273 
[0.136] 
1.665 
[0.201] 
0.06334 
[0.802] 
0.1759 
[0.676] 
PORT 2.96 
1.162 
[0.286] 
0.8273 
[0.367] 
8.844 
[0.004] 
1.286 
[0.262] 
3.539 
[0.065] 
0.002748 
[0.958] 
PRIN 3.19 
50.87 
[0.000] 
3.098 
[0.082] 
8.375 
[0.005] 
0.4462 
[0.506] 
1.605 
[0.208] 
2.567 
[0.113] 
PROG 2.85 
3.673 
[0.060] 
2.827 
[0.097] 
2.724 
[0.104] 
0.497 
[0.483] 
1.404 
[0.240] 
7.903 
[0.006] 
RBS 2.23 
2.171 
[0.144] 
0.6614 
[0.418] 
2.307 
[0.132] 
0.2895 
[0.592] 
0.5329 
[0.467] 
0.1318 
[0.717] 
SAFF 3.84 
17.51 
[0.000] 
0.9576 
[0.331] 
7.024 
[0.010] 
3.848 
[0.053] 
1.179 
[0.281] 
3.196 
[0.078] 
SAIN 2.95 
4.591 
[0.037] 
0.07536 
[0.785] 
12.99 
[0.001] 
3.382 
[0.072] 
0.2607 
[0.612] 
0.3544 
[0.554] 
SAS 3.21 
14.47 
[0.000] 
0.06974 
[0.793] 
10.05 
[0.002] 
3.391 
[0.070] 
0.03494 
[0.852] 
1.581 
[0.213] 
SCAR 2.55 
1.521 
[0.221] 
1.633 
[0.205] 
10.01 
[0.002] 
0.6566 
[0.420] 
1.336 
[0.251] 
0.8701 
[0.353] 
SCOT 4.25 
15.51 
[0.000] 
0.07986 
[0.778] 
1.471 
[0.229] 
2.075 
[0.154] 
0.02771 
[0.868] 
2.419 
[0.124] 
SHEP 3.28 
34.76 
[0.000] 
0.3091 
[0.580] 
4.1 
[0.047] 
0.04899 
[0.825] 
10.01 
[0.002] 
0.05981 
[0.807] 
SKIP 3.83 
20.79 
[0.000] 
0.08654 
[0.769] 
4.713 
[0.032] 
0.9588 
[0.330] 
5.688 
[0.019] 
1.178 
[0.280] 
SMLE 7.33 
0.005113 
[0.943] 
14.13 
[0.000] 
37.7 
[0.000] 
2.941 
[0.092] 
25.11 
[0.000] 
7.356 
[0.009] 
STRY 2.6 
7.351 
[0.009] 
1.036 
[0.312] 
0.3106 
[0.579] 
1.381 
[0.244] 
1.319 
[0.255] 
0.1765 
[0.676] 
TAC 5.06 
1.116 
[0.295] 
0.7597 
[0.784] 
5.769 
[0.019] 
17.66 
[0.000] 
1.776 
[0.187] 
3.547 
[0.064] 
TSCO 9.51 
63.98 
[0.000] 
3.815 
[0.054] 
11.56 
[0.001] 
10.35 
[0.002] 
1.564 
[0.215] 
2.172 
[0.145] 
ULSB 3.27 
22.87 
[0.000] 
0.7254 
[0.398] 
5.189 
[0.026] 
5.159 
[0.027] 
23.26 
[0.000] 
0.9515 
[0.333] 
UNIV 3.01 
0.1222 
[0.729] 
3.776 
[0.062] 
0.5734 
[0.455] 
1.166 
[0.289] 
0.1923 
[0.664] 
0.03991 
[0.843] 
VERN 2.62 
25.01 
[0.000] 
6.753 
[0.011] 
3.995 
[0.049] 
0.422 
[0.518] 
0.007449 
[0.931] 
0.467 
[0.497] 
WESL 11.95 
17.86 
[0.000] 
19.66 
[0.000] 
16.98 
[0.000] 
0.02764 
[0.869] 
0.2439 
[0.624] 
0.3053 
[0.583] 
WEST 4.42 
0.2959 
[0.588] 
0.9035 
[0.345] 
2.596 
[0.112] 
0.01273 
[0.910] 
0.026 
[0.872] 
0.3969 
[0.531] 
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WOOL 4.78 
0.01119 
[0.916] 
0.6472 
[0.426] 
0.7599 
[0.389] 
0.4359 
[0.513] 
6.274 
[0.017] 
14.67 
[0.000] 
YBNK 5.91 
76.85 
[0.000] 
5.742 
[0.019] 
48.67 
[0.000] 
11.54 
[0.001] 
28.18 
[0.000] 
2.228 
[0.140] 
YORK 4.75 
7.638 
[0.007] 
0.002997 
[0.956] 
0.2728 
[0.603] 
17.37 
[0.000] 
0.8153 
[0.369] 
0.3238 
[0.571] 
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Appendix U – Constrained NARDL results (Chapter 7) 
Bank p q LBase+ LBase- 
Nature of symmetry 
(Base) Fpss 
AAL 2 8 -2.581 2.581 LR and SR symmetry 2.98 
ABBE 8 8 2.87 -1.089 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 3.23 
BAB 6 6 2.294 -2.294 LR and SR symmetry 5.26 
BARC 3 6 2.083 -0.381 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 6.38 
BARN 3 4 2.52 -0.766 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 7.98 
BATH 3 8 1.276 -0.533 LR and SR asymmetry 7.59 
BOCY 4 5 4.305 -1.157 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 11.8 
BOIG 5 6 1.235 -3.599 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 10.24 
BOIN 8 6 4.234 -0.572 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 40.13 
BOS 6 7 2.596 -0.548 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 7.77 
BRIT 7 7 1.058 -1.058 LR and SR symmetry 9.75 
BUCK 5 5 3.622 -0.34 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 9.85 
CAMB 5 3 3.823 -1.401 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 10.52 
CHEL 7 8 1.269 -1.269 LR and SR symmetry 4.17 
CHGL 4 8 4.239 0.403 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 8.74 
CHOR 2 5 3.424 -0.916 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 11.57 
CHSE 2 3 1.136 -1.512 LR and SR asymmetry 16.29 
CHSM 4 5 5.997 -0.23 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 8.45 
CITI 6 4 4.075 -0.676 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.87 
CLYD 3 3 5.533 -0.433 LR and SR asymmetry 3.93 
COD 5 3 2.887 -0.877 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 9.94 
COOP 3 6 4.135 -1.565 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.26 
COV 2 2 1.971 -0.991 LR and SR asymmetry 11.61 
CUMB 5 3 3.696 0.092 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 8.94 
DARL 5 4 3.211 -0.821 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 9.89 
DERB 7 6 2.91 -0.285 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 3.73 
DUD 7 7 2.47 -0.445 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.09 
DUNF 3 4 2.095 -1.493 LR and SR asymmetry 25.08 
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EARS 5 2 4.512 -0.926 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 8.88 
ECO 4 3 2.086 -0.829 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 18.72 
FIRD 4 2 5.502 -1.774 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 6.66 
FTB 4 2 3.037 -1.35 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 14.04 
FURN 2 2 3.001 -0.571 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 9.33 
HANL 2 2 3.034 -0.584 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 17.8 
HAR 3 4 2.357 -1.034 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 10.76 
HARP 2 2 0.726 -0.726 LR and SR symmetry 6.86 
HLFX 5 5 3.443 0.785 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 11.58 
HOAR 7 5 4.438 -1.068 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 11.29 
HOLM 5 5 -0.39 0.39 LR and SR symmetry 6.67 
HSBC 4 2 3.251 -1.205 LR and SR asymmetry 4.75 
IPS 3 4 3.058 -0.699 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 7.8 
JHB 4 3 2.254 -1.068 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 12.6 
KENT 2 3 2.128 -1.386 LR and SR asymmetry 7.47 
LAIK 6 2 5.417 -2.916 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 6.81 
LBRO 5 3 4.089 -0.484 LR and SR asymmetry 3.36 
LEED 4 2 1.714 -0.63 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 11.06 
LEEK 3 4 4.119 -0.454 LR and SR asymmetry 8.2 
LTSB 4 2 3.226 -0.44 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 9.29 
MANC 7 3 2.088 -2.088 LR and SR symmetry 7.2 
MANS 8 6 3.061 -0.919 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.86 
MARH 2 6 2.554 0.461 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 10.29 
MARS 6 7 1.963 -0.861 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 16.77 
MELM 5 4 1.128 -1.128 LR and SR symmetry 1.24 
MERC 7 8 3.022 -3.022 LR and SR symmetry 1.06 
MONM 8 4 2.645 -0.865 LR and SR asymmetry 6.19 
NAP 6 7 0.659 -0.659 LR and SR symmetry 2.16 
NATS 6 7 5.928 0.095 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 1.5 
NATW 6 5 5.104 -0.532 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 7.28 
NBNK 5 3 5.926 2.071 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 7.07 
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NEWB 4 6 1.41 -0.644 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.25 
NEWC 3 2 2.775 -2.775 
LR symmetry, SR 
asymmetry 12.8 
NOTT 2 2 2.593 -0.027 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.58 
NRCK 8 4 3.342 0.801 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 6.74 
NWDE 5 6 2.236 -1.354 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 6.41 
PORT 3 4 1.686 -1.686 LR and SR symmetry 1.81 
PRIN 4 2 4.727 -0.763 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 10.01 
PROG 5 6 1.085 -1.085 LR and SR symmetry 3.42 
RBS 2 2 1.041 -1.041 LR and SR symmetry 3.18 
SAFF 2 5 2.583 -0.395 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 4.43 
SAIN 2 8 1.114 -1.345 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.74 
SAS 7 6 2.726 -0.606 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.61 
SCAR 2 2 -0.194 0.194 LR and SR symmetry 3.89 
SCOT 5 5 3.845 -1.206 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 10.75 
SHEP 8 4 4.019 -1.225 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.8 
SKIP 3 2 2.301 -0.925 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 7.77 
SMLE 5 7 1.529 -1.529 
LR symmetry, SR 
asymmetry 3.38 
STRY 8 5 1.36 -0.715 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 5.78 
TAC 5 6 -0.83 0.83 LR and SR symmetry 6.14 
TSCO 6 4 1.482 -0.604 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 15.29 
ULSB 7 6 4.06 -1.089 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 4.08 
UNIV 6 6 2.287 -2.287 LR and SR symmetry 3.72 
VERN 4 5 3.994 -0.7 LR and SR asymmetry 3.36 
WESL 2 2 0.588 -1.168 LR and SR asymmetry 26.23 
WEST 6 5 1.054 -1.054 LR and SR symmetry 8.16 
WOOL 6 6 1.774 -1.774 LR and SR symmetry 4.71 
YBNK 6 5 8.656 -0.764 LR and SR asymmetry 5.9 
YORK 3 2 1.801 -1.063 
LR asymmetry, SR 
symmetry 7.95 
 
 
  
